BIOSECURITY AS A THEME, A DOMAIN
AND A REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

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"[The] line separating injustice and misfortune is a political choice, not a simple rule that can be taken as a given. [...]
The difference between misfortune and injustice often stays just in our goodwill to act or not to act in favour of the victims, to blame or to absolve, to help, to ease their situation and to compensate them, or, to look the other way".

Judith Shklar*, The Faces of Injustice,* 1990

Abstract. The definition of *biosecurity* concerns solely the regulations for the misuse of biological materials manipulation, diversion, release, theft and loss. In our interpretation, though, the big picture of biosecurity should be approached as well from the authorities' perspective and from the handlers' perspective, as from the perspective of the people and from the perspective of the human being, too. The paper describes the conceptual sphere of the term *biosecurity*, which is currently interpreted in a very narrow perspective. From a safety, security and ethical perspective, the conceptualization of *security* implies at present correlating the dimensions of *human security* and *biosecurity*. Biosecurity is a theoretical and practical political reality, too, not merely a biological reality or a biological purpose.

As a field, International Relations already included several distinct components regarding human security. However, currently, the definition of *biosecurity* is disconnected from "human security", a choice which we consider to be in epistemic perspective wrong, but also ontologically and ethically wrong. A concept closely related to biosecurity is biosafety, regarding mostly the *protection* of public health and environment from *accidental exposure* to biological agents. The two concepts – biosafety and biosecurity – are considered together as a matter of *biorisk management*, which should be approached ethically and wisely. The ontological and axiological perspectives should be considered, too. Biosecurity is not complete unless it answers requirements of human value, human quality of life, human dignity and freedom of creation and expression.

Keywords: *Biosecurity; Biosafety; Biorisk Management; Human Security; International Relations*

The problem of injustice is definitely associated also to possible biosafety concerns and it always arises when there are, or, would have been, ignored solutions, which have not had required in order to emerge superhuman abilities,

but only goodwill, good planning and good faith; because injustice occurs whenever either the problems or the existing (or possible) solutions to those problems have been ignored, by "closing eyes" or "turning one's head away".

Today's world needs to quickly understand and learn biorisk management to be able to limit the number of potential victims in the event of a new biological threat, ideally, before the victims become victims.

As Judith Shklar[1], in an attempt to identify the faces of injustice, captures the idea in the fragment selected as a motto, there are catastrophic events, unpredictable events or even errors, with terrible repercussions. However, it is in our power to take adequate measures as are those included in what is called *biorisk management*, which could reduce or even avoid catastrophe, injustice or misfortune and this is exactly what is being learned now "as we go", all over the world, with this occasion of the current pandemic of the Covid-19 disease.

A good understanding of biosecurity management requires a full understanding of the concept of biosecurity. Thus, we intend here to discuss the conceptual sphere of the term biosecurity, in the spirit of arguing a broader comprehension of the term, with an accent placed on ethical aspects. The term already exists in domains related to the biological and medical sciences, but it is interpreted in a very narrow perspective rather than being interconnected and made explicit and relevant in the perspective of international relations.

The term biosecurity should be understood as a much more complex conceptual sphere and, in our interpretation, this conceptual sphere has the potential to become a sub-domain of international relations. Any discussion of "security" currently involves international decisional and procedural components concerning the potentially bio-hazardous substances created in the laboratory or not, but these should also imply all the aspects pertaining to human rights, international law, ethics in international relations, the nation state and globalization, following both the implications identified in terms of human security and those distinguished under the "thick or thin" relation of biosafety and biosecurity (with reference to Michael Walzer).

In this perspective, *justice* (when it covers security and biosecurity) should be understood as a "good" that can be distributed according to universal principles or derived from them (the "thin" area) or according to particular aspects more difficult "translatable", which are forming in our discussion the "thick" area of biosafety and biosecurity concerns. These issues are transferred by Michael Walzer[2] from the analysis of distributive justice to a theorization of just war. Nevertheless, justice should be a meta-regulative factor and it should in this respect cover biosafety and biosecurity, too. In our opinion, the analysis of the concept of biosecurity also presents "thick" and "thin" aspects, because biosecurity also implies the possibility of a "war" with a concrete biological threat, as it happens in the world today (in 2020), a war that needs goals and rules. In this sense, correlating the interpretation as well with the dichotomy proposed by

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[1] Judith Shklar, *The Faces of Injustice*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990.
[2] Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, Basic Books, 1983; Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, Basic Books, New York, 1992.

Michael Oakeshott[3], namely, considering the distinction between "teleocratic" societies (governed by purposes and ends) and "nomocratic" societies (governed by rules), we can propose an interpretation in which the "teleocratic" aspects of biosecurity are rather "thick" area and the "nomocratic" aspects are rather the elements for a "thin" area of *just* and *ethical biosecurity*.

However, the emphasis should be placed on the realities of biosecurity, although we understand these realities not only through concrete data and facts, but also through the multifocal "lenses" of political philosophy perspectives, which include an ethical and human rights perspective, too. As a field, International Relations have already included several distinct components of political philosophy theories, and these are also relevant to human security.

To analyse this conceptual sphere more precisely, we specify that the current definition of biosafety refers exclusively to the regulations on the misuse, manipulation, release, theft and loss of biological materials. However, in our interpretation, the bigger picture of biosecurity should be described from the perspective of the authorities and from the perspective of the user, the people and, above all, the individual.

Currently, the extremely narrow definition of biosecurity is disconnected from the area of realities, meanings and *values* designated by the phrase "human security". As a result, this is a definition that we consider wrong due to the unjustified narrowness of concerns about activities involving biological materials and substances. We emphasize that biological materials and substances, not to mention the experiments with bio-weapons such as artificially created or reproduced viruses, have clear impact and they pose potential threat for human existence and human life in general, going beyond both the realm of biology and trade. A closely related concept to biosecurity (which is also understood in a too narrow manner) is that of protecting public health and the environment against accidental exposure to biological agents. The two concepts are considered to constitute the main dimensions of biorisk management. In this paper, however, we interpret "biosecurity", "biosecurity" and "biorisk management" from an innovative, comprehensive, comprehensive perspective on human security.

The current context of concern for biosafety is particularly important. The current analysis indicates the priority of considering two dimensions: the crisis triggered by the SARS-COV-02 virus and the general tendency (dangerous and unethical) in human affairs to shift responsibility to the consumer, in commercial, financial, economic and (nowadays) in sanitary-medical matters, place responsibility with the citizen, in political relations or to place it entirely with the patient, in sanitary and medical matters. Human security does not benefit from this trend.

The resonance of the conceptual sphere of the term "biosecurity" is much stronger today, while, logically, any discussion of "security" necessarily involves, these days, countless issues highlighted by addressing the issues of "human security" and "biosecurity". As an area, international relations include distinct components of human security. However, as we have previously mentioned, the

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[3] Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1975.

current definition of biosecurity should not be disconnected from "human security", referring only to regulations on misuse, diversion, release, theft and loss of biological materials[4]. This means that we have to understand the human being and its whole cultural "forms of life" in L. Wittgenstein's terms, which pertain to ethics and values, too. On the other hand, in order to depict the bigger picture of human security we have to understand that there are biosecurity considerations from the perspective of the authorities and another set of considerations, from the perspective of the user, which may be correlated with the first, but not necessarily. A close concept is biosafety, defined mainly in terms of protecting public health and the environment against accidental exposure to biological agents. The two concepts are considered to give the main dimensions of *biorisk management*[5]. Starting from biosafety, understood in a rather narrow way, as a result of national, international and international standards, procedures and policies on biological risks, risk management and risk limitations, the prospects are that the analysis of international biosafety will mature into a subset of the field of international relations with a broader vision of "human security". And this broader vision of biosecurity as human security should be discussed, explained and promoted, especially in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic and its global consequences.

There is also an inevitable theoretical part of biosafety research that suggests a theoretical field to investigate, but also a field of conceptual and thematic re-signified aspects, capturing new and fluctuating phenomena, with a relevance that needs interpretation, especially from the perspective of potential underlined by the study of the emergent and emerging phenomena in order to map the changes of realities and policies in an interaction between globalization and *glocalization* (which means that global influence might emphasize local aspects and phenomena) that cannot remain limited to an academic world or, conversely, to current international affairs, but affects businesses, everyday life and current human security and human life, with surprising or predictable benefits and repercussions.

In the area of realities, *biorisk management* and the *creation of biosecurity systems* that are both comprehensive and functional, face a diversity of attitudes. Ideally, they reflect the optimal level of social responsibility through trust in the authorities and civil obedience freely derived from the belief in the rationality of decisions and solidarity, not from an increased state of caution towards the repercussions provided in the official decisions generated by the state of emergency.

The measures taken for biosecurity by various nations require social distancing, isolation and quarantine as methods of protecting the population, until a vaccine or treatment is validated. Most nations are closing their borders and imposing a state of emergency. The coherence of national measures at both national and international level is relative. In Spain, despite the imposition of social isolation,

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[4] Cf. https://www.biosafety.be/content/biosecurity, accessed at 27 March 2020.
[5] *Ibidem.*

the activity of stylists is allowed, for example[6]. Worldwide, some of the borders are closed unilaterally. Also, at the international level, despite the agreement on the need for social distancing, new population movements appear, accepted through governmental agreements for agricultural purposes, for the harvest of the first spring crops[7].

The coronavirus pandemic also proved that xenophobic reactions were inevitable[8]. The free press documents the avalanche not only of xenophobic anti-Asian and anti-Chinese incidents, but also of the establishment of these incidents in a global phenomenon, which is even celebrated and cultivated unsanctioned[9]. At the same time, however, various personalities, such as the mayor of New York[10] or the mayor of Toronto[11], or international organizations, such as the UN[12], are taking a stand against this dangerous xenophobic phenomenon, which affects like a "virus", this time metaphorically, the global political climate. In general, national and international socio-political communication deficiencies exacerbate the situation. We can see that in times of pandemic, as always in times of crisis, public communication through the press, television or social networks exacerbates sensational and catastrophic aspects, stimulates rumours, facilitates the reception of fake news and erodes public trust and solidarity necessary to overcome any difficult situation. Sensationalism, propaganda and fake news affect human security precisely by destroying the human perceived value, the symbolic status of (benign) otherness with consequences for social trust and solidarity in both national and international relations.

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[6] Jessica Jones, "Factbox: Spain's coronavirus state of emergency measures", https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-spain-factbox/factbox-spains-coronavirus-state-of-emergency-measures-idUSKBN21117W, 15 March 2020, accessed at 29 April 2020.

[7] https://www.dw.com/en/germany-drafts-romanian-farm-labor-for-coronavirus-pandemic/a-53066735, published at 8 April 2020, accessed at 16 April 2020.

[8] Joyce Lau, "Coronavirus sparks a rising tide of xenophobia worldwide", 23 March 2020, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/coronavirus-sparks-rising-tide-ofxenophobia-worldwide, accessed at 29 April 2020.

[9] "German and other European media fan coronavirus fears and sinophobia", *The Straits Times*, 5 February 2020, accessed at 12 February 2020; Rogers, Katie; Jakes, Lara; Swanson, Anna (18 March 2020) "Trump Defends Using 'Chinese Virus' Label, Ignoring Growing Criticism", *New York Times*, accessed at 22 March 2020; "Backlash against Asians could hinder efforts to contain coronavirus, expert says", *ABC News*, 13 March 2020, accessed at 15 March 2020; "Fears of new virus trigger anti-China sentiment worldwide", *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 2 February 2020, accessed at 10 February 2020; "Asians worldwide share examples of coronavirus-related xenophobia on social media", NBC News, 13 February 2020, accessed at 23 February 2020; "Coronavirus prompts 'hysterical, shameful' Sinophobia in Italy", aljazeera.com accessed at 2 March 2020; "Chinese targeted in Russia raids as coronavirus fears spread", 23 February 2020; "Coronavirus: Ukraine protesters attack buses carrying China evacuees", BBC News, 21 February, accessed at 24 February 2020; "You deserve the coronavirus': Chinese people in UK abused over outbreak", Sky News, 12 February 2020, accessed at 26 February 2020; "Dozens of statues and religious artifacts vandalized – Video – CityNews Montreal", Montreal.citynews.ca., 4 March 2020, accessed at 3 April 2020; 18 March, Tim Hains On Date; 2020 "Reporter to President Trump: Is It Acceptable To Call Coronavirus "Kung Flu"?", www.realclearpolitics.com., accessed at 28 March 2020; "CNN article on Trump pulling back Chinese Virus term", accessed at 4 April 2020, etc.

[10] "Mayor de Blasio Encourages New Yorkers to Visit Asian-American Owned Small Businesses", The official website of the City of New York, 13 February 2020, accessed at 11 March 2020.

[11] "Toronto mayor denounces xenophobia against Chinese community amid coronavirus fears", NBC News, 6 February 2020, accessed at 24 February 2020.

[12] "U.N. asks world to fight virus-spawned discrimination", Reuters, 27 February 2020, accessed at 11 March 2020.

When we are assessing the concept of human security, there are other issues for reflection that serve to establish a more complete perspective on biosecurity, including the shameful events of ethnic genocide, poverty and hunger, which threaten the security of the human being as a biological being and as a dignified being at once, as much as the viral and bacteriological threat threatens human security. Environmental threats (global warming, pollution, etc.) also pose a biosecurity threat that extends beyond the borders of the human species and this challenge has an environmental dimension and a second dimension regarding the quality of human life with all the register of human affects and emotions.

Biosecurity is a human security issue and should be regulated with consideration for the quality and dignity of human life, not only for a limited current safety of the human being. Specialized research in human security should consider ethical issues, especially as scientific and technological progress has a faster rate of development than the codes of ethics and the ethical infusion of national and international policies, standards and procedures do. The elements and phenomena which are relevant to human security and biosecurity, such as the security of human life (that is, in the face of hunger, poverty or natural and intentional/unintentional laboratory threats, by reconstituting threatening microorganisms as weapons, or as steps in development of science) are all the more dramatic in the context of hunger and non-eradicated poverty. At the same time, the significant aspects for biosecurity are more numerous than those selected either by intuition or by a narrow understanding of "biosecurity".

Our approach proposes a first analysis in order to extend the scientific understanding of biosafety, considering the human security, that is, the biological human beings in the face of the multitude of threats that may be biological by their nature, or by biological targets considered (here we are interested primarily human ones, but these are not the only ones to be considered). It is necessary that the issues of biosafety, biosafety and human security can be addressed in an integrated way considering the complexity of the human being and the necessities pertaining to human action, human creation, human will, expressions and emotion. A poor, humiliated, inactive, immobile, unexpressed and uncreative (disempowered) but safe human being loses all meaning and value.

The initial steps in this direction are made by studies on global health education and security. Judy Sture, Simon Whitby and Dana Perkins wrote "Biosafety, Biosafety and Internationally Mandated Regulatory Regimes: Compliance Mechanisms for Education and Global Health Security"[13], a study in which the authors have analysed the international educational obligations in the field of biosafety and biosafety that are valid for nation states, such as recognizing the existence of such provisions and understanding them as a basis for a better awareness of biosafety concerns and modalities. Such measures are necessary because it is natural for national and international decision-makers to assume and fulfil their responsibilities against the misuse of biologically hazardous materials.

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[13] Judy Sture, Simon Whitby and Dana Perkins, *Biosafety, biosecurity and internationally mandated regulatory regimes: compliance mechanisms for education and global health security*, in "Medicine, Conflict and Survival", Volume 29, No.4, Oct.-Dec. 2013, pp. 289-321.

Another interesting example is provided by the study entitled "Globalization of biosafety", signed by R. M. Atlas and J. Reppy. The study shows that reducing the risk of bioterrorism requires an international regime of "mandatory legal control of access to dangerous pathogens, transparency for sanctioned biodefense programs, technology transfer and assistance to developing countries to jointly promote biosecurity and biosecurity, global awareness of the dilemma with dual use and the potential abuse of science by terrorists and the development of a global ethics of compliance"[14]. The authors point out that this international regime should use national and international institutions "that already have a role to play in ensuring safety and security" and the resources of the World Health Organization.

Focusing on aspects recently revealed by the problem of the Covid-19 pandemic, we notice that there is already a fairly clear direction, outlined around biosecurity, in the last three decades. First of all, it is about being aware of the difficult ethical implications or dangers of using biological materials and especially of biological and genetic engineering activities. Scientific achievements bear witness to the unprecedented development of the life sciences through new technologies, through new methods of synthesis in the laboratory, either as a consequence or as a reaction to whatever human beings have encountered and experienced in nature. The recent decades of the third millennium have brought to the attention of a globalized public, despite some well-kept secrets, to understand the frequency of special discoveries in areas such as epidemiology, public health, biological weapons, which may or may not be involved in terrorist acts or harm, intended against human beings, crops, animals. The growing awareness of these issues has led to the establishment of standards, procedures and rules on bioengineering activities, activities of production and handling of materials (activities included in the phrase "synthetic biology").

More and more laboratories are dealing with high-risk biological syntheses. The activities of the bio-hacker community, amateur biologists and bio-terrorists must also be considered and examined. There is an indisputable fact that there are more and more laboratories dealing with biological agents that can be potentially or in fact dangerous (bacteria, viruses, genes, etc.), and experience already points out that there is a need for standards, guarantees and more effective regulations in these areas of activity, with reference to errors, accidents or bad intentions associated with these types of activities.

The dystopian aspect and the colossal ethical danger take more precise contours if we think about the concrete scientific activities of the last two decades (since 2002) associated with the mapping of the hepatitis B virus genome and the publication of the sequences of this genetic code, the chemical synthesis of the polio virus laboratory of "Spanish flu"[15].

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[14] R. M. Atlas and J. Reppy, *Globalizing biosecurity*, "Biosecurity. Bioterror", Volume 3, No. 1, 2005, pp. 51-60.
[15] Cf. https://www.biosafety.be/content/biosecurity, accessed at 28 March 2020.

Consequently, the subject of biosecurity has been placed higher on the global political agenda of the United Nations, the World Health Organization and professional biosafety associations. There is a European Biosafety Association and an American Biosafety Association, but they may not be sufficiently involved, as they should be, in implementing public biosafety policies in the US and the EU. Until recently, national government agendas rather did not include biosecurity and biosafety concerns[16].

What is certain is that things are extremely complicated. For instance, the category of "biological agents" is broad and includes human individuals, varieties of animals, various organisms and micro-organisms which could in turn be threats or targets of threats. The threats are varied, too. The threat could be radiation or even national or international governments or institutions through their actions or through inaction, national or international governments or institutions, which are, at the limit, also biological agents, by directly or indirectly targeting human biological beings or solely dealing with human biological beings. From this perspective, we can compose a much more complex picture of the great diversity of biosecurity actions and issues.

But why should we establish biosecurity as a branch of international relations? Now it's clear. Diseases such as Covid-19 challenge national borders, especially in our world which is already one extremely connected, dynamic and relational due to globalization, neoliberalism and environmental concerns that have characterized contemporary humanity until recently. Although nation states are primarily responsible and accountable for measures taken to prevent, limit and eradicate pandemics, international institutions and internationally supported policies, standards and procedures improve or reduce the chances of achieving an international security context. At the same time, we can note that the world of international relations is not somehow above and beyond states – it is a world of states, reaffirming states as much as they challenge them.

In the world of international relations there are spheres of influence and persistent attempts to reconfigure the hegemonic "equations", in order to concentrate the influence at the international level: however, the theme of human security is already present and it should generate policies, as well as include and refine the existing policies, standards and rules of biosecurity. The issue of human security should also be an important concern for *national* security. As D. Hubert pointed out in his study in the journal *Security Dialogue* ("An Idea That Works in Practice", 2004), the analysis of human security is the analysis of sovereignty. In our perspective, it is also extremely relevant that in 2006, S. J. Maclean published the study entitled "A Decade of Human Security: Global

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[16] There are also exceptions: for instance, the official documents elaborated by the German parliament show that in the summer of 2012 it was considered necessary to elaborate a strategy against a potential pandemics after the identification of a new virus, a type of coronavirus, in the case of six German citizens, of which two died at 26 November 2012, one was hospitalized, treated and cured, up to the date when a rapport was elaborated to include a German strategy to counter a generalized worldwide pandemics. Cf. http://dipbt. bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/120/1712051.pdf, accessed at 11 April 2020.

Governance and New Multilateralisms" (Ashgate), while S. N. MacFarlane and Y. F. Khong, during the same year, have published the book entitled *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (at Indiana University Press). These works not only illustrate a varied bibliography, but show that not even during a decade (which represents a significant time interval in the age of speed and technology of "dromocracy" (meaning "accelerated democracy") highlighted by the philosopher Paul Virilio and of "fluid identity" (in a "liquid modernity", according to the sociologist Z. Bauman) biosecurity and biosecurity could not be in any way relevant correlated with bioethics studies and specific biopolicies to influence in an efficient and coherent national way international agendas, standards, procedures and policies, in order to ensure the effectiveness of human security and biosecurity, at national and international level.

The contemporary world is not only a world of speed and a world of liquid modernity, but it is also a chaordic world in which "chaos"-type realities and "order"-type realities emerge, complete and succeed each other in an adaptive way, through self-processes organization, which demands "chaordic leadership"[17]. The chaordic character appears more obvious during the current pandemic crisis. Apparently, the urgency is to limit the crisis by increased control and by diminishing democratic gains, by military ordinances, state of emergency and increased surveillance of public space. In fact, the right reaction is the increased responsibility of society at all levels, spontaneously (in an emergent manner), with phenomena of self-organization and solidarity, or even generalized chaordic leadership, in the case of each individual who becomes aware that he should make the best decision for himself and for others in a timely manner and in the most appropriate manner, assuming thus the responsibility for it. Chaordic systems are not just complex and open systems; they are evolutionary, potentially surprising systems, whose development and self-organization may be too little nomocratically controlled and too little guaranteed by a simple teleocratic orientation. Currently, each responsible individual contributes to the quality of the self-organization of the system by freely assuming a set of rational, reasonable and intelligible social goals of complex and changing systems, to a degree and the result tends even to overpass the stage called "liquid society", remarked by Z. Bauman. Thus, it is essential that the biosecurity systems designed also consider the chaordic aspect of contemporaneity, man and society. Biorisk management should benefit from the ideas of chaordic management.

Researchers Karen Armstrong, Barbara Barratt and Stephen Goldson estimate imaged biosafety systems in a continuum of bio-protection, starting from risk sources (starting from imports, transport vessels, correspondence, passengers, air, water, land), as in the diagram below, considering particular pre-border and post-border standards and situations, verification measures, appropriate forms of response, etc.

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[17] Dee Hock, "The Art of Chaordic Leadership", *Leader to Leader*, No. 15, Winter, 2000, pp. 20-26.

Armstrong, Karen & Barratt, Barbara & Goldson, Stephen. (2017).
Biosecurity in the bioprotection continuum: the complexities for pasture…,
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Key-activities-undertaken-across-the-biosecurity-
system-in-New-Zealand-to-reduce-the-risk_fig1_326315566

The issue of global cross-border assistance provided by international organizations to national governments will require a change of perspective on home affairs as a matter for nation states. Valuable initiatives for global human security could be generated by reflection on how to correct the deceptions perpetuated for decades by nation-states (corruption, poor governance, poor management of difficult situations and public funds, lack of optimal response, lack of experience and others), as well as certain suspicions about the threats against sovereignty and, consequently, a renewed conception of national security[18].

It is relevant that the discussion on biosecurity also should include the ethical dimension. In international relations, although the ethics of international relations continues to be a marginal subdomain, we need the ethical approach. The most appropriate is *the ethics of the right answer* which we have discussed starting from S. Chritchley with a different occasion[19]. The ethical approach starts from a nuanced understanding of the principles to be considered valuable in guiding our security actions and of the legitimate aims of our actions. In the attempt to understand the world of biological and medical threats, we should note the following idea: one disease is worse than another, no matter how much one objects to a proposed hierarchy. And this is the first thing we should expect from a (WHO) security agenda [if it is to have a public utility for the public agenda for human security][20]. The Commission on Human Security (UN) has established a hierarchy of biosecurity threats, which can prove to be instrumental, a previous

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[18] Matthew S. Weinhert, "From State Security to Human Security?", *The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations*, ed. Patrick Hayden, Ashgate, New Haven, 2009.

[19] Henrieta Șerban, *Ideologiile reformatoare*, Editura Institutului de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010.

[20] *Ibidem*.

generator of increased legitimacy, useful in developing lucid, realistic and effective clear public policies. At the same time, the WHO authority could be considered a threat to the image security of national political leaders and, ultimately, to the authority and eventually the existence of the nation-state, both during and after the pandemic.

A crucial aspect for the existence of the nation-state lies in the responsibility and efficiency with which it can respond to security and biosecurity threats. For example, Covid-19 already poses a security threat to the image and, although currently the actual peril is weak, to the legitimacy of the existence of the nation-state.

In our approach, it is also important to emphasize that human rights are the legitimate basis for meeting both the human needs for healthy existence and holistic development, as well as the strict requirements of human security and biosecurity. Therefore, it is undesirable to see difficult measures, easily justified and accepted in difficult times, such as establishing a state of emergency, perpetuated as long-term solutions, with unwelcome effects for *the democratic future*, with repercussions on human rights and as a boomerang effect, with negative consequences for human dignity, quality of human life, although maybe they are still justifiable in terms of human security and biosecurity. Reducing the realm of man and mankind to the (biological) safety and security is wrong no matter how important is man or mankind security. The human being should be "saved" in her entirety; along with her conditions of possibility and actualization for her humanity not only as a healthy and secure bodily entity. An efficient and comprehensive system should preserve also *the human ontological mode*, that is, as well the possibilities of self-expression, creativity, human rights, socio-political and even economic rights (UN also stated: below a certain threshold poverty is condemnable, wrong and inacceptable[21]), for dignified, not only safe and secure, human beings.

The re-signified security concepts topical during biological threats call for the analytical capacity to disassemble states into the smallest components, i.e., *human individuals, and to reform human societies through public policies that are not only responsive and transparent, but also ethical, pragmatic and proactive. In this respect, the well-known and verified principles of good governance are the first to be implemented to standardize and coordinate local, national and global measures to achieve biosecurity as human and state security.*

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Cosmopolitanism has placed the emancipated individual at the centre of all preoccupations; however, biological threats bring together concerns about the individual, the nation, federations and unions, but also the species as a whole

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[21] See UN, "Third Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (2018-2027)", https://www.un.org/development/desa/socialperspectiveondevelopment/united-nations-decade-for-the-eradication-of-poverty/third.html.

and, together, with a broader context of biodiversity. The biostrategies needed for international biosafety mechanisms start from the urgency and importance of developing a global health system with mandatory indicators, capabilities and similar procedures in relation to the number of inhabitants in all countries of the world, regardless of the stage of development. Is such a public health system at least possible in the European Union? Is this path of action utopian? The pandemic is a dramatic factor in rapidly changing the world. Biosafety is at the forefront of concerns for national and international security, being at the same time a test of sociality, humanity, solidarity, civic calm, democracy at national and international level. At the same time this crisis is a test of national economy and the international economy, a test of the functionality of specialized international institutions, or at least relevant in addressing biosafety risks, a test of international law and a test of reagent rate functionality and adaptability of the large UN or WHO bodies. Last but not least, this is a test for the ethical nature of national and global society of mankind and for the human ontological mode.

The field of biosecurity will need to be not only interdisciplinary but also inclusive. Concern for state security in terms of human security involves understanding the biological dimension of the state and global society, the relativity of human emancipation from the biological, the issues of sustainable development in relation to biosecurity, and issues contiguous with environmentalism in terms of biosecurity, including economic and democratic aspects. The state now has the opportunity to understand the global nature of any local biological threat. Security analyses conducted in international relations will no longer be able to ignore the multiple dimensions of the phenomenon of critical biological threats to the human, animal and plant biological substrate, with human implications and repercussions. In a sense, mankind should make the ethics of the right answer her "true nature", or, mankind might lose most of the conceptual meaning, so that eventually, the actions taken for the safety, security and preservation of mankind losing meaning, too.

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