

THE PART THAT WANTS TO BECOME WHOLE.
IDENTITY DISCOURSES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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“Moldova is more than a Romanian province, far from being a Russian province, and not enough to be a nation. Here geopolitics and social reality begin to collide.”

(Friedman 2010a)

“We cannot truly understand the world we live in, without trying to integrate it and to understand its emotions.”

(Moïsi 2009)

Abstract. *The study investigates the Moldovan identity file inscribed into an analysis of sociology of nation and nationalism. It was often the main mobile and objective of most governments across the Prut River especially that of the communist government and its stakes are not disappearing, even today. From this perspective, the speeches that bring to the fore the “European integration” and the European discourse, in general, – are the false consciousness of an identity topic. The argument of the paper is not that the social, economic or related to European integration problems are not important, but that behind them lays inclusively a desire to hide the identity topic and pass it to a lower register, secondary and irrelevant.*

Keywords: *Bessarabia, Moldova Republic, (pro) Romanian discourse, European Moldovanism, Moldovan ethnicity à la russe.*

Bessarabia is Romania?

On September 5, 2010, at the France-Romania football match, on the famous *Stade du France* a huge banner reading *Bessarabia is Romania!* was displayed. The poster is, without any doubt both surprising and challenging. But beyond the spectacular gesture, such a statement implies, today, especially after the last parliamentary developments in Republic of Moldova, a number of dubitation that even the apodictic air of the banner cannot remove.

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What is actually going on there? What does “Bessarabia” represent (anymore) in terms of identity?¹ And which data would be included in this folder to be able to understand, even partially, the sometimes surprising metamorphoses, allusions and electoral illusions of a population that seems to find an answer at every electoral cycle. Or it does not find it and wants to confuse things even to a greater extent.

Without an analysis of sociology of nation and nationalism, the background noise of this article is the *identity file*. In fact, it was often the main mobile and objective of most governments across the Prut River especially that of the communist government and its stakes is not disappearing, even today. Often, and we do not say that to stand out at any cost, a series of discourses circulating in the public space at Chisinau – from the emphatic invocation of the “main problems of society” to the speeches that bring to the fore the “European integration” or “we are Europeans!” – are the false consciousness of an identity topic, which, willingly or not, those who also utter such slogans wish to occult, to some extent. We should not address it steeply. Not that one is, otherwise, required to answer the questions that they do not want to respond, or that they do not want others to know their answer to them. We do not say here that the social, economic or related to European integration problems are not important. We merely say that, not only once, behind them lays inclusively a desire to hide the identity topic and pass it to a lower register, secondary and irrelevant.

But it is present. We even dare go further and suggest that even new power architecture installed after the 28th November in Chisinau is also the consequence, even the tacit one, including a significant identity change to the left side of the river Prut².

Which are the identity projects that are circulated in the Republic of Moldova from its establishment until today?

¹ The complexity of this dilemma has been underline by George Friedman after his trip in the region: “Moldova was once part of Romania. It was once part of the Soviet Union. Moldova makes a great deal of sense as part of something. The Soviet Union is gone. Europe has more problems than it can handle already; it is not looking for more. Romania is still there. It is not a perfect solution, and certainly not one many Moldovans would welcome, but it is a solution, however imperfect” (Friedman 2010a).

² The Parliament elected on July 29, 2009 was dissolved because had failed to elect the President of the Republic of Moldova. After the constitutional referendum failed to meet the 33% turnout required to validate the results, the Constitutional Court of Moldova ruled that acting president of Moldova, Mihai Ghimpu had to dissolve the parliament and hold new elections. Ghimpu then announced that the parliament would be dissolved on 28 September 2010 and new elections would be held on 28 November 2010.

Four contestants – Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (39.34% votes), Liberal-Democratic Party of Moldova (29.42%), Democratic Party of Moldova (12.70%) and Liberal Party (9.96%) – passed the electoral threshold and will be represented in the Moldovan Parliament (19th Legislature). The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, Democratic Party of Moldova and the Liberal Party formed the Alliance for European Integration in a coalition against the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova. The Communists won 42 seats, while the Liberal-Democrats won 32, the Democratic Party won 15, and the Liberals won 12. This gave the Alliance for European Integration 59 seats, 2 short of the 61 needed to elect a President. The result thus maintained the status quo following the contemporaneous constitutional deadlock (Dungaciu 2009 and Dungaciu 2011).

How Many Identities for a Single State?

Romania Discourse

A quick summary of the history of the republic from this point of view might look like this. In the beginning the most coherent was *the (pro) Romanian discourse*. The 90's have brought to the forefront of the public space, in front of a disoriented, Soviet and nostalgic camp, but without a coherent project in addition to the return or the perpetuation of the USSR. The year 1994 meant, intermittently, the exit of the "(pro) Romanian discourse" from the area of the official or even officious discourse. Despite its public absence from the official meetings, its latencies are still present and probably will not ever be completely removed to the left of the Prut River. This discourse has the demography and the academy on its side, even though it does not have the support of the official policy. As any latency, however, to express and to manifest itself it needs appropriate manifestation frameworks, favorable circumstances and impulses. And as any latency, its immediate irruption is not one hundred percent guaranteed. So, the same way it could become paramount, it could succumb, too. This is what the authorities in Chisinau understood, explicitly or implicitly, tried or even blocked the contacts of any kind between the two sides of the Prut River.

Over this discourse that is constitutive for the young republic – see "Romanian language" in the text of the Declaration of Independence and founding unionist dilemmas – two other kinds of discourses overlapped in time, officially this time and, in fact, these two are quite contradictory with each other.

Soviet Moldovenism Discourse

The first one is the Moldovan discourse of Soviet origin (the discourse called in Chisinau – "primitive Moldovanism"). It had the début, as I said, in 1994, but reached its peak (and the ridicule!) during the communist government. In essence, it certifies the similarity between citizenship and ethnicity, producing an ethnic Moldovan discourse that claims a historical legitimacy of... 650 years, assuming with nonchalance and repeatedly, laughable, the whole history of medieval Moldavia. That, with the risk of massive overlapping the Romanian identity discourse, much better placed geographically (two thirds of medieval Moldova is in Romania) and historically (considering the medieval capital of Moldavia, the royal symbolism, etc.) to claim for itself the Moldovan ethno-symbolic heritage of a territory constitutive to the Old Kingdom and, later, of Greater Romania (see Dungaciu 2005).

Also, the promoters of the anti-Romania Moldovan discourse know that. Hence the ineluctable logic that pushes some to a type of pathological discourse, generatively referred to as "Moldova Mare" (*Great Moldova*) discourse, expressed here and there, via civic and political movements, by the newspapers assuming this vector clearly (be it placed in the title or not) or through the juvenile-extravagant speeches. But they know something else, as well, even if they do not tell it overtly. Namely that the ethnic Moldovan discourse with the historical

legitimacy of 650 years would require, as a first logical step giving up... Transnistria, which was never a part of medieval Moldova. The drama of such a discourse stays, in fact, not only in the impossibility of its fulfillment – many ethnical-political discourses stay under this sign – but in the clear conscience of those who promote it that its performance is impossible. “Moldova Mare” is not even a dream, because not only their promoters do not truly believe in it. Hence, the almost tragic awareness of some of its ideological leaders, of the most educated of their kind, who will also to be both lucid, and “in love” at the same time. And that’s not possible.

Which are the consequences? The transformation of this discourse in a rather resentful, negative weapon, obsessively directed against Romania, which is considered, tacitly, guilty for their private failures. It’s an excuse, perhaps, a good one. But that’s all. And it is too little to ensure that the national state identity discourse. In the short term, is loud and irritating, but medium and long term is condemned to failure and inefficiency.

Multi-ethnic and Multicultural Discourse

And this way we come to identify the third type of discourse also present heavily during the communist period. For, this paradox of identity of the Republic of Moldova in Voronin’s regime was that, in fact, it did not have an emblematic official discourse. It had two! As official is the Moldovan discourse of Soviet origin – as it is assumed in public discourse at the highest level – as it is also the “multi-ethnic and multicultural” discourse, assumed, too, with the same intensity and from the same highly official stand. The appeal to the official texts can prove this easily.

Depending on interests or context, one or the other of the discourses was taken out of the political hat. In relation with Romania, the ethnic Moldovan discourse came first, while in the relationship with Moscow and Tiraspol, the multicultural and multi-ethnic discourse predominated. In relation to Europe or the USA, either one of them took the fore, indecisively, depending on the interlocutor.

The dilemma was that, in reality, the two official speeches are incompatible with each other. One postulates a clear ethnic majority which is founding of the state – inscribed in the ethnic logic – and the other a multicultural and multi-ethnic civic community – accordingly to a civic logic.

So we see that inclusively during the communist times, the dilemmas of identity discourses were obvious and practically insurmountable. But the lack of a clear discourse from Chisinau and the contradictory movements merely perpetuated the impression of a building without foundation. To all these dilemmas emphasized here we need two more added. The first is related to the Transnistrian issue, read in terms of identity, which makes more difficult the issue discussed here³. A second problem is the condition of “Moldovan Diaspora”,

³ Aspect criticized more than once by the leaders in Tiraspol, through the voice of former Foreign Minister of the “Dniestrian Moldovan Republic” (DMR), Valery Litskai, who justified the impossibility “to live together”

the object of recent concern for the authorities in Chisinau, but whose identity condition does nothing but replicates the ambiguities and incongruencies known at home. For any state action in this direction must decide before who or what exactly the “Moldovan” is. Or *when* is someone that.

*Moldovan ethnicity à la russe.
The legacy of the “Voronin regime”*

We have made this short appeal to history until the elections of 29th of July 2009 for a very simple reason: things have changed after the takeover by the Alliance for the European Integration and after the overthrowing of the communists, inclusively from this point of view. Moreover, our hypothesis is that precisely the changing of the profile and of the perceptions of identity may be an element through which we can discern the most appropriate outcome of the parliamentary elections of the 28th of November 2010. It occurred a different kind of discourse – not very explicitly, yet, but rather suggested and not directly recognized as such –, another type of Moldovan ethnic current, which we could call *European Moldovanism*.

Before, however, we should talk briefly about *Moldovan ethnicity à la russe* or the inheritance of General Voronin.

We have already seen, even as a sketch, the manner in which the identity discourses evolved and their influence in society. Once again: this means in no event that they are only reading grid for the developments to the left of Prut and to treat them as such would be an error. But on the other hand, ignoring them or evaluate them in a simplistic, dichotomous, or lacking diachronicity register, respectively timely evolutions, is just a greater error.

He we state the first important observation, in this respect. During Voronin regime for eight years there has been a steady cooling trend – with very rare exceptions – the relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. It should not be neglected, because it acted only at the “surface”, on stage. The effects of the Voronin’s governance from this point of view are significant. Beyond the visible contusive aspects – that have been held up to the attention of media commentators and made the delight of the press – watching the deeper layer inside the society, for eight years strait, there were certain processes which themselves constituted the most tenacious legacy of the “Voronin regime”. Because, even in a less perceptible manner, under the visible tip of the iceberg meaningful for the strained relations between Bucharest and Chisinau, the 9 invisible ones out of 10 were also a consistent action of identity modeling: be it indirect.

of the two “banks” of the river Dniester inclusively through the fact that Moldova Republic and “DMR” are political entities based on radically different philosophies of statehood. While Moldova is based on a philosophy of the nineteenth century, with an ethnic majority and ethnic minorities, Transnistrians argued that their “state” is based on a post-modern formula, where there are no majorities and minorities, since “DMR” has three constituent ethnic groups, relatively equal, namely “the Moldavians, the Russians and the Ukrainians.” (See Dungaciu 2007).

We should remember the last years of the Voronin regime: the relations between the two sides – Romania and Republic of Moldova – are basically blocked at all levels: political, media, education (university extensions removed, changing textbooks), culture, etc. One rarely travels from one state to another and the cars with Romanian number were at that time a rarity in Chisinau. Moldovan citizens circulate relatively in Romania and when they do it is for practical reasons: Visa for Italy, Spain, and Portugal (or for these Schengen states for which they could not get visas in Chisinau) or taking off from EU airports in Bucharest to locations where they were going to work. Romania had often *utility* functions, as “transit station” and the visits were as short as possible and conducted under bad auspices, too: queues at the embassy, transport in difficult conditions, or travel by night, etc. All in all, there could be almost nothing to perpetuate nice memories.

Following the performance of the Voronin regime leaders, and first of all due to his personal performance, in society the Russian language status is improved and the quality of the Romanian language in the public space – and sometimes the quantity, too – decreases. In addition, while Russia is taking full advantage of the presence of Russian official and officious television companies from Moscow that only increase the Russian soft power, Romania not only loses the rights of broadcasting for TVR1 in Moldova Republic, but it becomes also the favorite hits collector for the local television companies – which do not cease to air whichever “failure” from the right side of the Prut River, usually collected from Russian sources (news agencies, newspapers, etc.). The pieces of information about Romania in Chisinau press were well selected and, when aired on public stations – especially on Moldova 1, the main propagandist station of the regime, along with the presidential TV channel, NIT – were systematically negative. Moreover, even TV stations in Romania accepted in Moldova Republic at the time were either the politically innocent (specialized in sports, music, etc.), or the ones critical of Bucharest politics and, especially, of President Traian Băsescu, seen by the official Chisinau of that time as “public enemy number one”.

Lacking the favorable reception by the population and their engagement into Voronin’s Moldovan Project, this does not mean that it had any effects in terms of self-identification within the pursuit of the national identity for the majority. Although not always explicitly, the distance between the two sides of the Prut increased progressively.

Regarding the minority Russian and the Russophones, the effects of Voronin government were even clearer. The communist regime has provided ideal conditions for the existence of the Russian minority, primarily because they were allowed, tacitly, to live their lives parallel to that of the majority, without being embarrassed or worried that any sudden policy change can change the status quo. The idea that Russians have supported Voronin and his regime strictly for nostalgic or ideological reasons is exaggerated. There were some of these, of course, but the Russians from the Republic of Moldova were urban, relatively affluent and educated over the average of the country, and they did not support the Voronin regime only for political sympathies or of other nature. But the

supported the regime also for the reason that ... it left them alone. Voronin regime – led by a rude character, politically exceeded also by Russian standards and that many of them despised honestly – allowed them the luxury of living *in* the Republic of Moldova without having to be *integrated* into the society of the Republic of Moldova. It was a parallel life, almost, that only intersected with the indigenous majorities when necessary, where the Russians lived separate, septic and often full of contempt lives. Without exaggeration and keeping good measure of the situation, we can say that we could identify a clear rift between the Russian minority and the native majority practically from any point of view considerable that we have investigated to track the reality: the language they spoke, the books they read, the authors frequented, the televisions watched, the restaurants and clubs they went to, the universities where they sent their children, the cars they drove, etc. In addition, the Russian minority benefited from the effect of seduction, that is, what the Europeans call “soft power”, in front of the natives who failed to resist temptation to behave the Russian way, or even to *seem Russian*, at least a few times in life ... On the other hand, we do not believe that someone may have witnessed a transformation or inverse transformation attempts. Contempt and respect had clear directions in the society of Moldova Republic.

In conclusion, at least from this point of view, Voronin behaved as a political pendulum, indecently, somewhere between Russians’ contempt and the complete distrust of the natives (i.e. to the point where that Moldovan project engages truly commitment). Voronin was never convincingly, a “Father of the nation”, but possibly a “Father of the State”. And that is something else. It is part of the Soviet imagination, part of an inherited project, respectively, in the Russian language, but that was perpetuated, in degraded forms, in the post-imperial period, too.

And these things begin to change after July 29, 2010.

European Moldovanism versus Soviet Moldovanism

European Moldovanism is a species of self-identification identity mechanism not necessarily new, but unique in its ability to *publicly* manifest apprehended. From *latent* it became *manifest*. It is a form of locality patriotism or “Moldovan” patriotism. The watchwords of his tacit supporters – for the time being the explicit political discourses in this respect are relatively temperate – are “realism”, “reasonableness” and “lucidity”.

Unlike *Soviet Moldovanism* promoted by the Voronin regime, it presents some virtual and main characteristics:

1. In what concerns its relation with Russia, it is not necessarily pro-Russian, without the radical pro-Romanian discourse in this direction; in the relationship with Moscow it accepts, eventually, the *pragmatism*, including blunt silence on certain historical topics, even if it is not clear each time which are the landmarks and the limits of this pragmatism;

2. From the *geopolitical* standpoint, this type of attitude and discourse attempts to justify itself, at a popular level, including through a variety of geopolitical autarchy

hard to define, translated usually in the formula that bursts often at the public level – “both without Russians and without Romanians” – respectively a sort of “by ourselves”, vague and unrealistic, of course, but becoming more prevalent in the population, including the young; the “solution” suggested, though, to exit this dilemma would be a *direct* plunge in “Europe”, which constitutes the predilection of the (geo)political discourse;

3. As a *political* approach, it is therefore pro-European, but this type of discourse serves many functions, including avoidance of the frontal undertaking of the identity relations with Romania, which so far has avoided them, and the occultation of the identity discourse about Moldova, while the integrationist discourse is currently serving as “state ideology”;

4. On *bilateral* relations with Romania, the *Moldovan Europeanist* will be more pragmatic, will insist on cooperation and collaboration, without explicitly to individualize the bilateral relationship within the European course of the Republic of Moldova, meanwhile, keeping the “traditional” politics of Chisinau, requesting a basic Treaty, especially that at this point it will have also the adhesion of other political parties from different sides;

5. Strictly related to the geopolitical issue (2), from the *ecclesiological* point of view, that of religion, Moldovan Europeanist is best placed to support, perfectly consistent in his view, the third “solution” for the church of the Republic of Moldova, namely the *autocephaly* status. If the pro-Romanian party has – in theory – the ecclesial equivalent of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, the most apt ecclesiastical equivalent of the “European Moldovanism” could not be the Russian project for the Metropolitan Church of Moldova (canonically subjected to the Russian Patriarchate), but ... the autocephaly of church in the Republic of Moldova⁴. Such a solution – beyond its utopia – would be ideal from the point of view of the *European Moldovanism*, because it would validate, indirectly, the existence of a “Moldovan ethnic majority” which the *European Moldovanism* does not promote as such;

6. From the point of view of *glotonym* and *ethnonyms*, this is a form of patriotism of those who recognize that they speak “Romanian”, but keep the idea of differentiation between the Moldovan identities from the two sides of the Prut River, even if not explicitly for ethnic reasons, but, however, for historical and cultural ones. They do not insist on the ethnic differences, because those would virtually be impossible to prove. But “Romanian language” is the maximum level of identity with the pro-Romanian discourse that this type of Moldovanism could accept with serenity.

⁴ The *autocephaly* Project was bashfully vehiculated at the beginning of the '90s, and then it disappeared from the landscape. It was resuscitated, not incidentally, by Presedent Petru Lucinsch – the *precursor* of the nowadays *European Moldovanism* –, who promoted it at Constantinople, but received a negative answer from the Ecumenic Patriarch. Briefly put, a Moldovan autocephalous Church cannot exist because there could not be two Romanian autocephalous Churches, since there is no „Moldovan ethny” able to found ecclesiastically and ethnically such a project. The question of autocephaly returned in discussion, incidentally, at November 22, 2007, when official talks of the delegates of the Romanian and Russian Patriarchy took place at the Trojan Monastery in Bulgaria. The main subject was the situation of the eparchies from Moldova Republic and the Church, in general. There was no result, but one of the proposals advanced then for the overcoming of the divergences was – tactically? – the autocephaly of the Church in the Republic of Moldova.

7. From the point of view of state identity, *European Moldovanism* is neither anti-Romanian, nor “pro-Romanian” but the idea of “two Romanian states” could be accepted more as a tactical approach, pertaining to the stage, and not as a project.

The phenomenon is relatively new, at least at the level of public visibility. If in the ‘90s the *public* polarization this view was, perhaps, following the identity veins of “pro-Russian” or “pro-Romanian” type, later passing gradually to a “Moldovan” identity on the Soviet vein (Agrarians, Voronin’s Communists, etc.), today the “Moldovan” identity of the European formula is becoming more visible, not against the “Romanian” identity, but not identical with it either.

The precursor of the *European Moldovanism* discourse, I suggested, could be President Lucinschi, which however could not effectively implement it effectively in practice because the European prospects for Chisinau were then very slightly tangible and outside an enrooted public use. It took eight years of *Soviet Moldovanism*, plus the disappointment of Voronin regime and a favorable geopolitical context for this discourse to return with new wind in their sails.

Today, this type of identity quest event found the best discharge in the political project and the person of Vladimir Filat, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and prime-minister of the republic. Without necessarily be intended that from the start, Vlad Filat is at present the leader who can capture – and he does capture! – associated states of mind. On the one hand, he is the happy beneficiary of these latencies become manifest, and on the other hand, he gives those who need the confirmations that the European Moldovanist project becomes viable and that it has European recognition, while Vlad Filat, the bearer of the flag, and the one who represents at the highest level this project has recognition including that of the Euro-Atlantic leaders: Hilary Clinton, Angela Merkel and even ... Traian Băsescu.

From this point of view, Vlad Filat was the man of the political moment. Pragmatic enough to make statements that are spread over a diverse span and well managed according to the interlocutor; the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) became, willingly or not, the flag bearer of the manifestations of identity. And here is to be sought at least one of the explanations of his electoral success.

Communists by Circumstance or the Reaction of the Russophones

How did the Russian-speaking minority react? The identity resurrection on the locality identity formula, Moldovan and European, did not go unnoticed, especially within the Russian and Russian-speaking population. This population responded, in turn, and the manner in which it did it was explicit, this reaction being also one of the reasons for maintaining at this level the electoral percentage of PCRM. The wind that blew in the MLDP political sails was precisely what kept it afloat, despite the fact that Voronin, ship’s captain, became almost irrelevant. Voronin did not matter anymore, while the *perceived* functions of the Communist Party mattered and the perceived threat of the resurrection of the political forces of the majority.

Against what did the Russophone minority react? Against what they perceived as affecting the status quo established by the government Voronin. The change did not mean for them as much a political modification as the change the *status quo*. Beyond the contempt of the post-imperial minority for the current political majority, the key psychological mechanism of was *fear*: on the one hand, loss of *psychological protection*, on the other, the *predictability* provided by a Voronin government type. The resurrection of the indigenous identity fund may generate unpredictable evolutions, perceived as dangerous for the Russian-speaking minority located mainly in the cities.

Let us make a major statement: the difference between the self-identification of the majority as “Romanian” or as “Moldovan” is incomparably smaller for a Russian or a Russian-speaking person from Moldova Republic or from the Russian Federation than for someone in Bucharest and Chisinau. Otherwise said, for a Russian or Russian-speaking individual the difference between a “Romanian” and “Moldovan” is rather one of *degree*. Hence the logical conclusion: the fact that today the majority of Moldova declares to be “Moldovan” is not necessarily reassuring for Russian-speaking, because no one can guarantee that in future it will not be... “Romanian”, with all consequences following from here and that they perceive, at least for now, as dangerous. Hence, the danger sensed by the native minority to any potential resurrection, be it on the “Romanian” or on the “Moldovan” channel. Proof of this is also the fact that Russophones use the term “Romanian language” far more than the majority, because they do not see, naturally, no difference between the two languages and no need to differentiate among them to justify themselves or to comfort themselves in questions of identity as a part of the majority population does.

Let us return now to the reaction of the Russophones. The show to which they attended during the time the Alliance for European Integration and during the period of electoral campaign was unsettling. Resurrection grown on the native fund manifested at multiple levels: from sports victories with public resonance, highly publicized and promoted and turned into patriotic campaign type “Be proud of your country” or “Fly a flag high,” and to the European support of the government IEA, the climax being the consistent landing of the Europeans at Chisinau, which sent the government and the Alliance clear messages of support. The question became, perhaps for the first time, serious!

All these events have had, as I suggested, two types of effects: on the one hand, the reaction of the majority that begins to perceive Chisinau like an actor taken seriously by “high-brow” part of Europe, which gives him indisputable self-esteem, which would not have ever happened during Voronin government. And, when the head of government is received by the great world leaders from the U.S.A. to Europe, i.e. Hillary Clinton, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin or Traian Băsescu and all these did not have the ritualistic and ineffective air that was accompanying once the – indeed, extremely rare – visits of the former communist president, it is clear that local pride exults. “Politicians could be born... in Moldova, too” will be exclaimed, perhaps for the first time, by many representatives of the majority, which was extremely important to resolve,

partially, of course, an old dilemma of Moldova Republic: that of the “recognition” and of the “self-esteem,” the feeling that you enjoy, once in a blue moon, the desired attention.

What was cause for celebration for the majority was (also) cause of concern for the Russian-speaking minority. For he felt this development, but he felt it, I said, as a potential threat to his social status, at least by its lack of predictability. Where will this resurrection of the local fund arrive? Where will it stop? Hence this reaction of electoral mobilization to vote that party guaranteeing, even indirectly, *psychological protection and status protection*, and which can stop a political and local identity resurrection that risks – from the point of view of the minority group – to get out of control.

Hence, it derived the prompt mobilization to vote. We have to notice here, too, that the vote was not a spontaneous, an emotional one, or a disinterested one. Russophones’ vote for the Moldovan Communist Party (PCRM) was a generalist one, as I said, generated by *fear*, but perfectly reasonable at the level of *solution* identification.

Social Polarization in Republic of Moldova: What Does Come Next?

The explanation of election results can therefore be understood including through this mechanism of polarization that occurred within society, and which I have tried to depict.

In what stays this polarization? In the fact that, in terms of identity, Moldova Republic is likely to become what Samuel Huntington called, referring to Ukraine, “cleft country” (a country torn apart) – but, in the meantime, the attribute was explicitly associated also with Moldova Republic (Katchanovski 2006). More specifically, Moldova Republic goes on a *European Moldovanism* type of polarization versus *Russophone resurrection* type, protectively discharged during the last elections toward the Communist Party. The Romanian discourse (promoted mainly by the Liberal Party) tries to catch up.

If so are the current states of affairs, *in terms of discourses of identity*, the Moldova Republic political spectrum covers a centerpiece axis PCRM – PLDM, plus the two parties present in the Parliament, respectively the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party. But it is not our goal here to make predictions or political analysis going beyond the framework of this article (see Dungaciu 2009).

We stop here our analysis, stating that, if the analysis of discourses of identity and predispositions of people in this regard does not exhaust the political and geopolitical issue in the Republic of Moldova, their importance should not be, however, underestimated. As a recent volume from which I have selected the mottos of this analysis (Moisi 2009) attempted to convince us that the emotions matter, their ability to shape political or geopolitical world should not be neglected, too.

What will happen in our part of the world, we shall see. The future of the Republic of Moldova has always been unpredictable. As it were, alike, its past...

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