Abstract. This paper aims to examine the principle of nationalities as a main concept in the Transylvanian Romanians’ political thought from the end of the nineteenth century until the Great Union of 1918. The assumption of this approach is that the radicalism of the policy towards the nationalities in Transleithania – completely opposite to the Hungarian demarche of “establishing a constitutional system in a monarchical parliamentary regime” and of “removing absolutism,” the reverse of modern democratic and liberal principles, and oriented not only towards the nationalities submission and integration, but also towards a “hierarchical ordering” of them – involved (1) the specificity of instituting the principle of nationalities as doctrinal basis of the militant demarche, petitioner-memorandist and political, in combating the Hungarian policy towards nationalities and in imposing the recognition of nationalities as political nations in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and (2) a specific incorporation of the principle of nationalities within federalist conceptions. As such, this paper contains a configuration of the “nationality policy” of Hungarian government after the instituting of the dual monarchy, the analysis of the principle of nationality being allocated to a self-contained article.

Keywords: nationality policy; the principle of nationalities; liberal nationalism; nation-state.

“The unfortunate nationality policy” in Transylvania

Oszkár Jászí, member in the cabinet of the First Hungarian Republic1 as Minister of Racial Minorities,2 considered retrospectively, in 1929, that Lajos
Kossuth’s point of view sustained at the beginning of the Revolution – “that there were many nationalities in Hungary, but only one nation, the Magyar, running as a red thread throughout the whole modern history of Hungary” –, expressed in fact one of the chief causes which finally destroyed the monarchy. “The ruling element of the Magyars was not willing to apply also in the national field those democratic and liberal principles upon which it tried to remould the state.” If we are considering that Kossuth is situated in Hungarian “national liberalism” – one “apart from other European liberal traditions” and, in Robert Talisse expression, one with “strands of political and philosophical thought often viewed as inherently illiberal” –, a “liberalism” preoccupied by the “Hungarian national interests and superiority of the Magyar nation within the context of the Habsburg Empire,” by the “hierarchical ordering of the region’s nationalities within a polity led by the Hungarians,” we understand why the prominent representatives of Magyar national liberalism – mainly István Széchenyi (1791–1860), József Eötvös (1813–1871), together with Lajos Kossuth (1802–1894) – differ only in respect of “two issues pertaining to imperialism”: “the role of Vienna, or how much freedom Hungary could attain from the Habsburg Empire” and “the manner of the eventual assimilation of national minorities into the Hungarian nation.” In

3 Promoter of the status of independence and freedom for Hungary, the freedom of speech and conscience, abolition of social classes, minorities’ freedom to use their mother-language in local administration, in tribunals, in schools, in community life and even within the national guard of non-Magyar councils etc., he did not support any applying of the nationality principle in Hungary regional administration. Governor of the new state, the Republic, during the revolution of 1848-1849, he presented this revolutionary movement as a war for the liberation of Hungary. He has come into conflict with the Transylvanian revolutionaries and triggered an absurd war against the Transylvanian Romanians in which he encouraged abominable crimes against his opponents, leading to the murder of over 60,000 Romanians, the destruction of about 200 villages, innumerable churches and monasteries, including the murder of Stefan Ludwig Roth – condemned by the “blood tribunal” of the Hungarian and Szekler nobles in Cluj for “high treason” (May 11, 1849) because he has opposed to the law of introducing Hungarian as an official language in Transylvania, advocated the “equality of languages and nationalities” thesis, claimed that the language of the country is the language of the Vlachs and wrote the famous booklet Der Sprachenkampf in Siebenbürgen (The War of Languages in Transylvania, 1842). Singularized in terms of assimilatory ambitions, Kossuth followed his expansionist and anti-minority policies and actions of 1848-1849 also in his exile. He initiated a Danube Federation plan for uniting Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, and Romania, but being fixed in his idea of a unitary Hungarian state and in idea of a Federation “still without territorial autonomy for the other nationalities within the Kingdom of Hungary,” he disagreed with the Romanian and Slavic discussion partners “on the nature of nationality politics in the future (democratic) Hungarian state.” See László Kárti, “Liberty, Equality, and Nationality: National Liberalism, Modernization, and Empire in Hungary in the Nineteenth Century,” in Matthew P. Fitzpatrick (ed.), Liberal Imperialism in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 102 sq.


5 Ibidem.

6 László Kárti, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

7 Ibidem, p. 93.
fact, the Hungarian liberals, together with the other “Hungarian national parties, fought before 1848, in 1848 and after 1860 for the Hungarian political freedom by removing absolutism, the establishment of a Hungarian constitutional system in a monarchical parliamentary regime, but also for the submission and integration of the non-Hungarians ...”.8 “And this because the Hungarian nation was under the throne but over the Romanians and Slavs from St. Stephen’s Crown’s Hungary, which means that it was situated, except for a short time, in the middle of the pyramid.”9

This “liberal nationalism,” “built on Magyar supremacy underlined by the fear of pan-Slavism and of pan-Germanic interests,” on the “illusions” that the Hungarian language can create “a homogenous national speech community”10 and that the liberal reform “creates a culturally coherent unity within a multinational state,” expressing “chauvinistic attitudes,” imagining the “Hungarian imperial space,” and having Magyarization on agenda, promoted only “laws pertaining to the nationalities’ which have contributed to solidify Hungarian patriotism and the Magyar state and to expand the nationalism.11 In this “fashionable nationalist tide,” to express a more tolerant and nuanced liberal position could lead either to public rejection, as was the case with “Szechenyi’s speech at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1842, in which he attacked «Magyar pseudopatriotism» and «anti-nationality sentiments»,”12 or to a lack of public impact, as was the case with Eötvös’s definition of homeland: “homeland is not that piece of land on which we were born... home is something more... it is a place in which we can feel free.”13 In their homeland, the Transylvanian Romanians did not feel and were not free.

The “union” of the Principality of Transylvania with Hungary, decided by the Diet of Hungarian Nobles of Cluj, on May 18, 1848 despite the opposition of the Romanians who constituted the majority population, was an act of annexation14 against which the Romanians fought through petitions and force of arms and,

8 Dumitru Suciu, Ioan Bolovan, “Transilvania în timpul regimului neoabsolutist” (Transylvania during the neoboolalist regime), in Anton Drâgoescu (editor), Istoria României. Transilvania (History of Romania. Transylvania), Vol. I, Cluj-Napoca, “George Baritiu” Publishing House, 1997, section 5 “Conflictele între conceptele cuceritorilor privind patria maghiară sau austriacă desorgint feodală generate de ‘dreptul’ sabiei ºi... programele popoarelor cucerite axate pe federalism ºi... democraţia reală şi europeană”, in translation, “The Conflicts between conquerors’ concepts concerning the Hungarian or Austrian homeland [concepts] of feudal origin generated by the ‘Right’ of the Sword and... the conquered peoples programs focused on federalism and real and European democracy”, p. 1069.
9 Ibidem.
10 “...language became a talismanic front for liberal nationalists in the struggle for the renewal of the Hungarian Empire.” László Kürti, op. cit., p. 94.
11 Ibidem, p. 93, p. 94, p. 100.
12 Ibidem, p. 96.
13 Ibidem, p. 97. Besides, the National Assembly ultimately ignored also Eötvös’s support for non-Hungarian languages primary education for national minorities, as well as his suggestions regarding elementary education, the restructuring of the local elections and councils, and the need for a sound nationality policy.
14 The slogan “Union or Death” was emblematic for the force with which the annexation of Transylvania was desired by Hungarians. It has been launched in order to force the submission of the Romanians and to discourage their opposition, as well as “the blood tribunals” and the armed expeditions in Romanian settlements.
though they were victorious and recognized as a nation of Transylvania, on March 4, 1849, by the constitution of Franz Josef, in practice, this recognition was implemented only in 1863, when the Transylvanian Diet met in Sibiu. This Diet, in which Romanians had the majority, succeeded, being helped by Saxons and boycotted by Hungarian deputies, to adopt the important Laws I and II, “the only democratic and positive legislation that recognized through parliamentary channels, political nationality and Romanian language,” in an equal relationship with the Hungarian and German languages, as a state language in the Grand Principality of Transylvania. In fact, the influential Hungarian politicians, holding strong positions in the Chancellery of Aulice and Gubernius of Transylvania, together with the heads of the Hungarian councils and chairs, blocked the expressly requested by the Romanians of convocation in 1861 by imperial power of the Diet in Alba Iulia, “chosen through more democratic procedures than in the past, and which had on its agenda the parliamentary incorporation of the nationality and the Romanian language into the Grand Principality of Transylvania. In fact, the Hungarian blockade and boycott had been effective until 1863, when it succeeded the convocation Diet in Sibiu.” Also, in fact, the imperial government answered with delay and only partially to the demands of the Transylvanian Romanians. They did not obtain from the Emperor, although they fought alongside the imperial army against the Hungarian army, the implementation of the principle of nationality, as Simion Bărnuțiu claimed the recognition of the Romanian nation in a political sense, namely, the national autonomy on its own territory. It can be stated therefore that “the positive social policy that favoured

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15 In 1863 it comprised 59 Romanian elected deputies and 100 non-Romanians, out of which 56 Hungarians and 44 Saxons. Cf. Dumitru Suciu, Ioan Bolovan, op. cit., section 7 “Ungurii și austrieci în marș rapid spre compromis și dualism”, that is, “The Hungarians and Austrians in fast march towards compromise and dualism”, p. 1095.
16 The Law II, adopted in 1864, practical blocked by Hungarian officials in counties and chairs, has been used yet in the Diet. See in this regard ibidem, p. 1095.
17 See ibidem, p. 1094.
18 In the manifesto entitled Provocăţie (Provocation), of March 25, 1848, in which he replied to the Hungarian unionist propaganda and reiterated the condition that the Romanian nation should be recognized as nation with political rights, and the condition of the dissolution (“deletion”) of the serfdom, before discussing the union with Hungary (in the “national congress, in which we first agree on the acquisition of these”). See in this respect Simion Bărnuțiu’s manifesto, http://www.buletindecarei.ro/2014/03/exclusivitatemaniestefului-lui-simion-barnutiu-provocatiune-24-25-martie-1848-sibiu.html.

Simion Bărnuțiu’s claims for national freedom and equality were the basis for the 16 points that constituted the National Petition adopted by the Great National Assembly on the Blaj Liberty Field (with 40,000 participants) on May 3-5, 1848, and his famous speech, entitled “Romanians and Hungarians,” delivered on May 14, 1848, in the Greek-Catholic Cathedral of Blaj. The National Petition called, regarding the Romanian nation, for “its national independence in political respect”, proportional representation in all the institutions of the country, the right to use Romanian in legislation and administration, the annual national assembly convened annually, the use of the term “Romanian” to name the Romanians instead of those of “ólah, walach and blach,” the freedom and independence of the Romanian Church – “without distinction between confessions,” the abolition of serfdom without compensation from the serf peasants, industrial and commercial liberty, the abolition of tithe, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, personal liberty, freedom of assembly, “courts with jurors (Jurye) with publicity, in which the processes are verbal,” the arming of the people or the national guard for the defense of the country and the Romanian militia with Romanian officers, the establishment of Romanian schools in all villages and towns, gymnasiums, military and technical institute, priestly seminars, the establishment of a university, the “deletion of privileges” in what concerns the
the peasantry and the productive categories” and even “the general economic and industrial development” could not counterbalance “the political evils of the neo-absolutism of 1849–1860.”¹⁹ The modernization and liberalization promoted by Hungarian politics were limited to the equalization of individual civil or citizenship rights and of social ones by allocating property to all peasants, former thralls, without distinction of nationality. As far as Romanians and Romanian national collective rights were concerned, the modernization and liberalization have not been applied, the Pestan Parliament not considering a law by which the Romanian nationality and language would be legally recognized, as the Emperor himself recommended.²⁰

The only attempt to reach an understanding with nationalities about “a redressed nationality bill” was a belated one, on July 1849, made under the pressure of military events and shortly before the surrender of the Hungarian army to Sibiu, near Arad, on August 13, 1849. The Hungarian government intended to offer concessions to the nationalities,²¹ the Hungarian Prime Minister Szemere stating on July 29, 1849, that one of the aims of the Hungarian revolution was exactly the free development of the nationalities. This was, in fact, precisely the reason for the discord and war between the Hungarians and the Romanians in 1848-1849. As proof, the note made by the government to be negotiated with Nicolae Bălcescu and to be agreed by Avram Iancu, “does not mention anything about nationality,” as Nicolae Bălcescu has remarked.²²

participation to “public tasks,” the elaboration of a new Constitution of Transylvania based on the principles of freedom, justice, equality and fraternity, the elaboration of new codes – civic, criminal, commercial – by the same principles, the rejection of the idea of “union” with Hungary “until the Romanian nation will be a nation constituted and organized with deliberative and decisive vote, represented in the Legislative Chamber.” See Proclamationă de la Blaj. Petiţia Naţională adoptată de Adunarea de la Blaj prin care sunt exprimate revendicările românilor transilvăneni (The Proclamation at Blaj. The National Petition adopted by the Assembly at Blaj, by which there are expressed the demands of Transylvanian Romanians).

¹⁹ Dumitru Suciu, Ioan Bolovan, op. cit., section 7, p. 1091.
²⁰ The Emperor has recommended to Pestan Parliament to vote for a law recognizing Romanian nationality and language “on a handwritten note,” after he sanctioned the decision of the Diet in Cluj (“constituted on the basis of the 3+4 system, i.e. without the deputies of the majoritarian Romanians) who voted for the union, “acting in the spirit of state centralism of Hungary promoted in Art. VII of the Diet in Pozógyi (Bratislava).” Ibidem, section 5, p. 1073.
²¹ By “The Project of Pacification” – signed on July 2, 1849 in Segheod by Kossuth with the Wallachian revolutionary and historian Nicolae Bălcescu and with the Wallachian revolutionary, journalist and poet Cezar Bolliac, but not accepted by the Commander of the Army of Transylvanian Romanians, Avram Iancu, because of its “tardiness, uselessness and lack of sincerity of Hungarian leaders” – the Hungarian government undertook to assure the Romanians the right to use their mother-language in the Romanian communities, to be elected in administrative offices, to have the freedom to act in industry and commerce, to have schools in Romanian language and a free Orthodox religious autonomous practice, namely “minimum national rights.” From another perspective it was considered that the Hungarian party “made further concessions beyond granting the rights… The Romanians renounced their demand for territorial autonomy and the Hungarian party agreed to multi-lingual communication and administration in multi-ethnic counties … and to recognize nationalities as communities, which opened the door to validating collective rights.” András Gergely, “The Hungarian Nationalities Act of 1849,” in Ignc Romsics and Belá K. Király (editors), Geopolitics in the Danube Region: Hungarian Reconciliations Efforts, 1848-1998, translated by Nóra Arató, CEU Press, Budapest, 1999, p. 52.
²² In a letter sent to Ion Ghica. See Dan Berindei, Politică externă și diplomatii la începuturile României moderne (Foreign policy and diplomats at the beginning of modern Romania), Mica Valahie Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 261.
The Compromise of 1867, through which Hungary became a partner in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and through which it was attempted a discouragement of any form of political secession, the nationalism aggravated the problems of a multi-national state and increased the pressures of Magyarization. It is particularly relevant in this regard Kossuth’s statement that the Compromise meant only “a creation of a «suicidal nation»,” that “the unwillingness on the part of the Hungarian government to deal with the nationality issues would lead to the eventual collapse of the Habsburg Empire.” Kossuth’s prediction has come true, but unfortunately after a period of time in which the nationalities of the Kingdom of Hungary have suffered a humiliating process of denationalization, indoctrination, and political marginalization. In fact, with the Compromise, the nationalism combined with the insistence on the superiority of Hungarian culture has materialized itself in a more amplified “unhappy policy of nationality” and “erroneous internal policy.”

For the Transylvanian Romanians, uncontested loyal to the institution of the “good” Austrian Emperor and “ardent supporters of the Habsburgs,” since the better exponents of the Habsburg dynasty often protected Romanians from the abuses of Magyar feudalism and the strength of the basic principles of the government of the Principality of Transylvania established through the Diploma Leopoldinum (October 16, 1690), the Ausgleich promulgated by Emperor Franz Joseph represented a catastrophe in terms of autonomous and separate political existence, a catastrophe unfortunately prepared since 1865 and even before and not only determined by Austria’s defeat in the 1866 war. If by Oktoberdiplom,
the Diploma of Emperor Franz Joseph I (October 20, 1860), which restored the situation prior to 1848, the autonomy of the Great Principality of Transylvania (and of Croatia) was admitted and if between 1863–1864 the Romanians got the highest number of seats in the Transylvania Diet in Sibiu, by the Compromise Transylvania has been incorporated in Hungary – although Austria has preserved the autonomy of its provinces – and has lost its autonomy which it had as against the central power headquartered at Vienna, since 1526. It is noteworthy that the Transylvanian Romanians functioned after 1867, nevertheless, “on the old Kaisertreue channel, thus showing that they did not consider the dualist regime to be legitimate.” But beyond the principle of not doing anything that could be interpreted as acceptance of the new Transylvanian regime (passivism), Transylvanian intellectuals and the population, disturbed by the official attitude of getting rid of Romanians whenever they are no longer needed, have gained the conviction that the Romanian nation must rely first of all on itself and pursue an independent policy in the Austrian direction (neoactivism). This conviction actually reflected the awareness of the fact that the Transylvanians played the role of instrumentum regni for The Vienna Court with Transylvania integration into the Habsburg Empire.

By including Transylvania in Hungary, the Romanians ceased to be the majority population, it “acquiring” the status of minority of the Kingdom of nationality.” The Emperor acted, in disagreement with his Rainer-Schmerling anti-dualist government, “on the new but at the same time so old way of reconciliation” in the sense of elaboration, by the instrumentality of conservative politician Count György Apponyi, of a political Memorandum to allow the propitiation and alliance between Austria and Hungary; encouraging Austrian liberals, concentrated around Styrian liberal leader Moritz von Keiserfeld (considered in fact as exhibiting a “conservative liberalism.” See I.C. Nyin, “Intellectual Foundations of Austrian Liberalism”, in Austrian Economics: Historical and Philosophical Background, edited by Wolfgang Grassl and Barry Smith, Routledge Revivals, London & Sydney, Crom Hekm, 1986, p. 82) to move closer to Hungary; sending capital and significant aid for economic regeneration and the fight against famine; appointing in 1865 Hungarian politicians in key positions over the head of Rainer-Schmerling government, who resigned; visiting the Pesta Legal Academy; appointing some Hungarian adherents of the constitution of 1848 as supreme commits; offering consistent aid to some cultural societies; sending von Auguss, the vice-governor of Hungary, at the head of dualistic liberals home in order “to perfect and start things.” Thereupon, “in the Easter article of 1865, published by Ferenc Deák in Pesti Naplo, the Compromise, based on the Pragmatic Sanction, laws and constitution of 1848, was already announced. The Coronation Diet in Pesta (1865-1868) has only solved some details, to reactivate them in the state life and to regulate the common affairs of Hungary and Austria.” See for all these specifications Dumitru Suciu, Ioan Bologan, op. cit., section 7, pp. 1092-1097.

30 Which opened the era (1860-1867) of a constitutional government (the “liberal regime”) in the Austrian Empire. 31 But, in turn, annexed Voivodina, Slovakia, Banat, Zaran, Solnecul de Mjloc, Chioarul, Crasna in Hungary, in which Crișana and Maramureș were also included.


33 See in this respect Sabina Fati, Transilvania – o provincie în căutarea unui centru. Centru și periferie in discursul politic al elitelor din Transilvania 1892-1918 (Transylvania – a province looking for a center: Center and periphery in the political discourse of the Transylvanian elites 1892-1918), Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, Cluj, 2007, p. 49.
Hungary, a “minority” on which the Hungarian authorities have radically applied a policy of forced Magyarization. This policy and the radicalization of the Hungarian nationalist discourse, specific for the Austro–Hungarian dualism and for a new institutional framework, was also the result of the affirmation of a new generation of intellectuals and politicians – István Tisza, Gyula Andrásy and Albert Apponyi – which transgressed the efforts of the forerunners – István Széchenyi, Ferenc Deák and József Eötvös – to achieve a possible *modus vivendi* with non–Magyar nationalities. The forced Magyarization started with the abrogation of the equal right of Romanian nation to other nationalities and religions and the abrogation of the officialdom of Romanian language (June 8, 1868). Furthermore, the Law of Nationalities (December 7, 1868) stated that all citizens of Hungary politically form a single nation, one and indivisible, the Hungarian nation, all others being considered “Hungarian political nations of citizens of different languages.” To the Hungarian nation it belonged, in full equality of rights, any citizen of the country, regardless of nationality. Hence, the Romanians had the same rights at the individual level as the rest of the Kingdom’s residents, but not also collective ones. The Hungarian, the official language of the state, “guaranteed the political unity of the nation” and only in municipal courts the residents could use their mother language, not also in the courts, administrative bodies, universities. It can be stated that this policy expressed a “repulsive attitude of the Magyar upper class against the aspiration of the nationalities” and that its main vector, “the rapid Magyarization,” was strongly “consonant with the idea of the Hungarian national state”: the Magyarization of the schools (elementary Orthodox and Greek–Catholic Romanian ones – 1879; secondary schools with teaching language other than Hungarian – 1883; non-Hungarian kindergartens – 1881), control of the Romanian church – 1899, ousting of the Romanian intelligentsia from the state life and local administration – 1894, when the Romanian National Party was dissolved, four Romanian newspapers were banned, several Romanian militants were convicted, the censorship and an abusive electoral system was introduced. 

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36 Marius Turda points out the reasons why the result of the Magyarization or “the assimilation of the Romanians was an unfinished experience”: the resistance of the Romanians as a different people as a religious and cultural structure, the lack of a substantial Romanian urban population susceptible to assimilation, as a result of the social-political exclusion to which the Romanians were subjected for centuries. Marius Turda, *loc. cit.*, p. 7.
38 The electoral law no. XXXIII of 1874, contained many disputable provisions: “granting the right to vote was done only on a census basis, and in the Transylvanian townships populated by the Hungarians the census was three to six times smaller than in the rural ones inhabited predominantly by the Romanians. The same census in the rural communes mentioned was eight or nine times higher than that applied in the communes of Hungary. The electoral districts were so drawn that they were disadvantageous to the Romanians, and there was even an amendment that provided for the obligation to vote in a locality other than the residence.” Sabina Fât, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Before 1848, the way the Romanians were represented was tragic. “In the Grand Principality of Transylvania (Ardeal) Diet there were 373 deputies, out of which 333 were Hungarian nobles, 35 Saxon patricians,
Through it, 5,665,000 Hungarians sent 400 MPs, while the remaining nationalities up to 13 million send only 7 deputies to the Parliament in Budapest. This policy and political design was contemporary, in the second part of the «century of nationalities», with a western Europe in which the affirmation of the principle of nationalities was considered to belong to the “character” of a civilized state\(^5\)
 and to the morality of its politics and with a western Europe willing to apply the principle of nationalities. Beside, even in the Austrian part of the kaiserlich und königlich Doppelmächte — Cisleithania — the national problem had been partly solved. But, in comparison with the western part of Europe and with Cisleithania, the “programme” applied in Transylvania has constituted itself as a “rigidly megalomaniac” policy of “rebuilding and reorganize a state as a unified Magyar nation-state” — although in fact he was multinational and multilingual —, this state rebuilding being a policy against the will of the nationalities and a policy through which many millions of people were to be denationalized.\(^40\)

For the period 1690 – 1847, the data indicate in historical Transylvania (Ardeal) as average proportion of the Romanians 52.7%, of the Hungarians (including Szeklers) 27.3%, of the Germans (Saxons, Clerks and the Imperial Army) 7%, of other ethnic groups (Armenians, Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, etc.) 3.3%.\(^41\) For the interval 1830s and 40s, it was stated that a total of 62.3 % of the population of Transylvania were Romanian, and only 23.3 % were native Hungarian speakers.\(^42\)

According to the census of 1850 – 1851, in the Great Principality of Transylvania the number of Romanians was in 1850 1,226,901 (59.5%), the Hungarians 354,942 and the Szeklers 180,902 (representing 26% of the total population), the Saxons

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\(^5\) Romanians. But the latter have held and exercised their mandates as official persons, bishops, noblemen or clerks, because they were still even to the middle of the nineteenth century ‘illegal’ as the Romanian nation could find its representation in this forum as a political nation. ... On the territory administered by the counties there were 916,015 Romanians who did not have representatives either in counties’ congregations or in the Diet, while the 368,540 Hungarians in the same space had defensive and political leaders in both forums. Even the 205,635 Romanians from Fundus Regius did not have representatives in the ascending assemblies or in Saxon University in Sibiu, while 167,147 Saxons owned by their patricians the local monopoly in the Imperial lands and 10% of the mandates of Deputy. Also, the 1,211,544 Romanians in Banat, Crișana, Maramureș, Partium did not have a national representation in the counties or in the Hungarian Diets. \(^39\) Dumitru Suciu, Ioan Bolovan, op. cit., section 5, p. 1068.


\(^40\) See Oszkár László, op. cit., pp. 305-306.

\(^41\) Sorina Paula Bolovan, Ioan Bolovan, “Politică și demografie în mișcarea de emancipare” (Politics and demography in the emancipation movement), in Călător prin istorie: omagiu profesorului Liviu Maior la împlinirea vârstei de 70 de ani (Traveler through history: paying homage to Professor Liviu Maior at the age of 70), Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj, 2010, p. 376.


175,658 and the Germans 16,558 (9.3%), the Gypsies 78,802 (3.8%), Jews 15,570 (0.8%), Armenians 7,600 (0.4%) and the remaining 0.2% were made up of Czech, Slovak, etc. 43 “At the time of 1869 census, it is estimated that the proportion of Hungarians and Romanians was 24.9% and 59% respectively”44 from the total number of 4,224,436 inhabitants. In 1869, of 13,219,350 inhabitants of Hungary, 6,207,508 were Hungarians, 2,321,906 Romanians, 1,816,087 Germans, 1,825,723 Slovaks, 286,834 Serbs, 448,040 Ruthenians, 208,529 Croats and 104,651 other nationalities, so that 6,207,508 Hungarians had to Magyarize 7,011,770 non-Hungarians 45. “The Hungarians were indeed the majority if we consider the Romanians, Serbians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Croatians, Slovenes separately and we relate them to the number of Hungarians.

Only the totality of the non-Hungarians exceeded the number of Hungarians. But from a political point of view, this totality was split into lonely individuals who were simple fillings or solderings at the Hungarian political nation.”46 The radical policy of the Hungarian governments, felt by the Transylvanian Romanians like waves of political persecution47 and exasperating chauvinism48, expressed the exacerbation of the antagonism between the two nations and the refusal of the Hungarian authorities to find equitable and modern solutions to national problems. From this perspective, it is rigorously correct the ascertainment that “the fate of Transylvania remained a point of friction as both Hungarians and Romanians stuck to their own perspective concerning its fate, ossifying what Dennis Hupchick has viewed as «one of the seismic epicentres along the human fault separating western and eastern European civilizations».”49

43 See in this regard Dumitru Suciu, Ioan Bolovan, op. cit., section “I. Dinamica demograficã a Transilvaniei în timpul regimului neoabsolutist și liberal” (Demographic dynamics of Transylvania during the neoabsolutist and liberal regime), p. 999. 44 Árpád Varga E., loc. cit., p. 10. 45 “... even according to the more optimistic calculations, in Hungary proper six million Magyars were faced by seven and a half million of non-Magyars. These masses of nationalities were already comparatively advanced in their national consciousness, in consequence of the Revolution and of the Bach system.” Oszkár Jászí, op. cit., 315. 46 Dumitru Suciu, Ioan Bolovan, op. cit., section 5, p. 1071. 47 For example, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a Romanian deputy in the Hungarian parliament and one of the most influential Transylvanian politicians, wrote in Österreiches Rundschau (as Jászí specifies, the magazine of the leading Viennese circles), in October 1913, about the Magyar chauvinistic policy and the policy of artificial Magyarization, “summoning Archduke Franz Ferdinand to carry on the pacification of the Mongolia of Europe.” Oszkár Jászí, op. cit., p. 400. Jászí showed that, beyond the series of protest meetings organized in several cities of Romania by Liga Culturală of Bucharest “against the oppression of their brothers in Hungary”, Conrad von Hötzendorf, chief of the Common Army k.u.k. (kaiserlich und königlich) and exponent of the Great Policy of the monarchy, declared in 1913 that “Romania must be regarded as lost to the Triple Alliance in consequence of the exasperation which the Magyar chauvinistic policy aroused among the Romanians.” In fact, Count Czernin, the Ambassador of Austria-Hungary to Bucharest between 1913 and 1916, repeatedly averted Austrian government that Romania will turn over towards Entente if the nationality policy of Hungary will not change, just like the Archduke Franz Ferdinand urged the Emperor Wilhelm to convince Count Tisza to keep his previous promises of pacification of the Romanians and to revise the Hungarian nationality policy. See Oszkár Jászí, op. cit., pp. 400-401. 48 Jászí reminds that Magyar upper class used deliberately the term Wallachian (Olăh) instead of that of Romanian, that this usage had “deprecatory sense in order to repudiate the Hungarian hypothesis of the Roman origin of the Romanian people. I scarcely exaggerate the situation when I say that this derogatory denouncement caused more hatred and suspicion among two nations than many administrative and cultural grievances”. Oszkár Jászí, op. cit., p. 300. 49 László Kürti, op. cit., p. 109.
And it is also rigorously correct that the policy of Hungarian governments opened a period of developing and implementing political solutions or projects through which the Romanian communities could be emancipated and by which the expanding Hungarian nationalism could be partially annihilated. Nevertheless, the solving of the nationalities conflict, because “went to the heart of the fundamental issue of the demarcation of national frontiers”\textsuperscript{50} did not materialize. The principle of nationalities was not accepted by the most of the Hungarian leaders, neither in the dual monarchy nor in their state federalization projects, because of its “clear territorial demands” which were flagrantly contravening to their desire “to maintain the larger scope of Hungary’s borders.”\textsuperscript{51} But, as many Romanian and foreign historians have pointed out, the failure to solve the problem of recognizing the equal right of nationalities and the rejection of ethnic federalization projects – “reasonable federalism”\textsuperscript{52} of the “projects that seemed more modern and more appropriate to realities”\textsuperscript{53} – has led to the strengthening the political forces and tendencies that concerned the disappearance and dismemberment of Austria-Hungary on the basis of the principle of nationality and national self-determination.

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\textsuperscript{51} See \textit{ibidem}, p. 102-103.

\textsuperscript{52} Oszkár Jász, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 398.


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