THE UNION OF BUKOVINA WITH ROMANIA IN 1918 AND THE IMPACT OF EXOGENOUS SHOCKS ON NATION-BUILDING

IONAȘ AURELIAN RUS*

Abstract. Bukovinian Romanian unionism had been a very marginal phenomenon until 1914. The exogenous shock of World War I and especially of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy had a significant impact on it. The shock greatly diminished the level of satisfaction of the Bukovinian ethnic Romanian population with the Austrian Empire. The war, the decay and the collapse of the empire brought to an end the integration of the Bukovinian Romanian population in the polity. It thereby precipitated a rather universal desire among the originally overwhelmingly non-unionist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants to unite with Romania. The same factors led to the discrediting, and often to the physical tearing down, of the symbols of the Austrian Empire. The literature in the field of International Relations has noted the impact of exogenous shocks, which I will also call sudden shocks in this article, on nation-building (nationalization of the masses, or increasing spread and intensity of nationalism). In this text, I will focus on what international relations scholars call “the second image reversed” (the impact of the international system on the domestic politics of the various countries). I am looking at the impact of this variable on Romanian nation-building in Bukovina, especially in respect to Bukovina’s union with Romania in 1918.

Keywords: Exogenous Shocks; Early Unionism; Bukovina; 1918; Romania.

Introduction

The literature in the field of International Relations has noted the impact of exogenous shocks, which I will also call sudden shocks in this article, on nation-building (nationalization of the masses, or increasing spread and intensity of nationalism). In this text, I will focus on what international relations scholars call “the second image reversed” (the impact of the international system on the domestic politics of various countries). I am looking at the impact of this variable on Romanian nation-building in Bukovina, especially in respect to Bukovina’s union with Romania in 1918.

* PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati Blue Ash College; Ionas.Rus@uc.edu.

While Romanian nationalism in Bukovina was generalized among the ethnic Romanian population, Bukovinian Romanian unionism had been a very marginal phenomenon until 1914. The exogenous shock of World War I and especially of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy had a significant effect. The shock diminished the level of satisfaction of the ethnic Romanian population of the province with the Austrian Empire. The war, the decay and the collapse of the empire brought to an end the integration of the Bukovinian Romanian population in the polity, the Austrian Empire. It precipitated among the originally non-unionist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants a desire, indeed a consensus, to unite with Romania. The same factors led to the discrediting, and often to the physical tearing down, of the symbols of the Austrian Empire by the fall of 1918.

As a whole, the Bukovinian Romanian population supported the Union of Bukovina with Romania on November 28, 1918. Large majorities of the German and Polish ethnic groups in the province also backed it. The elected representatives who endorsed this change in sovereignty had been voted by a majority of the Bukovinian adult male voters. The opposition of the overwhelming majority of the ethnic Ukrainians and the neutrality of the Jews should also be noted. These developments are consistent with the importance of the exogenous shock suggested by my model.

As we shall see later in the article, slightly more than half of the population of the province apparently endorsed the November 28 decision in favor of union with Romania. Its initial supporters included 36 out of 63 deputies in the Bukovinian diet elected in the previous elections of 1911, and 25 of the 46 such deputies who had been elected through universal suffrage. They also included 8 of the 14 Bukovinian (Austrian) parliamentary deputies elected in the same year. The political parties and factions that would support the union before Bukovina officially became a part of Romania in the latter part of 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference were quite popular. They obtained 59.45% of the votes in the Austrian parliamentary elections of 1911 during the first round of the elections, and 60.23% during the second round. They excluded the ethnic Ukrainians, who overwhelmingly preferred the inclusion of Bukovina, or of its northern part, where the members of the ethnic group represented the majority population, in the emerging short-lived western Ukrainian republic of 1918-1919.

Exogenous Shocks in a Broader Context

The impact of sudden/external/exogenous shocks operates in both directions. The shocks could facilitate the process of nation-building or could hinder it. Their sudden, massive impact should be contrasted with the slower, in the short run, hardly perceptible, impact of the other variables, which I will not discuss in here, namely the ethnic basis, education and industrialization.¹ The literature in the field of International Relations has not ignored the impact of exogenous

¹ For more details on these variables and on the Bukovinian Romanian case, see the dissertation Ionas Aurelian Rus, “Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Impact of the Ethnic Basis, the Educational System, Industrialization and Sudden Shocks,” Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick,
shocks. However, even though I will sometimes use the terms interchangeably, my concept of the sudden external shock is somewhat wider and more comprehensive. When I conceptualized this variable, I was concentrating on what international relations scholars call “The second image reversed” (the impact of the international system on the domestic politics of the various countries).2

The sudden external shocks could be triggered by the collapse of an empire, a lost war, a revolution caused by a lost war, the occupation of a territory by troops coming from outside its borders, possibly a coup d’etat etc. All of these types of sudden shocks are major, external and their impact is often measurable. The internal shocks could include the implementation of a repressive policy, a recession/depression etc. Their impact is more difficult to measure.

The post-primary educational system, particularly at its higher levels, favored, in a number of ways, the growth of Romanian unionist activism in Bukovina before 1916-1918. The unionist movement involved overwhelmingly individuals who had been a part of it, either as faculty or students, until the fall of 1918, and especially those who were a part of the system at that time. I will show later in this article that the sudden shock of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy caused a change in the self-determination options of the Bukovinian Romanians in favor of union with Romania. By contrast, this process was much slower among the Bukovinian Romanians in the U.S. In the latter country, the identification with Romania (as the country of their birth) had not been finalized in thousands of cases by 1920. However, it was finalized by 1921 among those who had settled in Canada.

Before judging the growth of unionism during the Great War, we need to evaluate the objective reasons why a person would be unionist or non-unionist, as well as the magnitude of nationalism in the few years before the war. The average Bukovinian Romanian before the war sensed that the level of performance among the politicians and bureaucrats in Romania was not particularly high. He or she typically believed that the officials in Bukovina, including those of Romanian ethnicity, performed better.


Most, but not all, the Bukovinian Romanians thought that they lived materially better than their counterparts in Romania did, and that the Austrian administration was more honest, but also less lenient, than the Romanian one. However, there was no perception that the schools, hospitals and other public services were of higher quality in Austrian Bukovina than in the Old Kingdom of Romania (pre-World War I Romania). The average Bukovinian Romanian preferred Austrian rule for objective, rational reasons, but was not necessarily attracted to Austrian myths, symbols and rituals. World War I would put the loyalty of most Bukovinian Romanians to Austria to the test. The trend was in favor of unionism even when the war was going well for the Central Powers.

A large majority of the conscripted Bukovinian Romanians served the Austrian Empire loyally during World War I. However, there is no evidence that the decision to go to war was popular with most Bukovinian Romanians. One can not find any explicit endorsement of the decision to go to war from the overwhelming majority of the politicians of the predominant party among the Romanians in the province, the Romanian National Party. This is also applicable to all of those elected to the Austrian parliament as the representatives of this party, by far the most popular force among the Bukovinian Romanians.

The explicit or implicit endorsement of the war in 1914-1916 by a small number of ethnic Romanians in Bukovina manifested itself in a specific way, through propaganda for the entry of Romania into the war on the side of the Central Powers for the sake of the union of Bessarabia, which had a Moldovan/Romanian plurality or majority, with Romania. Only the Democratic Party deputy to the lower house of the Austrian parliament, Aurel Onciul, one of the six ethnic Romanian deputies, and three other politicians took part in it. Only one of them was from the Romanian National Party, and none of these was a member of the Austrian parliament’s lower house. After the entry of Romania into war against Austria in 1916, all the members of the “Romanian Club” in the Austrian parliament made a declaration indicating their loyalty to Austria on August 29, 1916.3

Early Unionism among Those with a Post-Elementary Education (1914-1916): A Quantitative Look at the Defections to Romania (Part I)

A large majority of the openly unionist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants in the early part of World War I, when Romania was not yet a participant in the war (1914-1916), had the characteristics that one would expect. They were individuals with a post-elementary education. The inhabitants who were connected to the

educational system and/or had a particularly advanced education (the higher the level of education, the greater the likelihood) were the most likely to defect to neutral Romania during this period.

A number of factors decreased the number of loyal subjects of the Austrian emperor. These included the intensification of Romanian unionist propaganda by 1914, Romania’s entry into the war against the Habsburg monarchy in August 1916, and the temporary wartime occupation of southeastern Bukovina by Romanian troops soon after that. Another factor was the large number of wartime drastic, often unwarranted, measures taken by the Austrian authorities against allegedly, but in many cases, not truly disloyal, not truly pro-Entente/pro-Russia, ethnic Romanians. These included at least 42 summary executions in 1914, as well as incarcerations in concentration camps, which were either preventive, or for suspicion of high treason or espionage. These measures were taken from the beginning of the war until after the Central Powers had made peace with both (Soviet) Russia and with Romania in early 1918.

Even so, by 1914, the Bukovinian post-elementary schools were, particularly as one went up the educational ladder, a hotbed of intense Romanian nationalism, including active unionism. The latter phenomenon included concrete activities that were clearly in favor of the unionist goal, namely the preference for union with Romania, rather than merely a passive sympathy for unionism.

A large majority of the unionist nationalist activists, including all of those who got into trouble with the authorities because of their unionist activism from 1877 on, were professional, and particularly post-elementary, educators, and current college or high school students. Out of 200 refugees to Romania in the early part of World War I until March 1916, who should be classified as unionist activists, 144 (72%) were in this category. Moreover, 101 (50.5%) or 102 (51%) were involved with the post-elementary school system. Between 1877 and 1918, almost all of the other identifiable unionists had some post-elementary education.4

The Romanian unionist activists who fled to Romania during the first part of World War I, in 1914-1916, included 180 individuals who apparently had a post-elementary education (90%). Among them, there were 45 individuals with a finished higher/university education (22.5%), and 86 (43%) with some higher education, including current students. They included 2 university professors, 16 middle school and 2 vocational school teachers, 40 elementary school teachers and 3 dismissed teachers. Secondary school teachers were proportionally three times more likely to flee than the elementary school teachers. The refugees also included 81 students, 39 of whom studied in gymnasia, 39 at the college and university level, two in a technical college and one unknown.5

---

4 The data is from Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, pp. 136, 137, 167-169.
Among all the ethnic Romanian students who attended Austrian gymnasias for males, 2.97% fled. At the level of higher education, the figures were higher, with 15.38% among the university faculty, 10.63% among the university students, and 11.11% among the technical school students. The post-elementary educational system, and particularly the university in the provincial capital of Czernowitz, was therefore a hotbed of unionist activism. This was true both in terms of its influence over those who had gone through the system, and especially among those involved with them directly at that time, regardless of gender, social origin, etc.\(^6\)

The role of the post-elementary education system should be understood within the context of the original weakness of Romanian unionism in the province. Until the very last days of Austrian rule in Bukovina (October and early November 1918), unionism was not very widespread among the general population of Romanian ethnicity. For a large majority of the ethnic Romanians, support for Romanian nationalism was combined with loyalty to the emperor until the fall of 1918.

It would be inaccurate to argue that, until 1916, the massive participation of educators and students in unionist activism was part of a broader unionist trend affecting other social groups to any significant extent. Among the refugees to Romania, there were 18 self-employed intellectuals, professionals and unemployed persons of independent means. They represented only 0.31% of the 5,858 Bukovinian Romanians counted in these categories by the 1910 Austrian census. Many more, 82 out of 200 (41%), were civil service and professional employees. These people represented 2.22% of the 3,559 Romanians involved in these occupations resident in the duchy. However, only slightly more than 0.7% of the non-educational Austrian state employees, as opposed to 6.82% of all the pre-college professional educators, fled to Romania.

Most Romanians between the ages of 13 and 75 who were punished for genuine or perceived unionist deeds and attitudes through executions and interments at the concentration camp in Thalerhof in Styria seem to have been members of the intelligentsia (teachers and priests). This demonstrates the importance of the educational system.\(^7\) Not surprisingly, only a minority of the Bukovinian Romanians who were detained in concentration camps during the early part of World War I happened to be peasants. Yet a large majority of those who were detained preventively after Romania entered the war against Austria were peasants.\(^8\) Among some Austrian historians, there has been a certain tendency to argue that the outcry against the executions and interments within the Romanian ethnic population was due to the previously existing unionism of a small minority of critics among the Romanians. This view is not persuasive.\(^9\)

---

\(^7\) The Hungarian authorities interned a much larger proportion of the Transylvanian Romanians; this was logical given the widespread, eventually universal, pro-Romania unionism.
\(^8\) Prokopowitsch, *Rumanische*, pp. 148-149.
\(^9\) In 1906, 1,500-2,000 Bukovinian Romanian peasants (according to the Austrian historian Erich Prokopowitsch) or over 2,000 (according to the Romanian historian Dan Jumara), at any rate, more than 2% of the statistical category, traveled to Bucharest, the capital of Romania. They participated in the celebration
A large majority of the openly unionist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants in the early part of World War I, were individuals with a post-elementary education. The individuals who were part of the educational system and/or had a particularly advanced education were the most likely to defect to neutral Romania during this period.

Unionism among Other Groups and the Impact of Other Variables (1914-1916) – A Quantitative Look at the Defections to Romania (Part II)

The explanation of the rest of the defections to Romania is also consistent with my model. For example, all the peasants who defected were soldiers who had fought in the war and were thus affected by the sudden shock. The single artisan who had fled had a post-primary nationalistic education and was part of a “unionist cluster” of defectors from his village whose make-up would be predicted by my model.

In the censuses of 1900 and 1910, the peasants represented 83% and, respectively, 80% of the separately economically self-sustaining Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants. This census-based category excluded the auxiliary working, and dependent non-working, family members. Very few peasants behaved in a manner that could be interpreted as unionist before 1916. Most peasants who were executed or sent to concentration camps were innocent of unionist deeds against Austria. The refugees to Romania until 1916 included 5 peasants who owned land (2.5%) plus 5 peasant soldiers who were members of the Romanian Legion (2.5%). Three of the five peasant-soldiers who deserted and fled to Romania were not soldiers who had been drafted into the Austrian army. They were poorly-armed, poorly-trained cannon-fodder, opponents of the Russian invasions of Bukovina who had volunteered to fight in the Austrian patriotic “Romanian Legion,” and were presented in the Austrian official propaganda as Austrian patriots, though they merely wanted to protect their villages. Some of these people were executed by the Russian troops as “partisans.”

The fact that the Austro-Hungarian authorities did commit human rights abuses, including the executions of innocent people suspected of disloyalty and collaboration...
with the invading Russians, including ethnic Romanians, made many other ethnic Romanians turn against Austria because some of the victims were ethnic Romanians. So did the fact that some people were suspected because of the common religion of the Romanians, Russians and Ukrainians, Eastern Orthodoxy, and because some non-unionist nationalists were labeled as unionist and repressed. The overzealous colonel (gendarmerie general), Eduard Fischer, who also commanded the Romanian and Ukrainian Legions in Bukovina, was responsible for these crimes.

The Russian army and authorities also committed atrocities in Bukovina, including against ethnic Romanians. Yet the above-mentioned unionists did not defect to the Russians, but fled to Romania. At any rate, these first desertions are the early sign of how the sudden shock led to an increase in the incidence of unionism.

Industrialization slowed down the nationalization of those employed in industrial and related activities, at least in the sense that inhabitants employed in industry often did not support nationalism, and were universally non-unionist. According to the 1910 census, the 3,740 Bukovinian Romanians employed in industry (and no industrialist whatsoever), minus the artisans, represented 3.79% of the separately economically self-sustaining Romanians in the province, and 20.48% of those not employed in agriculture. The number of nationalist, including unionist, activists, and of documented passive unionists, among them was zero.

All of the 190 non-peasant unionist refugee activists, and, incidentally, the other identifiable separately economically self-sustaining nationalist activists and passive unionists, had other occupations. They were professionals and intellectuals, government officials and employees, students, artisans, commercial clerks, and persons of independent means who did not work. These population groups included 10,285 individuals, and represented 10.43% of the separately economically self-sustaining Romanian population, and 56.31% of its non-agricultural portion.

There was only one unionist artisan. He was a young cabinet-maker who fled to Romania. He had apparently been educated at the Campulung vocational school of woodworking, a recently founded stronghold of Romanian nationalism. One gets the sense that the factor that led to his defection was the impact of the educational system. The various considerations related to his occupation tended to have a different impact in other cases, which explains why he was unique. Yet the spread of unionism in his village was also probably a key factor. He and a peasant fled from the 77.9% ethnic Romanian village of Tereblecea (Tereblestie in German), together with two Gymnasium/middle school students. No other rural village in Bukovina supplied such a variety of refugees. Why this village?


The extent of the economic interactions across the Austrian-Romanian border was probably a very important factor, which probably led to intermarriages, etc. It explains why the ethnic Romanian inhabitants of the border villages in this area of Bukovina had participated in the Romanian peasant revolt of 1907.\textsuperscript{14}

Indeed, the other villages whose inhabitants crossed the border to Romania in 1907 and participated in the 1907 Romanian peasant revolt (Mitocul Dragomirnei – 2 defectors, Şcheia – 4 defectors) were in the same situation. They also had more defectors than expected.\textsuperscript{15} In other words, until Romania entered the war against Austria-Hungary in mid-August-1916, the spread of unionism was the one expected based on my model.

The explanation of the rest of the defections is also consistent with expectations. For example, all the peasants who defected were soldiers who had fought in the war and were affected by the sudden shock.

\textit{Mass Disillusionment with Austria, August 1916-October 1918}

Austria’s war against Romania bred a great deal of disillusionment with Austria that had not manifested itself before Romania declared war against the Habsburg monarchy. The war between Romania and the Habsburg monarchy brought to an end the actual satisfaction of the minority of the Bukovinian Romanian population that had previously been satisfied with the Austrian Empire rather than merely been loyal to it.

This is not the place for a thorough discussion of Bukovina’s union with Romania in 1918. We will look at the mass shift in the self-determination options of ethnic Romanians from pro-Austria to pro-Romania preferences after 1916.

The period of the war between Austria-Hungary and Romania led to some changes. After Romania entered World War I, a few hundred Bukovinian Romanians deserted from the Habsburg army or were captured by the Entente, particularly on the Russian front. They eventually joined the Romanian army. Most of them seem to have been peasants. Yet not all the peasant prisoners volunteered to join the Romanian army as soon as possible, though a majority did. Over time, an increasing majority of the prisoners were switching their loyalties to Romania.\textsuperscript{16} Those who switched sides fought against the Central Powers in Romania, the lands of the Russian Empire, and Italy in 1917 and 1918.

The war also had an impact on the “home front” in Bukovina. The renewed promises of the Romanian political class and of King Ferdinand to redistribute land to the Romanian peasants announced in 1917 were increasingly making it

\textsuperscript{14} See Marea răscoală a ţăranilor din 1907 (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1967), p. 618, relying on a newspaper account from the Viennese Neue Freie Presse, and the various numbers of The New York Times from March 1907, which, however, do contain a number of geographical and factual errors.

\textsuperscript{15} See the data in Prokopowitsch, Rumanische, pp. 168-169 and Marea răscoală, p. 618.

\textsuperscript{16} See Ion Calafeteanu and Viorica Moisuc, Unirea Basarabiei şi a Bucovinei cu România (Chişinău: Ed. Hyperion, 1995), passim.
rational for the Romanians in Bukovina to favor union with Romania. Moreover, the impact of the death of Emperor Franz Joseph (1830-1916, ruled 1848-1916) has to be factored in. His successor, Charles I (Karl I, 1916-1918), showed less gravitas, solemnity, ability and decisiveness. He was indeed called “the stupid August” by the Romanian National Party leader Iancu Flondor, an aristocrat who knew how to speak to the average people on their “wavelength.” It would be difficult to pinpoint when most ethnic Romanians in Bukovina had stopped being loyal to the empire, but this had already happened by late October 1918. The emperor’s plan for the federalization of the Austrian Empire from October 16, 1918 into ethnic units responded to the changes in the self-determination options of the various ethnic groups of the state. Yet it did not succeed in averting the collapse of the old monarchy.

The war against Romania bred a great deal of resentment against the Habsburg monarchy among the Bukovinian Romanians. The period 1916-1918 brought to an end the satisfaction of the minority of the Bukovinian Romanian population that had previously still been satisfied with Austria.

The Union with Romania: The Romanian National Council and the Role of Political Actors

We have already seen that the shock of World War I and in particular the war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Romania had a significant role in increasing the spreading of unionist attitudes among the Bukovinian Romanians, as well as their increasingly open expression. The “coma” and break-up of the empire caused the end of the feeling of connection of the Bukovinian Romanian population with the Austrian Empire. It thereby pushed the originally overwhelmingly non-separatist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants toward unionism, which became the dominant ideology and generalized preference. The quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanians supported this position by late October or early November 1918. The same factor led to the discrediting, and often to the literal/physical tearing down, of the symbols of the Austrian imperial polity in the first days of November 1918. By that time, Romanian unionism had become generalized. This factor facilitated the separation of the province from Austria. This move was universally acclaimed by the Romanians of Bukovina by early November 1918 and subsequently.

A growing number of Romanian unionists began expressing their views in public. Iancu Flondor led the Romanian National Council. It had 50 members. They were elected by the National Assembly of the Romanians of Bukovina, which included 300-400 members, on October 27, 1918. The National Assembly included, or was supported by, four of the six Romanian deputies in the Austrian lower house. They were those members who were not of aristocratic origin, including the Social Democratic parliamentary deputy Gheorghe Grigorovici, who represented an urban, predominantly German-speaking district in Czernowitz.

17 Calafeteanu, Unirea, p. 287.
Practically all the Romanian members of the Bukoviniandiet also backed the council.18 It also included some local officials selected by their peers, the Romanian mayors and other elected representatives of the primarily Romanian inhabited localities.19

On the same day of October 27, the National Assembly decided that all of Bukovina should unite with Romania. This move was fully endorsed by all those present or who had sent telegrams of support. These people represented practically everyone in the Romanian National Party, and the unionists who had not fled to Romania. It also represented most of the Democratic Party led by Aurel Onciul, as well as several unaffiliated figures, especially journalists. The Romanian National Party representatives, the unionists and the unaffiliated figures, desired the union of the entire province with the Kingdom of Romania, based on historical rights, as a former part of the principality of Moldova. However, some of the Democrats as well as the Social Democrat Grigorovici favored the democratic idea of giving the mostly Ukrainian districts in the north of the province to the Ukrainians.20

In the summer of 1918, on July 22, the division of the province along the ethnic line seems to have been favored by four or five of the six Romanian deputies in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies (two of the four deputies from the Romanian National Party, the Democrat Onciul and the Social Democrat Grigorovici). However, the intensely nationalist Bukovinian Romanian public opinion and press, which opposed the division of the province, had shown its disapproval toward this more democratic line supported by most of the deputies.21 Since the parliamentarians had been in Vienna during most of the war, and due to the war-related censorship, they seem to have been less than fully knowledgeable about the attitudes of their

---

18 Deputies Gheorghe Grigorovici (Social Democratic Party) and Gheorghe Sârbu (Romanian National Party) were present at all the meetings of the body. The deputies Constantin Isopescu-Grecul and Teofil Simionovici (both RNP) indicated their approval of the creation of the body and of its decisions, both before and after they were taken. Yet due to the fighting in Galicia between the Poles and the Ukrainians, their rail connection was interrupted, and they had to return to Vienna. See Radu Economu, *Unirea Bucovinei, 1918* (Bucharest: Editura FundatiaCulturala Române, 1994), p. 6, 8, 9. The aristocratic deputies Alexandru Hurnuzachi (Alexander von Hurnuzaki, RNP) and Aurel Onciul (Aurel von Onciul, DP) were in Czernowitz, but stayed away from the meetings of the body because the former still felt loyal to the emperor, while the latter desired a division of Bukovina between Romanians and Ukrainians on an ethnic basis within the Habsburg monarchy.


21 See the declaration of Constantin Isopescu-Grecul in the Vienna parliament, in the name of the Romanian parliamentary group, on July 22, 1918, in *Viata Noua of Suceava*, vol. 5, no. 12/18, which appears in Calafeteana, *Unirea*, pp. 254-256. On the opposition of the press and public opinion, see *Viata Noua*, October 27, 1918, cited in Calafeteana, *Unirea*, p. 256, Ion I. Nistor, *Problema ucraineanãîn lumina istoriei* (Râduã: Editura Septentrion, 1997), p. 183-184, and Economu, p. VI. Nistor’s allegation that a majority of the Bukovinian Romanians opposed Isopescu-Grecul’s line is persuasive. It is indirectly supported by the 46,136 signatures of the 1912 Romanian nationalist petition that talked about the indivisibility of Bukovina, and by the fact that the Romanian National Party deputies did heed this public opinion. See Ioan Scurtu, Ion Alexandrescu, Ion Bulei, Ion Mamina, *Enciclopedia de Istorie a României* (Bucharest: Editura Meronia, 2001), p. 208. Ukrainian, Romanian Democratic Party and neutral sources support the view that this was indeed the distribution of public opinion among ethnic Romanians. See, for example, Nowosiwsky, p. 120. Cezar Scalat (see Calafeteana, *Unirea*, pp. 300-302) is an example of a Democratic politician who desired an undivided Bukovina.
constituents on this issue. Probably in the attempt to placate the more moderate minority among the Romanians, Flondor agreed on November 2, 1918 to give to the Ukrainian authority control over “the indisputably Ukrainian part” of Bukovina provisionally, until the peace conference. The Ukrainian leadership whose make-up will be discussed below rejected this proposal.22

Before the subsequent entrance of the Romanian army into the province, the top leader of the Democratic Party, Aurel Onciul, tried to bring about a partition of the province along ethnic lines, locality-by-locality. He proposed that if a locality had a Romanian plurality, the Bukovinian Romanian government would run it, and if it had a Ukrainian plurality, the Bukovinian Ukrainian government would run it. If neither condition applied, then the communal council would choose one or the other, except for the provincial capital, Czernowitz, which would be administered jointly.23 In other words, what mattered to the predominantly Ukrainian supporters of this idea were not the results of the parliamentary elections of 1911. They emphasized the open census declarations of the individuals and the results of previous local elections, which had often been decided on local issues.

This solution was perceived by a majority of the members of the Romanian elite as disadvantageous to the Romanians in comparison to the results of the 1911 parliamentary elections. This was because a number of villages had more Ukrainian-speakers than Romanian-speakers in 1910, but voted mostly for Romanian candidates in 1911. A number of Democratic and Social Democratic representatives in the Romanian National Council seem to have preferred, or at least accepted, the union with Romania of only the districts whose inhabitants wished to join that country. However, Onciul desired that the Bukovinian Romanian territorial unit should remain within a Habsburg monarchy federalized along ethnic lines. Practically nobody except for Onciul supported this view. Moreover, while Aurel Onciul’s official document in Romania indicated that provincial capital would have a joint Romanian-Ukrainian administration, the Ukrainian version of the document assigned it to the Ukrainian part. This double-crossing of Onciul was made possible by the fact that there were several ethnic Ukrainian military units in the Habsburg army in Bukovina (e.g., the Ukrainian Legion), and no predominantly ethnic Romanian one. It was a miscalculation that ignored the possibility of the entry of the Romanian army into Bukovina.24 The public expression of such views would eventually end after Emperor Charles I (1916-1918) de facto gave up his throne. The Austrian Empire was formally dissolved on November 11.

Meanwhile, the Bukovinian Ukrainian national council included four of the five Ukrainian parliamentary deputies and the representatives of the Ukrainian

---

23 See Nowosiwsky, pp. 163-164, and Nistor, Problema, pp. 211-212.
24 In the judicial district of rural Czernowitz, the ethnic Romanians were 40.9%, 64.3% of the registered voters, and 63.3% of the adult male voters voted for Romanian candidates in the 1911 parliamentary elections. The figures for the northern part of the Sereth judicial district, currently in Ukraine, were 38.8%, 38.4% and 63.4%. The numbers for Storozynetz were 48.3%, 50.2% and 86.9%. For the data, see Popescu and Ungureanu, pp. 81, 90-91. Also see Calafeteanu, passim, on the disagreement of a majority of the Romanian Democratic Party politicians with Onciul’s actions. They, and Onciul’s voters, had previously endorsed Onciul because he was good at providing peacetime (material) patronage. Also see Nistor, Istoria, pp. 382-385.
parties. It was also made up of 14 of the 17 Ukrainian diet representatives, including the four parliamentary deputies and ten who were exclusively members of the Bukovinian diet. It also seems to have enjoyed the support of the other Ukrainians elected to the Austrian parliament and to the Bukovinian legislature. The Bukovinian Ukrainian national council called for a division of the province along ethnic lines as determined by the Austrian census linguistic, not electoral, data. It took over Czernowitz and the mostly Ukrainian areas of the duchy between November 2 and 6, 1918. By November 5, the “old” imperial authorities had no more power in the mostly Ukrainian areas. Yet the new Ukrainian authorities of the Austrian areas of Galicia and Bukovina declared their preference for federal status for this Ukrainian unit within Austria. 25

Increasing Romanian nationalist disloyalty to Austria was already visible on November 4. On that day, some Orthodox clerics refused to show their allegiance to the monarch, and there were nationalistic riots against Austrian rule. Starting on the next day, the Romanian preference to break away from Austria manifested itself through widespread riots, attacks on military depots, and the removal of the symbols of Austrian rule. There were also calls by the population of certain localities for the entry of the Romanian army into Bukovina, and other types of displays of unionist nationalism. 26 By November 5, the union with Romania of only the Romanian parts of the province was far less popular among the members of the ethnic group than the option of the Romanian annexation of the entire province. 27

These factors, and the demand of the Romanian National Council for Romania’s intervention, triggered the Romanian government’s official decision that the country’s army should enter Bukovina. It was made during the evening of November 5, and implemented starting early on November 6. All of Bukovina was under the control of the Romanian army by November 24. The advance of the Romanian army, which entered Czernowitz on November 11, caused the retreat of the Ukrainian leaders and of their soldiers, including the Ukrainian Legion, to Ukrainian Eastern Galicia almost without a fight.

The Romanian National Council established a government of the Country of Bukovina (“Tara Bucovinei”) on November 12. Seventy-four of its representatives were the members of the enlarged Romanian National Council that included some new members.

Onciul was excluded from the Romanian National Council. This was because he had unilaterally made a deal with the Ukrainian leadership for the partition of the province along ethnic lines on November 6. This agreement did not benefit from any Romanian support apart from a few activists of the Democratic Party, who soon jumped on the bandwagon of the union of the entire province with

27 Nowosiwsky, p. 120.
Romania. The explanation of the lack of support for Onciul among his previous supporters was partly based on the above-mentioned fiasco of the Romanian Legion, which had been promoted by Onciul in 1914, and on the fact that that he had pushed for the by now discredited Austrian patriotism. This had discredited Onciul in the eyes of the minority of the Romanian voters who had cast ballots for his party. This only confirms the importance of the war as an element of the sudden external shock. 28 By November 15, even Onciul supported the union of the entire province with Romania. The decision for union was strongly supported by the Romanian population, and there is no evidence of Romanian open dissent from this line in Bukovina, as we shall see in the next section.

The shock of World War I and, within this context, of the war between the Habsburg Monarchy and Romania had a significant role in facilitating the spread of unionist attitudes and their increasingly open expression. The “coma” and break-up of the empire led to the collapse of the support for continued allegiance to Austria among the Bukovinian Romanian population. It thereby pushed the overwhelmingly formerly non-unionist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants toward union with Romania. The overwhelming majority of the Bukovinian Romanians supported the latter option by late October 1918. By the first days of November, Romanian unionism became generalized. This factor facilitated the separation of the province from Austria. The Romanians of Bukovina universally acclaimed this move by early November 1918.

The General Congress of Bukovina and the Union of Bukovina with Romania

The union of Bukovina with Romania on November 28, 1918 was supported by the quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanian population (34.37% in 1910). The German and Polish ethnic communities in the province also backed it. The elected representatives who endorsed this change in sovereignty represented a majority of the Bukovinian population. They had been elected by a majority of the adult males in the province. However, the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainians (38.38% in 1910) was opposed to the union, and the Jews were neutral. These developments were not surprising. They are consistent with the importance of the sudden/exogenous shock suggested by my model.

The Romanian National Council was expanded through the inclusion of additional ethnic Romanians as well as the representatives of some of the non-Romanian ethnic groups. The congress also included seven elected representatives of the German National Congress. They represented the ethnically (not linguistically)

---

28 In 1907, Onciul was elected as the most socio-economic progressive Romanian member of the Austrian parliament. By 1911, he was merely second best. Yet he was re-elected with the help of patronage, which had been promised in his party’s program. By early November 1918, he was opposed to the union of Bukovina with Romania, which implied land reform (the redistribution of land to the peasants) in contrast to his much more modest programs of credit to the peasants through a bank of the country. The latter would lend money to the peasants to buy land. By that time, Onciul could, and did, not appear as in any way progressive. See the information in Nistor, Istoria, pp. 318-320 and passim.
German population (8.76%). The Poles (4.56% of the population), who had supported the Romanians in Czernowitz even before the arrival of the Romanian army, were represented through six elected Polish delegates.29 There were also thirteen peasants from the compactly Ruthenian/Ukrainian north of the province. These individuals were the elected mayors and representatives of 5 of the 180 predominantly Ruthenian communes.30

A large majority of the Jews of Bukovina was neutral. To be sure, in early 1919, the Jewish communities of southern Bukovina, most of whose population was ethnically Romanian, endorsed the union. The electoral list of the Jewish communities in the 1911 elections for the lower house of the Austrian parliament had represented the Jewish religious communities, or rather the very religious Jews. It had obtained the votes of only a minority of the Jews (749 votes) in 1911. The Jewish communities in the three cities who supported the union with Romania also included those who had voted for a moderate nationalist Jewish candidate (2,074 votes in the first round, 2,219 votes in the second round) of the cities of Radauti (Radauz), Siret (Sereth) and Suceava (Suczawa) in 1911.31

The overwhelming majority of the Ruthenians/Ukrainians, and apparently all of those with a Ukrainian identity, were originally opposed to the union with Romania. However, within the context of the American proposal to grant much of northwestern Bukovina to an autonomous Ukrainian entity within Poland, some developed a more nuanced perspective. A part of the local Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population showed its opposition to this idea, and its preference for being under Romanian, as opposed to Polish, rule, but this was “the lesser of two evils” in the extreme. This attitude was expressed through the sending of petitions to the Paris Peace Conference. Those who wrote these petitions mentioned economic, political, cultural and religious reasons for preferring Romania. They emphasized the fact that they were Orthodox, and that they would endanger their faith through union with a Roman or Greek Catholic country, such as Eastern Galicia within Poland. These letters were influential, in the sense that they helped in the awarding of the territory to Romania.32

To be sure, these Ukrainian inhabitants had originally preferred to be part of an independent Western Ukrainian state in November 1918. However, times had changed. Bukovina, or rather its northern, predominantly Ukrainian, part, was

29 Economu, pp. 130-131, 137-140.
30 Economu; Nowosiwsky, p. 80, and Nistor, Istoria, p. 394. The communes were Rarancea, Toporâtu, Cucușul Mic, Ivančață and Putila. The villages also had a Romanian minority, and at least nine of the thirteen representatives had recognizably Romanian names.
32 See Nistor, Problema, and one of the letters to the conference from the commune Caraciu pe Ceremus (in the Ukrainian language), in Nistor, Problema. Also see Economu, passim, and Mariana Hausleitner, Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina: die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Großrumäniens 1918-1944 (München: Oldenbourg, 2001), p. 113. Even Hausleitner, who is not particularly sympathetic toward Romania or Romanian nationalism, does take the letters at face value. The communes that sent the letters included Plosca, Sârgheieni, Putila, Dihteneț, Chiselițeni, Răstoace, Câmpulung pe Ceremus, Iabloniu, Ciomuhuzi, Milic, Banila, Vașcăuți, Caraciu etc. (Nistor, Problema, p. 213).
supposed to have autonomy within the Western Ukrainian quasi-federal state, which the Ukrainian population of northern Bukovina had hoped would unite with Eastern, ex-Tsarist, Eastern Orthodox, Ukraine. However, the situation had changed, and to some extent so did the self-determination options.33

Slightly more than half of the population of the province apparently endorsed the decision in favor of union with Romania of November 28, 1918. Its initial supporters included 36 out of 63 deputies in the Bukovinian diet elected in the previous elections of 1911, and 25 of the 46 deputies among them elected through universal suffrage. They also included 8 of the 14 Bukovinian parliamentary deputies elected in the same year. The political parties and factions that would support the union of 1918, before the province was officially given to Romania at the Paris Peace Conference in the latter part of 1919, were quite popular. They obtained 59.45% of the votes in the Austrian parliamentary elections of 1911 during the first round of the elections, and 60.23% during the second round. These votes did not include the Ukrainians who decided in 1919 to prefer Romania as “the lesser of two evils” in comparison to Poland, as well as those Jewish tickets whose representatives stayed neutral in November 1918.

At the Paris Peace conference after the war, the Romanian prime-minister, Ion I.C. Bratianu declared on February 1, 1919, “In the Bukovina there are about 200,000 inhabitants of various races who had rallied to the Roumanian rule… 500,000 inhabitants out of 800,000 were represented at the proclamation of the union of the Bukovina with Roumania.”34 Surprisingly enough, the pre-war electoral results discussed above were consistent with his statements.

On December 19, 1918, Bukovina was formally annexed to Romania. The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1919 recognized the Romanian possession of the territory of Bukovina.35

The quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanian population supported the Union of Bukovina with Romania on November 28, 1918. Large majorities of the German and Polish ethnic groups in the province also backed it. The elected representatives who endorsed this change in sovereignty represented a three-fifths majority of the Bukovinian population. The opposition of the overwhelming majority of the ethnic Ukrainians, and the neutrality of the Jews should be noted. These developments are consistent with the importance of the sudden/exogenous shock suggested by my model.

33 The expectations of some Ukrainian peasants that they would get more land through the Romanian land reform than through a potential Polish one might have also have played a factor. Indeed, they did, and numerous Ukrainian peasants benefited from the land reform. On the other hand, the electoral results for the 1920 elections for both houses of the Romanian parliament demonstrate that a majority of the ethnic Ukrainians of northern Bukovina desired to be the citizens of a Ukrainian state rather than of Romania. They voted mostly for Socialist candidates who supported this line. Ukrainian unionism was displayed by the electoral results in a minority of these areas, either directly, or through the non-voting or spoiling of most ballots in some parts of northern Bukovina in the 1919 elections. For a discussion of all of these issues, and of Ukrainian separatism during the subsequent period of Romanian rule, see Rus, Variables, pp. 167-168, 250-258.


**Measuring the External Shock: The Switch of Self-Determination Options Among the Bukovinian Romanians in North America**

The importance of the sudden/exogenous shock is also demonstrated by a comparison between the evolution of the preferences of the ethnic Romanians who stayed in Bukovina, who were affected by the sudden shock on the one hand, and the Bukovinian Romanians who had migrated elsewhere, who were not. These immigrants had overwhelmingly settled on the North American continent, and were not affected by the sudden shock. In the latter case, the adjustment to the idea of Romanian rule in Bukovina had not yet occurred in numerous cases by the end of 1918. It would ultimately take a longer period, often several years.

We have seen that the Bukovinian Romanian prisoners of war in Russia, and those inhabitants who resided in Bukovina had switched their self-determination preferences by late 1918. One can not say the same about all the ethnic Romanians outside of these areas until the Romanian agrarian reform/redistribution of land to the peasants of 1921. To be sure, the Canadian census of 1921 (and those of 1931 and 1941) does show that by that time the ethnic Romanians of Canada, most of whom were Bukovinians, started to indicate that they had come from Romania rather than Austria. Yet by the time of the American census of 1920, only perhaps one-half of the Romanian-speakers in the United States who originated from Bukovina indicated their country of origin as Romania. The other half still indicated Austria. 36

By contrast, at least 85% of the Transylvanian ethnic Romanians listed their country of origin as Romania, not Hungary, which had possessed the area until 1918, in the 1920 U.S. census. 37 By 1930, practically all of these ethnic Romanians who originated from the Habsburg Empire were indicating their country of origin as Romania.

---


37 The population of Romanian mother-tongue living in the United was born in the several countries, or had parents born in several countries, according to the 1920 U.S. census. The numbers by country were: Romania 71,805, Hungary 10,819, Austria, 7,241, Russia 484, Turkey in Europe 416, Greece 209, Turkey in Asia 97, Bulgaria 68, Serbia 65, and other countries 125, while 354 were of mixed parentage. The Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration indicate that between 1899 and 1928, 15,304 of the ethnic Romanians who came to the United States came from Romania, while 124,637 came from Austria-Hungary. It is obvious that a majority of those who claimed that they were born in Romania actually came from Austria-Hungary, but declared to the census-takers their country of origin as Romania rather than either Austria or Hungary. See Galitzi, pp. 31, 32. An analysis of the U.S. census results indicates that the total number of individuals who stated in the census that they were born in Austria was 1,174,973 in 1910, 575,627 in 1920, 370,914 in 1930, and 479,906 in 1940 in the continental United States. See U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1938* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 26, and U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1944* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 31. Also see U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 117-118. The increase in the proportion of native-born individuals of foreign or mixed parentage from Romania, from 26,934 in 1910 to 64,776 in 1920, and to 147,060, in 1930 is interesting. So is the decrease in the numbers of those of Austrian heritage (but not birth) from 538,518 to 316,318. These changes were caused mostly by the post-1918 re-identification of many inhabitants away from an Austrian identity toward an ethnic
As we have seen in a previous section, the sudden shock of World War I, and the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy caused a change in the self-determination options of the Bukovinian Romanians in favor of union with Romania. This process was much slower among the Bukovinian Romanians in the North America. In the U.S., the identification with Romania as the country of their birth had not been finalized in thousands of cases by 1920. However, it was finalized in Canada by 1921.

The importance of sudden/exogenous shocks is also suggested by a comparison between the ethnic Romanian population of Bukovina, which was affected by the sudden shock, and another group of inhabitants. These were the Bukovinian Romanians who had migrated to the North American continent. The latter were not affected by the sudden shock. Their adjustment to the idea of Romanian rule in Bukovina had not yet occurred in numerous cases by the end of 1918, but would take a longer period, often several years.

Conclusions

Bukovinian Romanian unionism had been a very marginal phenomenon until 1914. The exogenous shock of World War I and especially of the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy had a significant impact on it. The shock greatly diminished the level of satisfaction of the Bukovinian ethnic Romanian population with the Austrian Empire. The war, the decay and the collapse of the empire brought to an end the integration of the Bukovinian Romanian population in the polity. It

identity. The numbers are from Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 65, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, p. 116. It is obvious that almost the entire decrease in the population that claimed Austrian birth between 1910 and 1930 was caused by a reclassification by the inhabitants of the country that they listed as their country of origin to one of the successor states. The decrease was caused almost exclusively by the reclassification of their places of birth by the census respondents to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. The ethnic Poles tended to declare that they had been born in Poland even before 1920. It would also appear that even in 1910, a majority of the ethnic Romanians in the United States who declared that they were born in Romania (65,923 inhabitants of Romanian, Yiddish and other native tongues declared that they were born in Romania in 1910) were actually born in Austria-Hungary. The overwhelming majority of the ethnic Romanian immigrants to the U.S. were Transylvanian Greek Catholics. Therefore, it is likely that a majority of the Transylvanian Romanian ethnic population of the Orthodox faith declared its country of origin as Romania even in 1910, possibly with the aim of making an unionist statement. The welcoming of the Romanian army in Transylvania, whose Romanian population was about equally divided between Orthodox and Greek Catholic inhabitants, by a large majority of the Romanian population in 1916 was genuine. Yet one should also not forget the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Romanians in the areas occupied or liberated by the Romanian troops was Eastern Orthodox. We do not know about the religious backgrounds of the more than 20,000 Transylvanian Romanians of military age who had crossed the Carpathian Mountains to the Kingdom of Romania between the beginning of the war and early 1915, or of the around 5,000 who had volunteered to serve in a Transylvanian Legion which would liberate Transylvania during the same period. For more background on the Romanian American population, see Galitz and Vladimir Wertsman, The Romanians in America 1748-1974: A Chronology & Fact Book (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975). Also consult James Paul Allen and Eugen James Turner, We the People: An Atlas of America’s Ethnic Diversity (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 92-93 and passim. Also see Miron Constantinescu et al., Unification of the Romanian National State: The Union of Transylvania with Old Romania (Bucharest: Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971), pp. 94-96, 100-103.
thereby precipitated a rather universal desire among the originally overwhelmingly non-unionist Bukovinian Romanian inhabitants to unite with Romania. The same factors led to the discrediting, and often to the physical tearing down, of the symbols of the Austrian Empire.

The quasi-totality of the Bukovinian Romanian population supported the Union of Bukovina with Romania on November 28, 1918. Large majorities of the German and Polish ethnic groups in the province also backed it. The elected representatives who endorsed this change in sovereignty had been voted by a majority of the Bukovinian adult male voters. The opposition of the overwhelming majority of the ethnic Ukrainians, and the neutrality of the Jews, was also significant. These developments are consistent with the importance of the exogenous shock suggested by my model.

Slightly more than half of the population of Bukovina apparently endorsed the November 28, 1918, decision in favor of union with Romania. Its initial supporters included 36 out of 63 deputies in the Bukovinian diet elected in the previous elections of 1911, and 25 of the 46 such deputies who had been elected through universal suffrage at that time. They also included 8 of the 14 Bukovinian (Austrian) parliamentary deputies elected in 1911. The political parties and factions that would support the union before Bukovina was formally granted to Romania in the latter part of 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference were quite popular. They obtained about 60% of the votes in the Austrian parliamentary elections of 1911. They excluded the ethnic Ukrainians, who overwhelmingly desired the inclusion of Bukovina, or of its northern part, where the members of the ethnic group represented the majority population, in the emerging short-lived western Ukrainian state of 1918-1919.

SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Calafeteanu, Ion and Viorica Moisuc, Unirea Basarabiei si a Bucovinei cu România, Chișinău: Ed. Hyperion, 1995;
Constantinescu, Miron et al., Unification of the Romanian National State: The Union of Transylvania with Old Romania, Bucharest: Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971;
Economu, Radu, Unirea Bucovinei, 1918, Bucharest: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1994;
Marea răscoala a târanilor din 1907, Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1967; 
Popescu, Ion and Constantin Ungureanu, *Români din Ucraina – între trecut și viitor [vol. 1, Români din Regiunea Cernăuți (Studiu etnomdemografic si sociolingvistic)],* Oradea: Treira, 2006; 