

## PERSPECTIVES ON THE VERSION OF CHINESE POSTMODERNISM

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**Abstract.** The present article capitalizes on documentation dedicated to an academic-scientific project, the *Encyclopaedia of China*, operating [here] with the distinction between the phrases “postmodernism in China” and “Chinese postmodernism”, as an evaluative way capable of highlighting the gap inherent/existing between cultural-discursive fashion, internationalization, and the individualizing-Chinese reality. In this sense, we will use two applied perspectives – Jacques Derrida and Fredric Jameson – for highlighting, in the footsteps of Wang Ning (1997), a set of obvious features: postmodernism is characteristic not only for the Western model and flow of ideas; not only did it take different forms in the West, but it generated mutations and produced different versions in several non-Western countries, including China; postmodernism, in Chinese space, is recommended as a clearly outlined form and allows for a formula which is radically distinct from the meanings of the term conveyed in the Western context. Manifested in China, postmodernism represents – up to a point – a transitory, temporary phenomenon, possessing the mark of secondarity, but able to become an integral part of a new/different pluralist register.

**Keywords:** *Chinese Postmodernism; Postmodernism in China; (a) Version; Jacques Derrida; Fredric Jameson*

*“China has no philosophy, only philosophical thoughts/thinking”*

In September 2001, Jacques Derrida concluded his visit to China, focused mainly on open dialogue with Chinese intellectuals about the way in which a theory dedicated to *the specters of Marx* would still have *spectral*-transformative projections in the given situation of the globalizing context with both economic imprints, recognized in the internationalization of capitalist modes of production, and also with propagat(ing) cultural effects. On the one hand, the

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presence of Jacques Derrida was necessary for a direct contact with the multicultural perspectives that relate to the *law – language – society* triad able to offer “a participatory response to cultural difference and diversity”, by increasing awareness and assuming a distinct position – “China can be in globalization without being completely globalized” – by resorting to foundations of universal value to the detriment of immediate hegemonic implications and claims. On the other hand, although he advocates the opening of philosophy to non-Western cultures and traditions of thought, Derrida explicitly devotes only secondary references to these issues, without any obvious ideological commitment, confirming his status (like Heidegger, the *platform philosopher* relevant to Derrida's work) as a thinker (directly) disinterested in non-Western thought.

In this interpretive sense, a comment is required on Derrida's statement – *there is no Chinese philosophy* – which Steven Burik<sup>1</sup> places inside the deconstruction framework, allowing five essential directions of interpretation.

The first contains Ning Zhang's two grouped interviews (in 1999 and 2000) with Jacques Derrida, both detailing the latter's interest in the demands and needs of intercultural exchange (through *translation, translatability* and *untranslatability*), Derrida himself perceiving his person through/by reporting in and to philosophy, or thinking integrated into diverse cultures.

The second deduces the way in which Derrida's stylistics encounters, as a construct – by valuing identity, univocity and the theory of correspondence – the fundamental ideas of Mādhyamika Buddhism.

The third operates within an extended comparative framework (Derrida – Dōgen – Zhuangzi), where the philosophical game seen as a working formula transgresses the way of representing thought mechanisms, preserving the traditional rules of philosophy, reality and representation, but provoking search and (em)placement in a theoretical *locus* with specific coordinates.

Such an excursion brings Derrida closer to Asian thought and, in particular, to Nishitani's philosophy, as for both of them *place* is equivalent to limitations in relating to Being and Presence, through an extrapolated dimension and a thought experience detached from any single substantial truth. But more than that, Steven Burik<sup>2</sup> states that in Derrida's relationship with the *dao* one can note obvious overlaps of the register, in the sense that Derrida reuses *traces* of the *dao*, “as more than a metaphysical principle, as an immanent work of the modelled processes that make up both the natural world and the human one”.<sup>3</sup>

*China has no philosophy, only philosophical thoughts/thinking*, is the statement (perceived with scandalous-provocative inflections!) uttered by Derrida at the French Consulate in Shanghai, in 2001, in a context (widely debated and included in the Chinese media) that he resumes and extrapolates during his visit to China – “Philosophy is related to a particular kind of history, some languages and an ancient Greek invention. [...] It has a European form” – a position that

<sup>1</sup> Steven Burik, “Derrida and Asian Thought”, in *Comparative and Continental Philosophy*, 12:1, 2-4, 2020.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

the philosopher had configured in 1991, warning about necessary precautions to be taken when applying the concept [*philosophy*] to non-European intellectual traditions.<sup>4</sup> Compared to the Derridian perspective, Byung-Chul Han<sup>5</sup> – *Chinese philosophy exists!* – adds a particularly emphatic significance, establishing that “Chinese philosophy is deconstructivist from the beginning”, in the sense in which “thinking in the Far East begins with deconstruction”<sup>6</sup>.

It is imperative, in this sense, to make three other necessary clarifications.

The first clarification refers precisely to the non-deconstruction of Chinese thought that Derrida notes, with reduced textual-interpretative passages in the Derridian work linked in particular to evidence according to which classical Chinese language is composed of phonetic elements which did not exceed its ideogrammatic structure, resulting in the impossibility of development/transformation into a phonetic or alphabetic language, detectable in the West. This comment justifies the statement that the Chinese (cultural-civilizational) area lacks philosophy as a tool of privileged access to reality, as “testimony of a strong movement of civilization, this [*philosophy*, we note] is developing outside any logocentrism.”<sup>7</sup>

The second concerns the actual complication-by-translation of Derrida's statement in China, with a meaning diluted by “a later translation of the Chinese translation of the original French sentence”, the interview with the Chinese philosopher Wang Yuanhua reproducing only what he “managed to hear and to understand by translating into Chinese”. For Jin Suh Jirn<sup>8</sup>, the clarification of the conjunction *only* and/or *still* remains relevant, an alternative with obvious tension points: *only* is part of the version published in Wang's collected writings, a conjunction triggering the reactions of the Chinese intellectuals; *still* defines the context and reaffirms the purpose of Derrida's visit to China, as not dedicated to identifying and documenting *logos* and/or being attributed to philosophy, and thus not being suspected of any derogatory, pejorative and/or hierarchical judgment, with negative value: “China does not have a philosophy in the sense given by logocentrism (...). Today in China there is talk of both *Western philosophy* and Chinese philosophy. (...) Philosophy has been given a name in Chinese; it was attributed a neologism (...), but the word *logos* remained a proper name. As such, there are no Chinese *logoi*. The problem is not that there is no word in Chinese that translates the word *logos*. The fact that *logos* was not synoecized when most concepts in Western philosophy, even the most recent ones, already have an equivalent in Chinese means that the problem is not

<sup>4</sup> Gregory Jones-Kastz, “Where Is Deconstruction Today?: On Jacques Derrida's “Theory and Practice” and Byung-Chul Han's “Shanzhai: Deconstruction in Chinese”, in *Los Angeles Review of Books*, 8 May 2019, <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/where-is-deconstruction-today-on-jacques-derridas-theory-and-practice-and-byung-chul-hans-shanzhai-deconstruction-in-chinese/>, accessed at 1 July 2021.

<sup>5</sup> Byung-Chul Han, *Shanzhai – Deconstruction in Chinese*, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> Yijing Zhang, “Is logos a proper noun? Or, is Aristotelian Logic translatable into Chinese?”, in *Radical Philosophy*, 2.04 Spring, 2019.

<sup>8</sup> Jin Suh Jirn, “A Sort of European Hallucination: On Derrida's *Chinese Prejudice*”, in *Situations* 8.2, 2015, pp. 67-83.

related to a gap or delay. If Derrida had said about China that it lacked *logos*, the receivers probably wouldn't have been so shocked.”<sup>9</sup>

The third involves a necessary excursion into the very (ex)positions that Derrida adopts (in the same year, 2001) regarding the equivalence of his own *gestures* (*discursive positions*!) as *active interpretations*, issued and extrapolated on *the limit of philosophical discourse*. Self-location is relevant [here] in the sense that the *limit* represents, for Derrida, the boundary that makes philosophy possible, as a functional way within a “system of fundamental constraints, of conceptual oppositions outside which it becomes impracticable.” In the act of *deconstructing* philosophy, Derrida identifies the imperative of rethinking structured genealogy, including an appeal to that which remains philosophically *unnamed*, by determining a history that hides or forbids, part of the circulatory approach existing inside and outside philosophy. But it is necessary to mention the imperative specification that he individualiz(ingly) includes in the stated context – “inside and outside philosophy – that is, of the West”.<sup>10</sup>

The issue remains specific to the “current ideology scene”, a characteristic that Derrida marks by its germination point in/from the fields of ideology (philosophy, science, literature, etc.), whose effectiveness, far from being directly general, remains different even through the complex networks it delivers. On the one hand, a closed concept; on the other hand, already modified by the effect and the reflex it evokes, *ideology* implies a new way of reporting the determined text (significant and referential) to reality (history, class struggle, production relations, etc.), a *detente* that extracts the *ideological* from the matrix of old delimitations, including regional ones. In this regard, the statement that *China does not have a philosophy* can be soundly updated: “The seemingly *regional-only effects* (...) have, at the same time, a non-regional openness, destroy their own limits and tend to articulate, according to new models, without presumption of (in)mastery, with the general scene”<sup>11</sup>.

### *The Appearance of the Chinese Version of Postmodernism*

In order to support the emergence/affirmation of the Chinese version of postmodernism, one has to accept a double anchoring within an evaluative horizon. The first provides an intellectual platform, customized by the theorizing of postmodernism and consisting of lectures dedicated by Fredric Jameson to the phenomenon – part of a three-pronged approach – in 1985, lectures held at Beijing University and Shenzhen University – in May 1993, in Beijing and Shanghai and in 2012, in Peking University – accompanied by the contextual predilection reiterated by/through opinions expressed by Douwe Fokkema (1987 and 1993), Hans Bertens (1993) or Terry Eagleton and Jonathan Arac (1995).

Fully and systematically translated and disseminated in the Chinese cultural-publishing space, Fredric Jameson's work can be considered a theoretical

<sup>9</sup> Yijing Zhang, *quoted article*.

<sup>10</sup> Jacques Derrida, *(Ex)poziii*, Idea Design & Print, Cluj, 2001, p. 13.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 72.

modelling program/guide, not only of China's projects, aspirations and strategies, but also of the complex socio-political reality, inseparable from the self-probing act of contemporary critical consciousness. This major impact is felt against the background of the 1980s, thanks to coordinated initiatives and approaches targeting the accelerated transformation of the Chinese economy into a free market system, with reference to the very factual socio-economic condition of post-socialist China and its extended and intense assertion of its place in today's world. In this context, Fr. Jameson's approach consists in specifications referring to a theoretical segment, delivered by an author-theorist legitimizing himself as *Western, American* and *postmodern*, but also qualified by the *Marxist-dialectical-critical* triad. Xudong Zhang<sup>12</sup> demonstrates the attractiveness and influence of Fr. Jameson's work by institutionalizing his ideological landmarks in the space of 1990s China, integrating him into a dynamic and creative intellectual movement based on the preponderance of liberal political theory and political philosophy, both subsumed to a project of social ideology perceived as a way of self-projection and recovery of the classical sequences of bourgeois social, political and intellectual history.

The second evaluation criterion is required to fold onto the analysis proposed by Jason Lim<sup>13</sup>, who appreciates Chinese postmodernism as *an infiltration-with-propagated-effect*, a phenomenon whose expansion (*propagation*, we note) is imprinted by the reception of Jameson's concepts, imbuing it with the values of an intellectual forum of reference and influence, of generating medium for a continuing ideational school. But, Lim also acknowledges, there is no denying the existence of a "distinctly-Chinese form of postmodern cultural discourse" tributary (up to a point – through Zhang Yiwu and Zhang Xudong) to Jamesonian influence and augmented by remodelling interventions of Chinese postmodernism, discussing interpretations signed by Zhang Kuan, Qian Jun or Pan Shaomei, or comments placed by Zhang Yiwu and Wang Ning in the sphere of the interrelational approach of the syntagma "*new post-era*" – global postmodernity, an area ideologically detached, however, from the version of historicity and Western meta-narratives circulated, discursively, in the early 1990s. Zhao Yiheng punctually insists on "post-ism", which he particularizes, integrating it into Chinese discourse, as an opportunity to present the social and political reality of China and to support the conservative strategy of reversing revolutionary radicalism<sup>14</sup>.

Xudong Zhang<sup>15</sup> returns to the systemic-integrative coordinates (even if one cannot omit the comments that foresee in the named appeal a crude, harsh formula of direct import, of unchiselled ideational fusion) that Fredric Jameson gives to Chinese postmodernism through *explanation, interpretation* and

<sup>12</sup> Xudong Zhang, "Postmodernism and Post-Socialist Society: Cultural Politics in China after The 'New Era'", in *New Left Review*, 1/237, Sept/Oct. 1999.

<sup>13</sup> Jason Lim, "Postmodernism and its effects on China", in *China Source*, 20 September 2013, <https://www.chinasource.org/resource-library/articles/postmodernism-and-its-effects-on-china/>, accessed on 13 January 2021.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>15</sup> Xudong Zhang, "Modernity as Cultural Politics: Jameson and China", in Sean Homer, Douglas Kellner (eds.), *Fredric Jameson a Critical Reader*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2004, pp. 169-195.

*understanding*, a triad present in receptive props, whose theoretical and intellectual influence was not felt “anywhere, deeper and more general than in post-Mao China” (Y. Wei<sup>16</sup> states that Mao's own philosophical doctrine betrays a number of ideatic affinities with the Western-postmodernist movement, through the very split operated by traditional Marxism, and by drawing guidelines to highlight the characteristics of a political-economic-philosophical, Eurocentric-cultural and logocentric-epistemological meta-narrative, through positioning within a local, conceptual-pragmatic, contextualized paradigm).

The mentioned findings attest to the constitution of a post-Hegelian, post-realist and post-philosophical discourse within the frame of critical theory and cultural criticism in postmodernism, as a theoretical discourse. All these are dynamic opening strategies/techniques, materialized in/by launching and explaining intellectual structures, modelling and eliciting intellectual-cosmopolitan inspiration for generations of Chinese students, by “theoretical articulation of positions by overlapping utopia and Chinese ideology modelling particular discourses about Chinese modernity, postmodernism and the future of Chinese socialism integrated with the requirements of global capitalism, by referring to landmarks of cultural policy and self-awareness”<sup>17</sup>.

Listing the fundamental themes/chapters of the Jameson-ian project, Xudong Zhang highlights, on the one hand, *culture as policy*, superimposed on “singular modernity”, a favourable approach for determining a singular culture to resort to narratives that can claim – deeply and essentially – a relationship of compatibility with the forms and structures of capitalism (Confucian capitalism or the discourse of Chinese modernism); on the other hand, Xudong Zhang admits, through the correspondence between *culture and political hermeneutics*, the need to accept a relationship of interdependence and to agree upon Jameson's ideas, which manage to synchronize with a series of political, economic and social reforms active in a certain period, and to connect to global historical change outclassing Marxism by introducing the data of an ideational-rational design in the flow of development. Both converge on outlining a “crucial intellectual-political genealogy” which anticipates the plethora of contemporary Chinese intellectuals, faithful to the critique of the theory of sovereignty inscribed in various historical paradigms of bourgeois politics and political philosophy, from the Kantian moment of bourgeois enlightenment and universal reason to the Hegelian transition from autonomous civil society and the constitutional state, to the “history of the world” governed by international law.<sup>18</sup> However, Xudong Zhang notes, what emerges is a double action tactic: on the one hand, “politics is the final category through which and in which we must understand Jameson's cultural analysis and theoretical intervention”; on the other hand, “as China triumphantly enters the global, postmodern era, postmodernism loses its effect.”<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Y. Wei, “Postmodernist Elements in Mao's Thoughts”, in *Cambridge Journal of China Studies*, 11 (3), 2016.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 183.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 186.



Fr. Jameson's discourse, delivered in Shanghai in 2002, illustrates, contextually, three guiding premises: the first launches the invitation to a critical debate on the Habermas-ian<sup>20</sup> theory of *modernity as an incomplete project*, advocating postmodernity started under the signs of modernity; the second axiom confirms the primacy of modern politics in confrontations/contradictions triggered in the interdisciplinary structure of a relationship established between narrative-imagination-ideology; the third updates the issue of the "collective social being". These levels are germinating and maintaining an active debate, of general interest in China, on the possibility of implementing "constructive" social, political and cultural objectives and projects through appropriate strategies. The term [constructive], invested with an imperative semantic value, expresses the need to build and articulate a new ideal of national type, able to overcome the simple and reductive national interest (the very phrase launched by Carolyn Cartier, "one country, all kinds of systems" is considered a postmodern alternative to the modern state system<sup>21</sup>). All these opinions argue in favour of the reality that "it is in China that the political and cultural-political significance of Jameson's work is being played and tested today."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> In April 2001, Jürgen Habermas was invited to give a series of lectures in China (with a direct stake in a dialogue with Chinese intellectuals, starting with *The Critical Theory*, in order to give an updated, relaxed note to the structural transformation of the public sphere into the area of newly industrialized states). Insisting on the effects of globalization and communicative rationality and their international implications, the Weberian relationship/report between/through the goals themselves and the means of achieving them by economic and social actions launched an effervescent debate.

Fan Yang (*A Discourse on discourses: Habermas, Foucault and the Political/Legal Discourses in China*, Sociology. École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan, 2015) addressed the above-mentioned issue by a *Chinese question posed to Habermas*, questioning, in fact, the way in which Habermas-ian research methods are meant to be universal or, on the contrary, restricted to the background and form of Western modernity, accepting the way in which the philosopher transcends the Western context, overcoming particular nuances and showing (universalizing) openness to contemporary routine, although "Habermas cannot completely rid himself of the nuances of Western logocentrism, and is not universalist enough for all cultures." In itself, *The public sphere and its structural transformation* can be read through the evaluative approach of the way democracy can become adaptable even on an idiosyncratic soil, such as China (*Ibidem*: 11). The relationship between law and democracy (deliberative) is a constant topic, researched and discussed in the Chinese university-academic environment, Habermas being *the subject* of an intense translation plan and *the object* of a large number of doctoral theses and applied research, even if limited to interpretation of his philosophical ideas to the disadvantage of attempts to find comparative and integrative formulas in terms of Chinese practice and concept; the effect is one of theoretical borrowing, of study to the detriment of practical-applied implementation and rethinking. According to Fan Yang, Habermas remains relevant in China through the very horizon of openness he proposes, of normative-practical conjugation of the delivered theory (*Ibidem*).

In/from the pleiad of thinkers belonging to the Frankfurt School, "the most appreciated today in China is Jürgen Habermas", especially in terms of the sociological, economic and philosophical-political appeal and excursion he deepens, interpretations dedicated to him transforming *The Critical Theory* into a political and social instrument, dependent on the goal of building modernity or defending the legitimacy of the Chinese state and improving governance: "Habermas' modernity as an incomplete project and the proactive approach to modernization are the most attractive of all the theories of the Frankfurt School" (in comparison, with reference to the academic-scientific databases, a number of 1,673 scientific papers were dedicated to Habermas – in 2018 – compared to Adorno – 803, Marcuse – 780 and Benjamin – 758) – Guohua Zhu and Xiangchun Meng, "From the 'Other' to the 'Master Narrative': the Chinese Journey of the Frankfurt School", in *CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture* 20.3, 2018, pp. 2-3.

<sup>21</sup> Charles Horner, *Rising China and Its Postmodern Fate: Memories of Empire in a New Global Context*, University of Georgia Press, Georgia, 2009, p. 129.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 191.

### *Affirmation of the Version of Chinese Postmodernism*

In the article “Postmodernism and Post-Socialist Society: Cultural Politics in China after the ‘New Era’”, Xudong Zhang<sup>23</sup> made the distinction between the phrases “postmodernism in China” and “Chinese postmodernism”, as an operational modality capable of highlighting the gap between/from cultural-discursive fashion, widespread at international level, and individualizing-Chinese reality. Thus, the sequence “postmodernism in China” requires to be integrated into the global discourse of postmodernism and postmodernity, whose insertion into China is mediated and guided by intellectuals synchronized theoretically and discursively with the West, and whose representation is dependent on the influence felt since the 1980s, with inherent recalculations and readjustments of form (in the 1990s). Regarding the effect of the growth of consumer-oriented economy and related to the process of globalization, the qualitative leap is limited to the effervescence of small circles/nuclei dedicated to literature, criticism and the field of arts.

“Chinese postmodernism” refers to China’s decisions as a state producer and cultural deliverer, consisting in the delimitation of rigid epistemological paradigms, aesthetic canons, historical and geographical periodizations, hierarchies and institutional reifications. The detractors of the phenomenon consider that Chinese postmodernism borrows or reproduces Western simulacra, masking inside its assumed form and through loan formulas social, economic and political dysfunctions geared to modernity. Moreover, Chinese postmodernism is labelled either as subversive (undermining the value system of the socialist state), self-satisfying (legitimizing the traded/*massified* culture and ideological control of the state), or excessively Westernized; or “too Chinese,” reiterating the dilemma according to which, in China, the modern is either far from over, or has not even begun yet.<sup>24</sup>

According to Wang Ning’s opinion<sup>25</sup>, “if there is such a thing as Chinese postmodernism, it has been and continues to be controversial,” the specification is integrated into the mapping (existence or in-) of its global expansion, especially to societies in the third world and Asia, which lack the “conditions for postmodernity.” The premise from which Wang Ning’s comment starts is that “postmodernism is no longer a monolithic phenomenon, but rather a movement that generates different forms both in the West and in the East.” In the research undertaken, postmodernism remains a concept (to be avoided), precisely through those aspects that define it as a Western cultural product, characterized by a post-industrial symptomatology.

Thus, *postmodern* and *postmodernity* are considered inclusive terms, which can be mapped even onto the Chinese area. *The postmodern, in the Chinese*

<sup>23</sup> Xudong Zhang, “Postmodernism and Post-Socialist Society: Cultural Politics in China after The ‘New Era’”, in *New Left Review*, 1/237, Sept/Oct. 1999.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> Wang Ning, “The Mapping of Chinese Postmodernity”, in *Postmodernism and China*, vol. 24, no. 3, Autumn, Duke University Press, 1997, pp. 21-41.



*sense*, is defined as that term/concept agreed upon by the very fact that it “does not presuppose a certain cultural tradition (non-existent in China) nor is it subject to the assumption of solidified modernity as a precondition for postmodernity”.<sup>26</sup>

In this regard, Wang Ning establishes a series of *six versions of Chinese postmodernity*.

The first variant is considered to belong to avant-garde fiction and experimental poetry (created/ cultivated by a generation that includes Liu Suola, Xu Xing, Wang Shuo, Sun Ganlu, Yu Hua, Ge Fei, Ye Zhaoyan, Hong Feng, Ma Yuan, Mo Yan, Can Xue, Lü Xin, Daozi, Zhou Lunyou etc.); the second manifestation is the expression of the rise of the “new realistic school”, which launches an indictment of the parodic aesthetics of traditional realism and the transcendence of modernism, of a magnitude that transcends the literary field (with its representatives – Chi Li, Fang, Liu Zhenyun, Liu Heng, Su Tong, Ye Zhaoyan), starting a return both to the “immediacy of the experience” and to the affirmation and deepening of the collective feeling, specific to the community; the third version is considered a unique form/formula, a germinal component of the “Wang Shuo phenomenon”, integrated with the crisis of representation and “post-industrial culture”; the fourth concerns the new historicism, of playful-parodic origin; the fifth version allows for individualizing frameworks, through the very scope of participation in international debates on postmodernism, closely linked to the ideational integration of poststructuralism’s methods in current Chinese cultural life; postcolonialism is considered the sixth coordinate of postmodernity.

A detailed mapping will offer firm conclusions, gathered in a set of obvious characteristics and particularizing features: postmodernism is characteristic not only for the Western model and flow of ideas; not only did it take different forms in the West, but it generated mutations and produced different versions in several non-Western countries, including China; postmodernism, in the Chinese space, is recommended as a clearly outlined form and allows for a formula which is radically distinct from the meanings of the term conveyed in a Western context. Manifested in China, as Wang Ning states, postmodernism represents – up to a point – a transitory, temporary phenomenon, possessing the mark of secondarity, but able to be–come an integral part of a new/different pluralist register.

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<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 23.

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