

“INEVITABLY SUBJECTIVE REMARKS” ON MACHIAVELLI¹

The primary assumption of this insert follows the assessment track issued by Leonidas Donskis in *Power and Imagination – Political Studies and Literature* (Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, Târgoviște): the recurrence of “political and moral lessons” in classical literature represents a tool which enables the study of “moral imagination” and the quantification of “the value-truth disparity”. Besides Machiavelli, there are more crucial papers and authors among him, like Shakespeare, Voltaire, D. Defoe and Orwell, whose rampant influence and perspective is still pivotal today. In *Foreword for the Romanian reader*, Leonidas Donskis assumes the returning of a political and historical narrative would be imperatively appropriate, because it would correspond to a viable policy. In this framework, Machiavelli is known not only by his literary calling, but also by his “storyteller gift”, both of them crafting him as a valuable political theoretician.

Following the method of *qualitative quantification* of the post-revolutionary approach in the Romanian area, we may address some types of narratives. It is crucial to indicate those narratives are well-adjusted, symmetrically stated.

The first point is *the narrative of re-reading Machiavelli*, adjusted to the current living (“What would Machiavelli think about us?”)². It is pertinent to say that Machiavelli has been portrayed in a detrimental manner, exacerbating his ruthlessness as a key point feature, which resulted in creating an *alter-ego*, severely divided from the original essence. In modern times, it seems that the essence of Machiavelli’s work has been obstructed, on account of well-known sayings like “Machiavelli – the Master of Evil”. This way of thinking about him is conspicuously shallow, because he was an erudite and a fine connoisseur of human nature, having the ability to elaborate comprehensive and genuine enquiries about the political area, unscathed by false adjustments or hopeless ideals. One of the most significant aspects of Machiavelli’s cultural heritage would be that his work can be ubiquitously and timelessly applied in many different areas, and still remaining an invaluable compendium of human nature understanding, equally used in politics. Consequently, Machiavelli should be analysed in terms of his objective and complex capacity of assessment, and not only by his apparently demonic feature, which is nothing but utilitarian practicality.

The second type of narrative is linked to *the lecture and the properly implementation of Machiavelli’s ideas*, adjusted to modern day politics. If a reader makes a foray into Machiavelli’s universe, he will realize the demonization is nothing but a flawed comprehension of his core concepts. From the *Machiavellian* perspective, it is important to use deception and dissimulation in the political act, but those attributes are far from being a justification for achieving minor individual aims. Conversely, Machiavelli thinks that politics resembles art, considering the fact that he believes the ultimate purpose of politics is the achievement of an aggregated well-being. According to the Florentine secretary, a balanced and stable principality is owed to a steady consciousness combined with personal virtues, which improve the decision-making process and the strategies planned for state preservation. Nevertheless, the virtues of the leader should be approved by public consent, and nowadays this matter is ratified by vote³.

A similar perspective of modern days tendency to vilify Machiavelli is also shared by the scientist Nuccio Ordine, who believes that nowadays leaders don’t genuinely comprehend Machiavelli’s masterpieces, emphasizing the negative aspect. For instance, Benito Mussolini and

¹ The expression is given by one of the most prominent Researcher of Machiavelli in Romanian, Ion Goian, as part of an Interview, integrated in the thesis *Timeless Concepts of Machiavelli in Politics* (Faculty of Letters, University of Bucharest, European Studies, Bucharest, 2019).

² Octavian Țăcu, “Despre Machiavelli și politica noastră”, accessed on 27 August 2020, available at <<https://www.timpul.md/articol/despre-machiavelli-i-politica-noastra-89563.html>>.

³ Vladimir Adrian Costea, “Machiavelli în fața crizei”, accessed on 28 August 2020, available at <<https://europunkt.ro/2015/08/03/machiavelli-in-fata-crizei/>>.

Silvio Berlusconi believed that Machiavelli's work only reveals deceitful and manipulative techniques, but that particular point of view is far from the truth, because deceit may be used on its own behalf, not for the common good. In addition to this, Nuccio Ordine claims that Machiavelli's suggestions should be analysed regarding their end purpose, which may justify some actions, considered to be unethical⁴.

The third narrative aims to insert Machiavelli in a superficial and ironic context. In order to illustrate this, it is appropriate to mention the terms *Machiavellianism* – *machiavrlâc*. The latter is related to Trahanache's assertion from "O scrisoare pierdută": "Ești tare, stimabil, la machiavrlâcuri"; "apoi, dacă el umblă cu machiavrlâcuri, să-i dau eu machiavrlâcuri". From an etymological standpoint, the term *machiavrlâc* has been obtained by joining the primary notion, *Machiavellianism*, suffixed with "lâc", originated from Turkish language. Even if in dictionaries the term *machiavrlâc* is presented as a counterpart for *Machiavellianism*, in practice the word lacks any primordial significance given by Machiavelli. In fact, the term *machiavrlâc* has fateful undertones, lacking morality. It is also likely that *machiavrlâc* has been obtained from the word "*matrapazlâc*", which means humbug, scam or fraud⁵. This particular aspect supports the demonization of Machiavelli, due to a flawed and subjective comprehension of his work⁶.

Nevertheless, *Machiavellianism* is still associated and diminished to a psychological and political symptom: it is attributed to leaders and presidents⁷, or it is used for plain generalizations, just like it has been done in a psychology article, in an erroneous and superficial manner ("Nowadays in Romania, over 80% of population is educated in a Machiavellian spirit")⁸. This article implies to stigmatize *Machiavellianism* and to associate it with psychopathy. According to the author, *Machiavellianism* is a tendency attained during the life, but it may also be hereditary⁹. As far as he's concerned, *Machiavellianism* has been taken over in the current days due to the hostile and precarious environment, in order to prevail. To a certain degree, this assumption seems to be correct, because Machiavelli thought that a man's power can be tested only in unpleasant contexts, but the present article lacks some other key-point aspects. The claim that "Nowadays in Romania, over 80% of population is educated in a Machiavellian spirit" exacerbates the negative tendency of *Machiavellianism*, despite the fact that Machiavelli didn't endorse devious behaviours or violent psychopathic attitudes, and he pointed that those particular behaviours must be used only in exceptional contexts. The present article also insists on observing own peers in order for them to be cured from the *pseudo-Machiavellian* symptoms. The overlooked fact in this assumption is that Machiavelli devoted his knowledge to leaders, not to ordinary people, because he believed that only some particular princes have the capacity to rule in a *Machiavellian* way, due to the fact that not everyone proves to have *virtu*¹⁰.

The forth narrative explains the Romanian political reality according to Machiavelli. From this aspect, it is significant to discuss a tale about a dream Machiavelli had had before he died, in which he had met Plato, Plutarch and Tacitus on their way to the underworld. Some of the people he met in his dream were heading towards Heaven, but the philosophers were going to Hell, while discussing politics. Legend says that Machiavelli preferred Hell, because Heaven would have been uneventful and dull¹¹. This allegory properly summarizes Machiavelli's work, and we may assume that he accepts his pragmatic views even though they are harsh on the surface.

⁴ Manuela Golea, "Cum ne păcălesc politicienii", accessed on 30 August 2020, available at <<https://romanioliberal.ro/cultura/oameni/cum-ne-pacalesc-politicienii-213794>>.

⁵ Vsevolod Cernei, "De vorbă despre vorbe cu Vsevolod Cernei. Care este sensul și originea cuvântului *machiavrlâc*", accessed on 31 august 2020, available at <https://www.publika.md/de-vorba-despre-vorbe-cu-vsevolod-cernei-care-este-sensul-si-originea-cuvantului-machiavrlac_3027028.html>.

⁶ Ioan Milică, "Machiavelli și machiavrlâcurile", accessed on 31 August 2020, available at <<https://www.ziaruldeiasi.ro/stiri/machiavelli-si-machiavrlacurile-163570.html>>.

⁷ Loredana Diacu, "Omar Hayssam: Machiavelism – Traian Băsescu și aghiotantul său", accessed on 31 August 2020, available at <<http://epochtimes-romania.com/news/omar-hayssam-machiavelism-traian-basescu-si-aghiotantul-sau-233538>>.

⁸ Dan Mois, "Machiavelismul și răspândirea sa în lumea civilizată", accessed on 31 August 2020, available at <<https://psihologdanielmois.ro/machiavelismul-si-raspandirea-sa-lumea-civilizata/>>.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Adrian Cioroianu, *Visul lui Machiavelli*, Curtea Veche Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

The fifth narrative addresses the time, the event and the context, reiterating Machiavelli's perennial work. In addition to the fact he believes a good prince must have an attitude beyond reproach in order to preserve the stability, he also points the importance of time in terms of ruling the state. Machiavelli's timeless nature ensues not only from his up-to-date work, but also from the importance he grants to *fortuna*. By *fortuna*, Machiavelli grasps the fortuitous events which may happen throughout history, both in terms of assisting the prince or disadvantaging him. Nevertheless, the Florentine secretary doesn't associate *fortuna* with some deity, instead he compares it with "one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers"¹². The current relevance of Machiavelli also arises from the fact that he foresees the unpredictable nature of *fortuna*, therefore he insists on trying to anticipate any troublesome events which may occur, or, if that's not possible, it is recommended to lessen the damaging effects in order to break the deadlocks. A good prince may avail his tenacity and bravery in order to prevail against *fortuna*¹³.

In addition to the above-mentioned narratives, we may add the significance of Machiavelli in terms of reporting about the European and Atlantic calling in the Romanian area. Returning to Leonidas Donskis perspective, who mainly addresses to the Romanian readers, it is relevant to say that, from his point of view, Machiavelli also has a crucial role in the "European stories" about the establishment of "modern and ethic imaginary", responding to issues regarding principles, democratic spirit, Europeanism, and national or European values.

Furthermore, Machiavelli is still relevant even for the configuration of the decade between 2011 and 2021. Hence, the American political scientist George Friedman, during a visit to Romania, advice the national authorities not to rely too much on NATO, justifying his suggestion with a key point reference about the army stated by Machiavelli. According to him, the most effective army is the one you own, whereas the armies of the allied countries aren't reliable sources of help, because they tend to follow their own individual interest; even if the victory is achieved with the help of foreign armies, the success wouldn't be long-term, due to the unsteady dependence on another country. In this context Machiavelli's perspective is reiterated, considering that it is better to lose by your own army, instead of winning with the help of a foreign one¹⁴.

Consequently, by following the previous narratives, Machiavelli's "lessons" become timeless sources of comprehension, which we may relate to an idea originated by Ion Goian that entails some "inevitably subjective remarks". In terms of current times, we may objectively credit Machiavelli with the indisputable role of an *influencer*.

ANDREEA MIHAELA ȚICU

DIPLOMACY OF DISTRUST IN THE "ERA OF SOLIDARITY"

The study and theoretical-practical quantification of *the state of mistrust* in inter-state relations requires the operation with an essential distinction, that of differentiating between the state of convergence and compatibility in actions and dynamic tactics of states – as an integral part of the *model of trust* – and a divergent reality, a *pattern* in which assertive scepticism leads to *mistrust*. The guiding premise starts from the evidence that not all states that are trustworthy automatically

¹² Marius Stan, "Voința împotriva fortunei. Machiavelli și lumea neprevăzutului", accessed on 31 August 2020, available at <<https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/voința-împotriva-fortunei-despre-machiavelli-și-lumea-neprevăzutului-/29919186.html>>.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ Afrodita Iorgulescu, "Machiavelli și...NATO", accessed on 31 August 2020, available at <<https://www.cotidianul.ro/machiavelli-si-nato/>>.

have trust from others. Or, the equation according to which the existence of unconditional reciprocity is an inescapable fact, and that it cannot be considered an absolutely and totally valid hypothesis. Accepting trust as the imminent guarantor of cooperation can lead to errors, as states can refuse cooperation if the level of trust is placed below an acceptable minimum level¹. Hence the risk of confidence or doubt and scepticism: if one state (A) does not trust the other state (B), the state and reality of this option would translate into a lack of commitment on the part of the latter (state B). *To trust*, under the established conditions, thus amounts to the existence of a possibility that State B could exploit. The effect is reciprocal and lies in a different reality on both sides – State A, believing that State B will protect its interests, becomes a vulnerable state².

Subjective beliefs, either rooted or inoculated, lead to imbalances, to an unfair result, with losses of that state, whose trust is not frequently sustained and verified by the actions and behaviours of the one it trusts. It should not be ignored that there is also the assumption that one state may erroneously trust another, and in this case, there is no credibility on the part of the other³. Therefore, *the lack of trust* calls for more caution, in order to annihilate or reduce the possibility of exploitation and perpetuation of unfavourable conditions. The egocentrism of states hides motives and intentions, which actually support the true strategic trajectory of their foreign policy. At the immediate level, trust is determined by the way an actor will look at his neighbours and the way he chooses to formulate his perspective on his future behaviour and actions. In-depth, the interpretation influences their response, adding to the beliefs about the character of the other party. Whether states consider the other state's action to be cooperative, hostile or neutral depends on how they view their motives and assess their motivation⁴. In fact, the *trust-cooperation* link does not imply a simple approach, but, rather, it is the product and expression of both explicit and implicit actions. It is not cooperation that produces trust, it does not determine it creatively, but the behaviour of the actors influences and stimulates trust, in a productive way⁵.

The above formulas and permutations confirm that the existence of *trust*, as a way of assessing compatibility between states, can lead to mutually beneficial interactions (a type of non-manipulative cooperation), without denying the situations in which states can obtain more advantages through exploitation and, implicitly, in breach of the undertaking of *trust*. The debate is required in the area of two options: either a type of deep connection between states (even with increased advantages for one party⁶), or an imbalance, marked by the desire to survive of one. If both parties, incompatible or relatively compatible, choose to cooperate, their chances of development or survival increase exponentially⁷.

Examining the context and the possibility of relations between states, the immediate evidence is that, with the change of political leader in the leadership of the Soviet Union, there was a domino effect that marked the links imposed between homogenized states in the communist thinking. At the end of the exercise of power, one can identify the signal of change of mentality, materialization and action of a collective reaction. The ideological layer existing and perpetuated until the "Gorbachev moment" will propose to the opposite, the fading and weakening of the Soviet regime, including through the formula of *solidarity* felt from Poland to Romania⁸.

The ideological-political configuration proposed by the new Soviet leader led, through its (*reforming*) direction to *relaxation*, to the assertion, during the 1980s, of an increasing number of

¹ Kendall W. Stiles, *Trust and Hedging in international relations*. New York, University of Michigan Publishing House, 2018, p. 5.

² Russell Hardin, *Distrust*. New York, Russell Sage Foundation Publishing House, 2004, p. 38.

³ Adrian Hatos, *Colectivism după colectivism? Forme asociative de organizare în agricultura românească de tranziție: 1990-2002*. Jassy, Lumen Publishing House, 2006, p. 87.

⁴ Deborah Larson Welch, *Anatomy of Mistrust. US – Soviet Relation During the Cold War*. New York, Cornell University, 1997, p. 17.

⁵ Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, Margaret Levi, *Cooperation Without Trust?* New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2005, p. 20.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

⁸ Tucker Aviezer, *The Legacies of Totalitarianism: A Theoretical Framework*. New York, Cambridge University, 2015, p. 16.

voices claiming detachment from the Moscow model. Designed through an innovative initiative (at and for the time being) to free itself from the constraints of a conservative value profile and the resistance felt within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's *new thinking* of political openness facilitated – through an *unexpected side effect* – (re) awakening and (re) opening, in the consciousness of the satellite states, some nationalist feelings and, at the same time, some anti-Russian intentions, of independence under the extended tutelage of Moscow. Confidence in the Soviet Union was undergoing deep and justified erosion, including against the background of the economic decline of the Soviet Union, a system increasingly dependent, through the reinsurance of relations of trust with the West, on financial aid from them. The relaxation of censorship led to a relaxation of control of the media⁹, all of which confirmed that the liberalization of the Soviet system made its shortcomings more obvious¹⁰.

Solidarity in Poland is a model for the entire Eastern bloc¹¹, the requirements of the trade union movement being perfected through three agreements, which recognized the establishment of *Solidarity*, a political rival of the Polish Communist Party. Despite all the resistance shown, the period 1986-1988 triggered a form of liberalization, which was manifested in concrete terms by external pressures and the changing international climate between the USSR and the Member States¹². In fact, in August 1980, when the strikes began in Gdansk, the communist regime was ordered to negotiate. Against the background of reforms, Lech Walesa is setting up the Provisional Council of the *Solidarity* Trade Union, an organization with a legal form and context¹³. In 1988, Poland felt the economic crisis intensified through rising food prices, leading to a widespread strike (widespread from workers to students)¹⁴, with the *Solidarity* movement receiving material support and assistance from Western unions as well¹⁵. Despite the accumulated achievements and the image delivered, filtering the nature and shortcomings of communism, *Solidarity*, isolated and illegal at the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev's term, could not hope for a decisive effect internationally¹⁶. The movement must, however, be recognized by the ability to adapt to a changing climate, to respond to it even more than that, to be part of the first forms that will seal a new type/another political conception. *Solidarity* marks an act that will mark the entire construction of Eastern Europe¹⁷ through a state of solidarity and awareness of individual freedom, an essential moral act confirmed by the presence of Pope John Paul II on his 1979 pilgrimage to Poland. According to Lech Walesa, the episode (re) ignites the Polish social force/flame¹⁸, through a continuous approach of a movement that opposed *in extenso* the preservation and perpetuation of a foreign power and a foreign policy: "*Solidarity appeared in Poland and could not to appear in no other country of the communist bloc "so that" only Poland was the site of mass crises, renovating the system*"¹⁹.

⁹ Pascal Lorot, *Perestroika. URSS sub Grobaciiov. 1985-1991*. Bucharest, Corint Publishing House, 2002, p. 24.

¹⁰ FA, *Oameni care au schimbat lumea. Revoluționari, reformatori și minți geniale*. Bucharest, Mladinska Publishing House, 2007, p. 466.

¹¹ Mark Kramer, *The Rise and Fall of Solidarity*, The New York Times, 12 Dec. 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/opinion/the-rise-and-fall-of-solidarity.html>, accessed on 22.11.2019.

¹² Ioan Lorin Fortuna, *Accentuarea crizei de regim în țările socialiste europene (1980-1990)*, Institutul Revoluției Române din Decembrie 1989. Timișoara, Artpress Publishing House, 2009, p. 105.

¹³ Ovidiu Drugă, *Efectul "Solidaritatea". Cum au dărâmat muncitorii polonezi comunismul. Istoria altfel decât o înveți la școală*, EVZ, 30 August 2018, <https://evz.ro/efectul-solidaritatea-cum-au-daramat-muncitorii-polonezi.html>, accessed on 1.12.2019.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Lord Carnes, *The Past and the Future of Public Diplomacy*, p. 61, <https://www.kamudiplomasiasi.org/pdf/pastandfuture.pdf>, accessed on 1.12.2019.

¹⁶ Mark Kramer, *op. cit.*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/opinion/the-rise-and-fall-of-solidarity.html>, accessed on 22.11.2019.

¹⁷ Misztal Bronisław, *Poland after Solidarity. Social Movements versus the State*. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishing House, 1985, p. 99.

¹⁸ FA, *Rolul Papei în prăbușirea comunismului*, BBC Romanian, 2 April 2005, http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/news/story/2005/04/050402_papa_comunism.shtml#, accessed on 1.12.2019.

¹⁹ FA, Academia Română, "*Solidaritatea*". *Revanșa Poloneză*. Edition by Felician Duică, Introductory note by Radu Ciuceanu. Bucharest, Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului Publishing House, 2007, p. 40.

The phenomenon of Solidarity was perceived and identified in the space of communist Romania, as a form of distancing from the government of Moscow, an aspect agreed and even encouraged. The perception changes, however, from a receptive situation of trust to one of cooling and scepticism, by identifying the trade union phenomenon as opposed to socialism²⁰. Summarizing the subsequent manifestations of *Solidarity*, the model was rejected by Nicolae Ceausescu, worried about the perpetuation and expansion of Poland's political evolution. However, the Romanians resonated, being supportive of the movement²¹.

Referring to the background of the 1980s and the named state-geographical areas, the working formulas hint at another set of equations: whether state A and state B comply with a commitment (even apparent), and state B considers the fulfilment obligations to State A in egocentric terms, then State A cannot and must not trust State B²². Lack of trust leads to a reality of subordination and hierarchy²³. Trust requires a fair analysis of the importance of one's own goals and vital interests, but also the existence of a leader who has the capacity/ability to offer rational alternatives and who acts following the issued strategy²⁴. For a vulnerable state, a minimum dose of trust can provide reasons for its interests to be respected and not exploited²⁵.

The context is required to be related to the existence of two frameworks: a medium of convergence and a divergent reality, the latter marked by irrational deviations, defect, inter-state infidelity, lack of trust that suspends the conditions of cooperation²⁶, a type of hesitation that diminishes interests and diplomatic strategies. The meaning of the term equivalent of *scepticism* here of *mistrust* does not exclude the possibility of cooperation, but considerably weakens the chances of success for both parties involved. Following the analysis of Karen S. Cook, the moment of the 1980s can be considered "situation X"²⁷, an interval marked by conflict of interest, divergent goals, *distrust* representing the state that will be imposed in the diplomatic approach that will mark the reality of the appointed moment.

*1989 – from "Romanian Solidarity"
with the Polish communist model, to the collapse of the Eastern chain*

Following in the footsteps of historian William Hitchcock, who says, "Gorbachev did not give freedom to the people of Eastern Europe. They have taken it"²⁸, Eastern European solidarity and the common context of the collapse of the communist chain, do not deny the particular forms and formulas of regaining freedom.

We consider that there are two immediate effects felt in the Romanian space as well.

The first considers precisely the "reforming friendship" (*trustworthy*) between Ion Iliescu and Mikhail Gorbachev, of what Vladimir Bukovsky considers to represent the relationship that leads to Romania's changes in December 1989, through a plan to implement reforms that "it included Ion Iliescu as the leader of post-Ceausescu Romania" and corrects the obviously antagonistic relationship between Gorbachev and Ceausescu until then. The letter-reply addressed by Ion Iliescu to the editorial staff of *Historia* magazine, contains some relevant clarifications for what Ion Ioniță called an "inexplicable political gesture" that of signing the treaty with the USSR in

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p.89.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 27, p. 28.

²² Russell Hardin, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

²³ Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in international relations*, Princeton, Princeton University, 2007, p. 6.

²⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politică între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Jassy, Polirom Publishing House, 2007, p. 46.

²⁵ Kendall W. Stiles, *Trust and Hedging in international relations*. New York, University of Michigan, 2018, p. 19.

²⁶ Andrew H. Kydd, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

²⁷ Karen S. Cook, Russell Hardin, Margaret Levi, *Cooperation Without Trust?*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2005, p. 62.

²⁸ Jeffrey A. Engel, *The Fall of The Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989*. New York, Oxford University, 2009, p. 4.

April 1991, by which Romania accepted that the USSR “decided with on Romania’s alliances”, an act of counter-solidarity with the leadership of Eastern European, former communist states (it was exactly the moment when Soviet troops withdrew permanently from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; Germany was celebrating reunification and the Warsaw Pact was dissolved! Ion Iliescu’s reply corrects a perspective that he considers “distorted”, pointing to the basic idea of the Treaty, that of de-ideologized relations with the USSR, on a foundation guided and ruled by international law and the post-Cold War context, with common principles, part of “all the Treaties signed by Romania, after 1989, both with the neighbours and with the West”. Relevant for the context of analysis of this paper is the explicit statement made by Ion Iliescu: The treaty provided for the commitment of the parties not to participate in alliances against each other, to enshrine the freedom to establish direct relations with the component states of the USSR, referring to the “new principles of USSR policy” (non-intermediary relations with the Republic of Moldova!), provisions considered natural to a “treaty of *friendship* and good neighbourliness”²⁹.

Secondly, the collapse of a dangerous and flawed idea and ideology (communism) and, later, the disintegration of the USSR will lead to a changed type of geopolitical reality, through new forms of bilateral cooperation and the elaboration of a foreign policy structurally rethought by states from Eastern Europe. In this sense, Romania will formulate an initially reoriented foreign policy – see in this sense, the participation of the Romanian delegation in the last CAER session in Budapest, on June 30, 1991, when the protocol of dissolution of the organization is signed³⁰; rethinking a parity strategy, through a good relationship with both the West and Eastern partners, especially the Soviet Union and China³¹. We resort once again to the statements of Ion Iliescu, who insisted on the normalization of relations with the USSR, through established bilateral ties³², by recognition and cooperation in spheres of mutual interest, through high-level contacts and meetings held since 1990³³. January 6, 1990, the high-level visit of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of the Political Bureau, Eduard Shevardnadze, is formalized at the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergiu Celac, reaffirming Moscow’s interest in Romania³⁴, with the explicit purpose of analysing the situation of the Soviet-Romanian collaboration in the broadest sense of the word³⁵.

The declaration of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs hints at the direction adopted, of legal re-evaluation of bilateral treaties on new bases, following that on March 8, 1990 he will pay a response visit to Moscow to address the same issue: the character attributed to these objectives and possible results³⁶. Of interest in this context is the fact that the phrase “Friendship Treaty” is avoided in favour of the prevalence of the neighbourhood, of normalized and civilized relations!

On February 9, 1991, the presidential adviser for foreign policy issues of the President of Romania, Ioan Mircea Pascu, will officially meet in Moscow with Vadim V. Zagladin, an adviser to the President of the USSR. The purpose of this visit was to communicate a personal message to M. Gorbachev from President Ion Iliescu, and to provide real data on the real internal situation of Romania at the moment, especially the “complicated economic situation” and the insufficiency of energy resources. The visit is relevant precisely for the persistence of “diplomacy of mistrust”,

²⁹ See in this sense the debate from *Historia*, <https://www.historia.ro/sectiune/actualitate/articol/ion-iliescu-reactioneaza-nu-le-datorez-nimic-nici-presedintelui-gorbaciov-nici-fostei-urss>, accessed on 30.05.2020.

³⁰ Ion Țurcanu, *Istoria românilor: cu privire mai largă asupra culturii*. Brăila, Istros Publishing House, 2007.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² Miruna Mădălina Trandafir, *Russia and The Romanian Post-December Foreign Policy*. Discourse as a Form of Multiculturalism in Literature and Communication. Târgu Mureș, Arhipelag XXI Publishing House, 2015, p. 246.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ Dragoș Ionescu, *Șeful diplomației URSS, Eduard Șevarnadze primul care a vizitat România după revoluție*. Afaceri, Istorie și Hazard, 17 January 2018, <https://dragos-ionescu.ro/2018/01/17/sevarnadze-la-bucuresti-1990/>, accessed on 31.05.2020.

³⁵ FA, *Remember 6 ianuarie 1990-Presa acum 30 de ani*. Amos News, 6 January 2020, <https://www.amosnews.ro/remember-6-ianuarie-1990-presa-acum-25-de-ani-6-2015-01-06>, accessed on 31.05.2020.

³⁶ Toma Roman Jr., *Sergiu Celac: Am contribuit la înființarea legală a SIE*. Jurnalul, 15 Dec. 2011, <https://jurnalul.antena3.ro/special-jurnalul/interviuri/sergiu-celac-am-contribuit-la-infiintarea-legala-a-sie-599314.html>, accessed on 31.05.2020.

easily deduced from a series of statements with specific reference to the visit called: the President of Romania “is generally satisfied with the development of relations”, but it is considered by both parties that the possibilities for deepening relations have not been exhausted by any means, both politically and economically”³⁷; moreover, Ioan Mircea Pașcu points out that “the old connection system no longer works, and a new one has not yet been established”³⁸.

This is the context that anticipates the signing on April 5, 1991 of the Treaty of Cooperation, Good Neighbourhood and Friendship (SN) between the USSR and Romania by Presidents M. Gorbachev and Ion Iliescu, meant to replace the existing form from 1970 and valid until in 1995³⁹. According to the new document, the relations between Romania and the USSR were interpreted through the perspective of reciprocity, in the diplomatic logic of friendly states, of “reshaping the normative framework of bilateral relations, with the desire to get out of the military alliance and insert values and the political changes initiated at regional level, in the framework of the document”⁴⁰.

In and from the perspective issued by Vladimir Bukovsky can be found perpetuated and re-contextualized the effects of diplomacy of distrust, with all this first evidence of a “friendship” treaty: the issue of the Republic of Moldova does not want to be addressed, considering that the Soviet side was directly interested in preserving hegemony and perpetuating the idea of assistance, to which he adds only symbolically the nuance of mutuality, and mutual support⁴¹. During the Romanian-Soviet dialogue, two unresolved historical problems were reached: the return to Romania of the treasure evacuated to Russia between 1916-1917 and the island of the Snakes, ceded in 1948, both points and realities of distrust! With all the friendship and closeness shown by Ion Iliescu, he will declare that, in and through the named Treaty we had to “take into account the objective realities, but we could not ignore the feelings either”.

Including in its relations with the Republic of Moldova (Romania naturally supported the evolution of events in Chisinau and, later, was the first state to recognize its independence on August 27, 1991⁴²) the Romanian-Soviet relationship was divergent, incompatible, knowing distancing, cooling and distrust, tension⁴³, especially through the options stated by Romania to position itself in a geostrategic context as a member and partner in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, NATO and the European Union.

A maximum moment of diplomatic distrust is recognized in April 1996, on the occasion of the unnecessary trip of the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Evgheni Primakov, to Bucharest, to Otopeni Airport⁴⁴, useless in the context of the annulment of the initialling of the Romanian-Soviet Basic Political Treaty (September 1993). The scene that illustrates a missed diplomatic moment, remains eloquent for the data and the reality of the Romanian-Soviet relationship and relations, in which the diplomacy of distrust prevailed. Its effects are still felt today, this time, in Romania’s relations with Russia!

IRINA GOCIU

³⁷ Simion Gheorgiu, *Politica externă post-decembristă a României (1991)*: “Frații nu trebuie să locuiască în mod obligatoriu în același apartament”. Revista de Științe Politice Polis, vol. II, no. 3 (5), new serie, September 2014, p. 100.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ Vladimir Socor, *23 aprilie 1991 – Ultimul tratat româno-sovietic*. Radio Europa Liberă Moldova, 4 August 2016, <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/27940680.html>, accessed on 31.05.2020.

⁴⁰ Adrian Năstase, *România după Malta. 875 de zile la Externe*, vol. 4 (1 March-30 April 1991). Bucharest, Fundația Europeană Titulescu Publishing House, 2007, p. 230.

⁴¹ Marius Oprea, *Chipul morții: Marius Oprea în dialog cu Vladimir Bukovski despre natura comunismului*. Preface by Stéphane Courtois. Polirom Publishing House, 2006.

⁴² Gabriel Pecleanu, *Relațiile România – R. Moldova – când calde, când reci, condimentate cu acuzații reciproce*. Mediafax, 25 January 2010, <https://www.mediafax.ro/main-story/focus-relatiile-romania-r-moldova-cand-calde-cand-reci-condimentate-cu-acuzaatii-reciproce-5440851>, accessed on 1.06.2020.

⁴³ Constantin Corneanu, *Relațiile româno-sovietice/ruse de la destindere la încordare (1990-2017)*. Asociația Europeană de Studii Geopolitice și Strategice, 14 Dec. 2017, https://www.aesgs.ro/relatiile-romano-sovieticeruse-de-la-destindere-la-incordare-1990-2017/#_ftnref128, accessed on 1.06.2020.

⁴⁴ Armand Goșu, *Scenarii în relațiile româno-ruse*. Revista 22, 7 February 2017, <https://revista22.ro/opinii/armand-gosu/scenarii-n-relaiile-romno-ruse>, accessed on 1.06.2020.

SMART DIPLOMACY – THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY

The evolutionary complexity of the 21st century diplomacy encountered a forward movement in all of its sections, occurring according to the new reality (including the new pandemic reality) which reshapes the operating parameters of global diplomacy. The vectoral direction – *multilateralism; mediation; global – international expertise; activity of supra-national diplomats and of intergovernmental organisations; global security and defence issues* – emphasises the changes occurred in the structure of traditional diplomacy and the maturation (theoretical, as well as and practical) versus the new global imperatives within which it must operate. The above-mentioned maturation is, here, as well, equivalent to the *smart diplomacy* version!

Whereas the defining paradigm of global diplomacy consists in the functionality of the *trinomial* acknowledged in and by the conjugation of *global governing – global institutions – global issues*, the topic generated by the summing up of deficits of the three dimensions above lies in the conditioning of its appropriate trajectory to a particular diagram. The above-mentioned matrix is indicative of the following formula: this polycentric global governing model directly proportional to society regulation is the direct consequence of complex interconnections found at all levels, either regional or global.

The instability of the trinomial with indubitable implications for the future framework of global diplomacy requires the review and preparation of *smart* insights and visions on the future of the international area, with new forms of adaptability for diplomacy to the new emerging global requirements. Therefore, the need to develop new skills and structures and adapt those already in use certify the utility of *smart diplomacy* and of the three related pillars – digital capabilities, diplomacy with the involvement of multiple stakeholders and feminist diplomacy – to serve as potential pathway and guideline consisting of tools and strategies aimed at the characteristics of global diplomacy as a submission for the settlement of current and future global challenges.

Firstly, the usefulness of the application of technology to leverage the potential of the digital era embeds the four dimensions of digital diplomacy outlined by Brian Hocking (Thierry Balzacq, Frédéric Charillon, Frédéric Ramel, *Global Diplomacy An Introduction to Theory and Practice, The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, pp. 84-85) as he warned that they should not be regarded as discrete categories, but as related features of an increasingly complex politics framework, which transcends the references of domestic and international politics.

The first dimension regards the decrease of control on emerging foreign policy events and agendas to their *speed* and *direction*. Whilst the issues within global negotiations for governance and freedom of the Internet demand settlement, the latter outlines the side of digital diplomacy dedicated to cyber agendas. The third dimension involves the use of digital technologies in the management of knowledge and data to foreign affairs ministries to manage their resources properly. Ultimately, digital capabilities perform the vital function of improvement of public service, consolidation of participation in policy-making processes and provision of services. Thus: “[...] we are now facing varied possibilities with regard to the condition of diplomacy in the 21st century: gradual change and adaptation in the existing frameworks and principles related to the circumstance where diplomacy undertakes structurally different forms, challenging the accepted terms on what diplomacy is – or should be” (*Ibidem*).

The *smart* stake resides in the variations of the four dimensions compared to the fields of politics and the three emerging phases: *setting of the agenda, negotiation and implementation*. The immediate evidence consists in the fact that digital diplomacy is less significant in *negotiations*, as they are under the progressive domination of the importance of implementation (and the more complex forms thereof) depending solely on context. The other two phases of the trinomial are strongly influenced by the dynamics of the new multilateralism responsible for the effects on diplomatic processes. However, the quality of digital capabilities to serve as diplomatic instruments provides the necessary resources the groups involved in the defence of policies and an enhanced decisional stance on the implementation/non-implementation of international agreements. Therefore: “[...] 21st century diplomacy is reflective of the evolving structure of the international

system, global governing models and national communities and their governing systems in an era of increasing populism. The attempt to equate the complex forces to the increase of new technologies, however significant, is always likely to lead to deceptive conclusions" (*Ibidem*, p. 94).

The *smart diplomacy* strategy relies on the enhancement of the level of awareness of the parties involved in diplomatic processes with regard to open and extended opportunities provided by the utilisation of digital capabilities – *the utility of issuing interests in a communicational way to a worldwide audience; detection of security threats against cyberattacks* by the training of the related states and governments. Thus, by the assignment of resources required to reach their potential, drawbacks can be monitored and rendered controllable in due time and eliminating risks or underlying crises.

With regard to *stakeholder diplomacy*, it occurs on the background of problems that are part of the polycentric global government model. The latter registers deficits equivalent to instability and non-involvement of key actors of global bearing of the international scene – the foreign policy of the POTUS, the United Kingdom consumed by *Brexit* and the US-China evolving tensions. The current pandemic reality outlined the deficit of global governance and its institutions to prepare and provide an immediate answer – vital to the given circumstances due to the alternative interests without an appropriate mediation and asymmetric involvement. The phrased assumption outlines the necessity to provide a solution to this erosion as the post-Coronavirus liberal international order based on rules – which is strongly (now!) put to the test – will not operate optimally.

The warning on the issues of current reality had been made as early as 2017 by and through the vision of Jean-Robert Leguey-Feilleux (*Global Governance Diplomacy. The Critical Role of Diplomacy in Addressing Global Problems*, London, published by Rowman & Littlefield, 2017, p. 239) on the evolutive complexity of global society, of the multitude of emerging challenges that requires the collective attention and of the concerted efforts of international actors involved in negotiation processes. "In the end, is the future more promising? The world is smarter organised for joint efforts. More international actors participate in this diplomacy [...] The multiplication of international actors means that there is a higher diversity of initiatives to settle international problems. This can complicate governance, but provides more alternatives. Success is never guaranteed, but we can learn from all this experience" (*Ibidem*, p. 247).

Stakeholder diplomacy provides an answer and a conjugated pathway, prepared following the "lessons" part of experiences stated by the achievement of a global multilateral regulatory framework based on the enhancement of sustainable partnership between the representatives (both state and non-state) of various interests, in order to establish the large-scale networks for agreement and cooperation. Whereas non-state actors contribute to influencing the foreign relations of the state by acting independently from the state by the worldwide cooperation with other stakeholders, they create *interrelated* and *overlapped* decision points, thus hindering the identification of evolving sources/directions of the policies. By establishing a framework favourable to the exchange of information, data, and expertise between diplomats of global bearing and experts in diplomacy-related fields, the principle integrated with *smart diplomacy* is certified as a solution-answer to the currently intensified issues of the deficit of global governance.

The last main pillar of smart diplomacy – *feminist diplomacy* – is indicative of the trends of global society and modern diplomacy manifesting social, political, and economic empowerment of women – *elements/representative parties* – in the diplomatic area. The beneficent initiatives of Sweden and France targeted the formal adoption of a feminist foreign policy. In 2014, the Swedish former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. Margot Wallström, initiated this type of policy structured around the three *Rs: Rights, Representation & Resources* – making the Swedish state the first in the world with regard to this type of implemented initiatives.

The claim of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs – "Now, other states also ask: *Where are the women? I believe we are slowly moving in the right direction*" (Rachel B. Vogelstein, "Five Questions on Feminist Foreign Policy: Margot Wallström", Council on Foreign Relations, published on 18 November 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/five-questions-feminist-foreign-policy-margot-wallstrom>) – is strongly backed by the agenda of *smart diplomacy* which pleads in the favour of the above-mentioned challenge, considering the exclusion of women's standpoints and perspectives from foreign policy as inadmissible on a global level: "History has shown us that diplomacy

survives and continues. It is the only currency available to states to be part of international society, and the involvement in its institutions constantly builds a supra-culture, which is the diplomatic culture. The very *raison d'être* of diplomacy infuses its culture: the necessity of building a network, to communicate and connect the differences and to do this on a continuous basis" (Yolanda Kemp Spies, *Global Diplomacy and International Society*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, p. 239).

Thus, *smart diplomacy* is reflective of the iteration of a global response to a reality with extended implications, by reference to the future improvements on gender equality, the use of digital capabilities and independent involvement of multiple stakeholders. Although global diplomacy transcends the traditional policies, adapting them to the new requirements of global society, the instability of international liberal order and the global scene massively disturbed by the deficiencies found even in the structural dimensions of the specified trinomial – *global problems* – *global governance* – *global institutions*, outlines the fact that the defining paradigm needs to be reviewed and, moreover, placed in the horizon of a *smart* future, an attribute which is impossible to dissociate for what, in the footsteps of Yolanda Kemp Spies, we could call in and by the *culture of global diplomacy*.

CARLA MÎNDREAN