SINATRA DOCTRINE, KVITSINSKY DOCTRINE, WARSAW PACT AND THE SOVIET ‘FINLANDIZATION’ OF ROMANIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY 1990s

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Abstract. This paper aims to reveal the nature, the magnitude and the impact of Kremlin’s articulated preferences in the shaping of Romania’s foreign policy topography from the early 1990s, with a special focus on the behavioural dynamics related to the evolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. Special attention will be paid to the signing of the 1991 Romanian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation – a document articulated on the political backbone of the Kvitsinsky Doctrine –, and whose provisions (if ratified by the Parliament) would have prevented Romania’s accession to NATO for 15 years.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Romania, USSR, ‘Finlandization’, Sinatra Doctrine, Kvitsinsky Doctrine, Warsaw Pact.

By-products of Gorbachev’s Sinatra Doctrine1 – which replaced Kremlin’s Brezhnevist foreign policy perspective and behavioural dynamics with a ‘let them do it their way’ approach2 – the revolutionary processes that reshaped the political geometry of the Eastern bloc reached an unprecedented magnitude, when Romania – the last bastion of totalitarian Communism in the region – descended into bloodshed and anarchy, in December 1989.

However, one key element of the riots and fighting that overthrew the totalitarian regime of Ceaușescu is that – despite of being essentially anti-communist – they had neither an anti-Soviet, neither a pro-Western character. In particular, the first official law passed by the National Salvation Front (FSN), the new political structure that took power amidst the tumult of the “revolution”, singled out the establishment’s unconditional support for Romania’s commitments regarding the Warsaw Pact3 and for Gorbachev’s perspective of the international institutional structure4.

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3 National Salvation Front (FSN)’s Statement to the Country, December 22 1989, 1.

In this context, despite a relatively widespread interpretation regarding the apparent acceptance of an asymmetrical core-periphery relationship with Kremlin singling out the violence and riots as a staged coup masterminded by Moscow\(^5\), by Washington\(^6\) or both\(^7\) and implemented with the help of former-high ranking Romanian communists affiliated to these intelligence structures, but also with the help of the Hungarian intelligence “working in concert with the West”\(^8\) there is rather scant evidence to support the allegations of an external subversion theory. In particular, the findings seem to point out to a reasonably acceptable, namely that, during the 1989 events, Romania could have been targeted by intelligence activities or even active measures-type of intelligence warfare, yet not to the extent that Soviet, American or Hungarian security services played the key role in the unfolding of the events.

However, whether the external subversion theory is veracious or whether it is mental construction aimed to help a nominal group of persons involved in the bloodshed to escape any repercussions of the December deaths by transferring part of the guilt to mysterious and mostly undefined exogenous actor(s), a key element of the Romanian-Soviet relation is the role FSN leadership aimed to assign to Kremlin, in the aftermath of the coup that ousted Ceaușescu, when new Romanian President Iliescu pledged for Soviet military assistance\(^9\) in order to ‘counter the threats against his new government’\(^10\) an announcement that was rendered public by the Romanian television shortly after.

Of note, decades later both Iliescu and Gorbachev officially denied such request was ever made\(^11\), although a declassified document of Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather pointed out the contrary. The manuscript containing the report of a discussion between a Polish diplomat and an employee of the Soviet embassy in Bucharest states that the on December 23, 1989 Ion Iliescu and Silviu Brucan, approached the Soviet Diplomatic residency and pleaded for a Soviet military intervention in Romania, that could help them secure their position\(^12\). In particular,

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on December 24, Washington via its US Secretary of State James Baker whitelisted a Warsaw Pact military intervention in Romania, an invitation which the Soviets ‘arrogantly’ rejected, both via diplomatic channels and through a declaration of Nikolai Ryzhkov, back then member of the CPSU Politburo and Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the December 24 1989 edition of the Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya newspaper.

However, by early 1990s – when the domestic situation was established to some extent – unlike most of the other ex-Soviet satellites preoccupied in various degrees with improving their relationships with the West – the standard mantra about Bucharest’s foreign policy was, according to Gosu, to confirm the new ruling structure’s affiliation to Kremlin, thus legitimizing further Soviet domination of Romania’s foreign policy dynamics. In particular, although the reasoning varies from one account to another, the explanatory range goes from pro-Soviet orientation of the new FSN government up to ensuring Romania’s survival in a moment when he had no security guarantees.

Some elements substantiating the existence of a core-periphery relationship, claims Gosu, derive, on one hand by the constant and repeated visits to Moscow of the Romanian government Ministers during the first months after the regime change and, on another, by the fact that, after a 26 years hiatus, Romania began to send military officers and diplomats to be trained in Moscow’s academies and institutes – a preamble of what emphasizes to be ‘a solid future relationship’ with the Soviets.

For the leading figures of the 1990 Romanian politics however, such actions and all other interactions with the USSR weren’t at all unnatural, but rather reflected a ‘recalibration of the bilateral legal settings’, inherent to the ‘systemic changes initiated by the implosion and collapse of the Communist regimes throughout Central and Eastern Europe’.

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Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee meeting that took place in Moscow on June 7, 1990 – aiming to ‘reconsider the character and functions’ of the Warsaw Treaty and to ‘transform it into a treaty of sovereign states with equal rights, formed on a democratic basis’ revealed however that Romania shared a different stage of dependence from Kremlin’s that Moscow’s other Central and Eastern European satellites.

According to Spero, during the Moscow meeting, there were three distinct currents within the Warsaw Treaty camp: on one hand, the Czechoslovak-Hungarian-Polish triangle, whose policy-makers coordinated their actions and strategies, countering Kremlin’s demands of restructuring the pact and persuading Moscow negotiators to accept trade-offs by the closure of the negotiations, the Soviets and the other less-reformed delegations (like Romania) who were supporters of a rather structural revamping of the Treaty and of the COMECON, and the GDR – which, at that time was already embarked on an institutional and political path to become a part of the Federal Republic of Germany and thus paid low interest to the evolution of the two structures.

In particular, Iliescu’s singular support for Gorbachev’s position, highlighted in the official press release, singled out the Romanian leader as the only non-Soviet policy-maker to advocate the transformation of the two Kremlin-led international structures into institutions which can actively contribute to international stability.

Bucharest establishment’s early 1990s perspective on a foreign policy geometry picturing Moscow as a natural ally is – according to Tudoroiu – extremely logical, because the new leading group (mostly comprised of second-rank former communist apparatus officials and headed by an Soviet educated ex-university colleague of Gorbachev) were actually using the perception of an unconditional support given by the neighbouring superpower, both in order to legitimize its actions and political preferences, and also to strengthen their control over the country. Along the same logical path, in her own narrative of the situation, Soare states that this ‘lingering connection to Moscow’ that ‘marked’ the early 1990s represented ‘a legacy of the old, Communist era and a result of domestic political forces as well as of regional strategic ones, shares a similar perception’.

In comparison, in Czechoslovakia – where the Velvet Revolution played a major role in the removal of many communist elements populating all levels of government – ideas of a common European security structure and of the
dismantling of both NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, or of a North Atlantic and European integration relied on a stronger democratic foundation.

Even in Hungary – where the former communists were still playing a significant role in the political and administrative structures – the first post-communist Prime Minister, Joszef Antall gave notice – during June 7, 1990 meeting – of its country’s decision to leave the military alliance by the end of 1991, if not abolished by then by its members. In addition, he argued for a the immediate elimination of all provisions in the treaty that allowed non-national armed forces to be deployed on the territory of a members state, which he qualified as a sovereignty infringement.29

On another hand, Poland – still with a communist president and communist-dominated Sejm (the lower house of the Polish Parliament) and concerned over possible territorial claims of the reunified Germany over its former provinces that were a part of Poland – had a more moderate approach towards antagonizing Moscow – using the presence of the Soviet troops on its territory as a guarantee for its sovereignty, but – through its foreign affairs minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, supported its Central European partners – in order to achieve a certain political independence from Moscow.

Either the reasons and facts that sustained the continuity of an asymmetrical, allegedly colonial-like relationship between Bucharest and Moscow in the early 1990s, the process did have a relevant collateral effect in diminishing the risk of ethnic conflicts in the country, acting as a strong deterrent for possible separatist forces that could have generated security concerns to Bucharest.

The quest for capitalizing security guarantees from the Soviets in order to deter possible manifestations of Hungarian irredentism is a thesis that can be identified in the narratives of the former FSN leaders of that time. Both, president Ion Iliescu (2001) and his former foreign affairs counsellor Ioan Mircea Pascu (2007) seem to circumscribe their explanations to the shared belief that Hungary – backed up by the US – could have used its foreign policy ascendant in the international relations in order to question its post-Trianon borders and to profit from Romania’s ‘inherent weakness’ and, together with other ‘unfriendly neighbour’ to pursue territorial claims.32

Of note, the image of a revisionist Hungary trying to threaten Romania’s territorial integrity was employed by Bucharest’s governmental rhetoric as far as

The relations between Romania and Hungary, sensibly improved in the first two months after the December 1989 events, with Hungary being the first state to recognize the new NSF government and with Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister Gyula Horn arriving to Bucharest on December 29, 1989, would however end up at a bellicosity level similar with those from Ceaușescu’s times after the violent ethnic clashes in the city of Targu Mures (19-20 March, 1990) during what Dutceag Segensten argues to be ‘the largest and the bloodiest incident’ in the ‘post-communist history of inter-ethnic relations in Transylvania’ that opposed Romanian majority and Hungarian minority.

Although the some voices like Istvan Haller, a Hungarian ethnic, and member of the National Council for Combating Discrimination or Smaranda Enache (president of Pro Europa Think Tank) argue that the conflict itself was staged by new Bucharest leadership, either to justify the resuscitation of Securitate, reorganized and rebranded as SRI – Romanian Intelligence Service shortly after (Haller) either to play the role of a social catalyst that will keep the people focused on ethnic problems while ignoring NSF’s neo-communist approach (Enache) and policies the situation itself might be considered an important factor of Romania’s 1990 foreign policy alignment.

The idea that the ethnic conflicts were arranged Iliescu and his acolytes in order to ‘justify the founding of the SRI’ is a central thesis of Andreescu’s account of the events pointing out not only that one month before the clashes, ‘Virgil Magureanu, the future Director of SRI initiated Vatra Romaneasca the chauvinistic organization which was deeply involved in the events from Targu Mures’ but also that the Decree founding SRI was illegal, as it has been issued by an entity that had no such prerogatives.

The layout of the diplomatic relations between Budapest and Bucharest from the mid and late 1980s which eventually culminated, according to Burke, with ‘growing prospects of a military conflict’ by 1988-1989, could have however played a role in the development of the post-Communist patterns of political interactions between the two states, especially as – despite of the several months interlude that succeeded the December 1989 riots and violence – the minority rights violation thesis occupied a top position in Budapest’s foreign policy agenda.

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37 Adevărul newspaper, March 18, 2010.
For Romanian leadership, who witnessed during the late 1980s how Hungary managed to secure – through the lobbying efforts of the factionalized yet extremely vocal umbrella organizations of the American Hungarian community (AHF, NFHA, HAC, HHRF) and through the help of the pro-Hungarian caucus from the US Congress – a crucial ethnic lobby success against Bucharest by obtaining the ‘the [1987] suspension of Romania’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status’ on a strategy that was built ‘entirely on Romania’s human rights violations and Ceaușescu’s maltreatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania’

Budapest early 1990s return to the minority rights violation rhetoric equated with a serious warning signal.

On the other hand, aware that the oppressive domestic policies of a Ceaușescu regime increasingly turning ‘paranoid’ by the late 1980s, but also Bucharest independent foreign policy dynamics, made Romania emerge after 1989 more isolated than almost any other East European countries, the new establishment from Bucharest tried to capitalize from the existent political opening and to recalibrate the state’s relations with both Western and Eastern Europe. In particular, free of any residual political ballast, other members of the Eastern Bloc, like Bulgaria, Hungary or Poland were already on their path towards Europe (all received guest status from the Council of Europe by 1989).

In particular, despite of the regime change that occurred in December 1989, Romania’s treatment of the ethnic minorities never left the international spotlight. An important role in this process would be played, however, by the fact that contrary to public perception, FSN’s early 1990 political agenda would gradually align itself with Ceaușescu’s nationalist backbone, although it is unclear if the cause derived from the fact that important figures from the new established echelons of power (former Securitate cadres and nomenklatura members) were haunted by the idea of a Hungarian conspiracy, or because such a nationalist approach could have diverted public opinion’s attention from democratic towards ethnic values, thus allowing FSN to securely build its institutional infrastructure.

In short, this ‘perceived lack of democracy, economic reform and the poor treatment of ethnic minorities in the early 1990s also hindered the country’s foreign policy’ managed to lead post-communist Romania in a situation when it encountered not Western indifference, but except in the case of France, ‘open Western hostility’.


43 Cristian Pârvulescu, “Renewing Politics; the Electoral Reform – a Stage of the Political Class Restructuring”, Political Sphere 1, no. 101 (2003).


Having to cope with worse political and way less diplomatic exposure than all other Central European governments and with the negative effects generated by the June 1990 mineriads and by the management of the `inter-ethnic conflicts from Targu Mures', Bucharest leadership managed to somehow reassert itself as a promoter of the UN charter values and even as a reliable international actor during the outbreak of the Ba'athist Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, as the events occurred during the Romanian presidency of the UN Security Council (through Romanian Ambassador to the United Nations, Aurel Dragos Munteanu).

From this position, Bucharest government endorsed the idea that UN has to take action in order to protect the sovereignty of a state – under the auspices and in the conceptual framework shaped by provisions of the international law, although through its Ambassador, it expressed Romania’s fears that an unilateral US intervention in the Middle East crisis could act as a precedent for future Soviet interventions within its spheres of interest\textsuperscript{46}.

Although Romanian stance could have been conceptualized as a pro-democratic and arguably pro-Western one, it did not have any anti-Soviet undertones: as Kosminsky and Jones summarize, unlike other post-World War II conflicts, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait wasn’t actually ‘an East-West confrontation’ as Washington and Moscow neither weren’t ‘squared off eyeball-to-eyeball as they were in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War’, neither were ‘backing opposing sides, as they were in the 1982-1983 Lebanon crisis’.

Moreover, despite being very vocal against the Iraqi aggression against the small emirate, and by endorsing UN resolutions against Iraq, including a trade embargo and the use of force for enforcing the embargo if needed, Gorbachev appeared to chart ‘a middle course in the Iraqi crisis, maintain his military ties with Baghdad, while offering some rhetorical and diplomatic support in the West’\textsuperscript{47}.

On the other hand, by supporting all the resolutions and sanctions against Iraq, a political stance severely directed against its immediate economical interests as it had to face a potential loss of ‘up to US $3 billion in oil refining revenues and defaulted Iraqi loans’ Bucharest government did gain some stature and legitimacy in the international community. Nevertheless, Bucharest’s commitment to ‘the full respect for international law’ wasn’t necessarily a proof of the early 1990s government’s newly discovered democratic vocation, but as Ambassador Munteanu himself highlights it, rather an expression of the very conviction that such behaviour could be the ‘best shield for Romania’ in its interaction with Kremlin\textsuperscript{48}.

By the end of 1990 – in the context shaped by the imminent dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON – Romania, claims Pascu, found itself ‘alone, without any security guarantees, within an radically changing environment’.


\textsuperscript{47} Jay P. Kosminsky; Michael Johns, “Bush to Gorbachev: Choose between Saddam and the West”, \textit{Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum} 280 (1990), pp. 1-2.

‘with potential or obvious risks that were taking shape along [Romanian] borders’ and with the borders themselves ‘being discussed in hostile circles from abroad’.

Likewise, Soare shares the uncertainty perspective of Romania ‘being left defenceless in front of an unknown West and an unpredictable East’, having to cope with its possible positioning within a new continental ‘buffer-zone’ and with the ‘lack of security guarantees from both sides [NATO and USSR]’.

In this context, although Iliescu’s rhetoric pointed out the crucial need for openness towards the West, Bucharest’s foreign policy dynamics reveal rather low advancement towards reaching such a diplomatic goal. This situation derives, argues Georgescu, from some sort of a bifocal openness, concomitantly towards East and West and his ‘wait and see’ attitude, oscillating between different alternatives Romania had in the beginning of the 1990s: ‘go East’, ‘go West’, become neutral, or stay isolated.

In this context the behavioural pattern of the Romanian foreign policy relies on the strategic need for security guarantees and two (although, not necessarily divergent but arguably coordinated, at least till mid 1991) foreign policy agendas: an Atlanticist one promoted by the progressive Prime Minister Petre Roman (who was among the few Romanian officials of that time arguably benefiting from a good image in the West) and President Iliescu’s Kremlinist one (who enjoyed a relatively good image in Moscow and who – according to a transcript of a May 23, 1990 discussion between the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his Bulgarian counterpart Alexandr Lilov shared ‘common views’ with Gorbachev).

In this context, although in July 1990 Prime Minister Roman asked NATO’s General Secretary Worner to confirm accreditation of the Romanian Ambassador from Belgium to begin and carry on diplomatic relations with NATO, for only several months later – following a his own visit at the Alliance’s Headquarters – to nominate a permanent Romanian representative to NATO, on April 5th 1991 – in what Tudoroiu classifies as ‘a shock’ for the majority of the political analysts – Romania and USSR signed an extremely controversial Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

The new document – aimed, according to Trandafir – to ‘identify in a legal formula, the new type of relationship between’ the two states which reflected

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49 Ioan Mircea Pașcu, op. cit., p. 8
51 Ioan Iliescu, op. cit., 1994, pp. 56-57.
the ‘metamorphoses carried out politically, economically and socially in both countries’ and which replaced the ‘unplanned’, ‘extensive’ and ‘informal’ cooperation occurring between Bucharest and Kremlin at the time (Gheorghiu, 2010: 232-233), with the negotiations themselves being ‘an amplitude demarche adequate to mutual exigencies’, that approved ‘a remarkable evolution and an ascendant trend at a bilateral level’.

However, among the provisions and clauses regulating the bilateral relations in the context of the dissolution of the multilateral platform of the Warsaw Treaty – which engulfed aspects of mutual assistance and cooperation between parties (including the possibility of the former Soviet satellites to establish direct relations with the Union’s comprising republics – the document, articulated on the political backbone of the Kvitinsky Doctrine incorporated a famous ‘security clause’ which denied the right of the signatories to enter alliances perceived as hostile by the other party.

Despite Iliescu’s constant denial rhetoric fuelled from the perceptions of bloc hostility as a reflection of the political reality of early 1990s, the new treaty jeopardized Romania’s potential ascension to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for 15 years.

Moreover, states Weiner, critics of the treaty, ‘inside and outside of Romania, viewed it as an infringement of the independence and national sovereignty of the country, which if implemented, could have resulted in its “Finlandization”’.

In this context, argues Papacostea the dominant, Iliescu-led wing of the Bucharest establishment agreed upon ‘mortgaging the future of the Romanian state in the area of interest of the Soviet Union for a period of 15 years’ transforming Romania, in Popa’s vision into the Eastern Europe version of Belarus.

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The *Kvitsinsky* clause – argues Ioan Mircea Pascu (who, back then was President Iliescu’s foreign policy advisor) – was accepted by Ion Iliescu and its government, only because Kremlin negotiators ensured their Romanian counterparts that it will be present in all similar bilateral treaties USSR was about to sign with all Central and Eastern European states\(^66\). This logical vein, explored and refined by Pascu both in his (2007) and (2008) works, made the binding provision extremely appealing as it would have prohibited not only Bucharest but also Budapest to accede to NATO, thus acting as an important deterrent for Budapest’s allegedly revisionist policy against Romania\(^67\).

In particular, although to some extent exaggerated, Romanian establishment’s perceptions of an expanding Hungarian irredentist attitude in Budapest weren’t however lacking any substance. First of all, the remarks of Joszef Antall – after the electoral victory of his party in June 1990 Hungarian elections and namely that he was *‘in spirit and sentiment’* the Prime Minister of 15 millions Hungarians, a figure which included the Hungarian nationals living abroad\(^68\), held, according to Benishev, *‘undertones of significant territorial claims’*\(^69\).

Moreover, Hungary’s decision to redeploy some of its military forces from the Western frontier to the Eastern border with Romania\(^70\) appeared to sustain the revisionist intentions perspective.

Furthermore, the rejection of Romania’s bid to become a member of the Visegrad Group by the Czechoslovak president Havel\(^71\) based on claims of anti-democratic stances of Bucharest, of bad treatment of political opposition and ethnic minorities and on the country’s and on bad economic performances and *‘troubled transition’* towards a free-market economy – which, in Havel’s perspective, could have jeopardized the group’s ascension to the European Community\(^72\) – was associated, in Bucharest, with another successful attempt of Budapest to isolate Romania, in a period when Romania was un-successfully trying to make dome *‘exploratory contacts with the Western powers’*\(^73\).

More or less realistic, the perception of a Hungarian threat to the Romanian territorial integrity made its way to the Bucharest’s first *National Security Strategy* drafted in 1991 and which was highlighting Romania’s need to consolidate its borders, and especially its Western border with Hungary\(^74\).

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\(^{66}\) Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *article cited*.

\(^{67}\) Varban Benishev, “Cooperation, No Cooperation – Theoretical Insights from Post-Communist Europe”, Central European University, 2013, p. 27.


\(^{69}\) Varban Benishev, “Cooperation, No Cooperation – Theoretical Insights from Post-Communist Europe”, Central European University, 2013, p. 27.

\(^{70}\) Daniel Nelson, *op. cit*.

\(^{71}\) Adrian Năstase, *România după Malta (Romania after Malta)* 1st Volume, Bucharest, RO, Editura Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2006, pp. 76-80.


From a totally different point of view, the 1991 treaty is – according to Papacostea – a reflection of Bucharest establishment’s support for the ‘reconstitution of a security system under the patronage of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe’. However, despite Kremlin’s intentions and actions to impose such limits through the Kvitsinsky clause ‘on the sovereign policies of the other Central European states’, the Visegrad countries had taken an united stance against that eventually led for the clause to be ‘left out from the treaties’.

This situation – argues Pascu – was the main element that led to the non-ratification of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between USSR and Romania in the parliament, as Romanian leadership refused to eventually endorse a document that was ‘sensibly distinct’ from the bilateral agreements Kremlin signed with all other former Soviet satellites.

On the other hand, former Prime Minister Roman, pictures himself as the force that opposed the ratification, refusing to send the document to the Parliament and stating that he was the one that eventually convinced President Iliescu not to ratify the treaty as such action would have had an extremely negative impact in Romania’s relationship with the Occident.

In particular, the non-ratification issue cannot be delinked with the political and structural mutations that swept through the region and throughout the entire international realm. The gradual political erosion of the USSR, Kremlin’s inability to solve the Yugoslav crisis, the August 19-21 Soviet coup d’état and the imminent collapse of the Union itself – did contributed to the issue but fundamentally preventing the ratification.

Nevertheless, regardless of this aspect, for scientists like Tudoroiu (2008), Gosu (2006) or Weiner (2004), the treaty episode offers solid proof for the existence of a core-periphery relationship between Kremlin and Bucharest, with

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the Soviet control over the Romania arguably exceeding the level recording during Ceaușescu’s regime. The existence of a hegemonic interference in Romania’s foreign policy, was extremely visible also in the case of Bucharest’s statement asking for dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, which was issued by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 6, 1991 – a moment that made Bucharest to be the last member of the Soviet bloc to do so, with the exception of USSR itself.

The main element that seems to offer substance to the theory of Bucharest’s positioning under USSR ideological and political mantle is – according to Benishev – Romania’s positioning towards the Moldovan independence and Romanian-Moldovan political union equations.

First of all, some validity for this claim derives indirectly from Kremlin’s high interest to limit in any possible manner for the ideological changes affecting the former Eastern Bloc countries, to ‘act as ‘external catalysts for national separatism and centrifugal tendencies within the Union’ or for its former allies to evolve into future ‘real or a potential threats for the military security of the Soviet Union’.

In this context, by citing a controversial note apparently drawn up by Vladimir Zagladin (the foreign policy advisor of the USSR president Mikhail Gorbachev) after an alleged conversation with his Romanian counterpart Ioan Mircea Pascu during the latter’s visit in Moscow in February 1991, Gheorghieu (2010) argues that, in February 1991, Moscow was giving serious attention to the development of Bucharest-Chisinau relationships, due to the political and social developments sweeping this Soviet Republic, and especially in regard to Romania’s interest into a possible reunification with Moldova, in the light of the recent German unification. According to the document, Romanian leadership was extremely careful to avoid putting any political pressure on the Soviets, as for Iliescu regime the major foreign policy objective was the ‘salvation of the USSR’ and ‘not to create problems that would affect its existence’. In order to substantiate these aspects, the document attributes to Pascu some interesting statements like ‘It is not imperative for brothers to live in the same apartment’ and ‘the leadership of the country [Romania] aims to continue working with the forces’ that are ‘struggling to open up the Moldovan [unification] issue’ behind which one can see the influence of the British government.

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84 Varban Benishev, op. cit., p. 29.
87 Ibidem, p. 234.
Despite an initial statement denying that such a meeting took place, Pascu eventually admitted that fact that he and Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisor did met in Moscow, yet at the Romanian Embassy in Moscow and in the presence of the Romanian ambassador, and not a Zagladin’s office in Kremlin (as it initially appeared in newspapers). However, he rejected the authenticity of the note, classifying it as a ‘intoxication’ and a ‘forgery’ created by ‘an intelligence service serving a power that’s hostile to Romania’ 88, claiming that only genuine topic approached in the discussion was the USSR’s hydrocarbon deliveries to Romania (which he claimed to have been the very reason of his presence in Moscow).

However, regardless of the authenticity of Pascu’s statements from the Zagladin note, there seems to be a relatively shared agreement within both academic and political circles that the rulers in Bucharest displayed ‘extreme caution’ on the subject of the Moldovan independence89. In this context, despite some vocal rhetorical and symbolical support along a pan-Romanian discourse, Bucharest will eventually ‘stop short of supporting’ the nationalist movements within Moldova, in order not ‘to upset the Soviet Union, which was in the process of restructuring itself’90.

Under these circumstances, the generally cool reception from Romania, allegedly determined by the good relations between Iliescu and Gorbachev and aimed to prevent adding any political pressure on Gorbachev in regard to the Moldovan issue91, led eventually to a dampening of the Moldovan pan-Romanians’ initial enthusiasm92.

In particular, the 1991 Romanian – Soviet treaty episode also played – to a certain extent – a nodal role in the worsening of Chisinau-Bucharest matrix of interactions: by recognizing ‘the existing border’ between Romania and the, back then, Soviet Republic of Moldova, the document actually reinforced ‘the lack of overt support for Moldovan independence’93. Moreover, argues Mircea Snegur – former president of Moldova in the period 1990 – 1997, the Romanian-Moldovan union subject, ‘was never approached’ in the official talks Romanian officials held in Moscow94.

In his analytical rendition of the Romanian-Moldovan unification, Papakostas links Bucharest’s hesitant behaviour towards Chisinau with the fear of Romania having to face ‘the risk of international isolation’. In particular, he states, a unionist approach which would have severely damaged the relationship with Moscow.

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90 Varban Benishev, op. cit., p. 29.
93 Varban Benishev, op. cit., p. 29.
and thus leading to hard-to-asses negative political outcomes, would have equated with giving up to a security alternative, in a moment when Romania’s aspirations for EU an NATO inclusion were rather some implausible scenario, taking into consideration Bucharest’s ‘unstable relations with western institutions’, IMF, NATO or EU\textsuperscript{95}.

In this context, isolated and without a clear support from Bucharest and having to cope with political and economic coercion from Moscow, Moldova was eventually pulled out towards Russia’s political orbit\textsuperscript{96} and became a member of the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of the Independent States in December 1991. However, unlike Romania, which signed a document that transferred parts of its sovereignty towards to a conceptual security bloc led by Kremlin\textsuperscript{97}, Chisinau leadership refused to sign a collective security treaty with Moscow\textsuperscript{98}.

Conclusions

Between 1989-1991 Romanian-Soviet relations were circumscribed to an asymmetrical, allegedly colonial-like pattern of interactions, arguably as a by-product of the new leadership’s endeavours to use the perception of the support given by the neighbouring superpower, in order to legitimize its actions and political preferences, to strengthen its control over the country and to diminish the risk of ethnic conflicts in Transylvania, acting as a strong deterrent for possible manifestations of Hungarian irredentism, a dominant thesis in the narratives of the former key elites of post-Decembrist establishment.

In this context, the 1991 Romanian-Soviet Treaty seems to have been a predictable output distilled from pre-established routines, similar perspectives and goals of the two governmental structures from Kremlin and Bucharest, a faux bandwagoning alignment through which Romania tried to support Moscow’s decision to set up a new security architecture on the foundations of the defunct Warsaw Pact and thus to extract greater support from its patron.

In the Romanian establishment’s perspective, however, this coagulation of a cooperative framework was arguably determined by the dictates of security, the treaty itself being conceptualized as a means to obtain security guarantees in order to alleviate an alleged Hungarian threat to Romania’s territorial integrity.

In particular, the treaty was the expression of Kremlin’s expected utility preferences, coherently forcing Romania to enter a social relation and create a social structure in order to advance its particular sets of political, economic and military interests and therefore representing a tool through which Moscow aimed to trigger a chain bandwagoning reactions in order to place Eastern Bloc countries under a new security bloc under its leadership.


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