THE SECURITY PROFILE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SECURITY STRATEGIES

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Abstract. The European Union is currently an economic power and a civilian player that plays a global security role. In order to understand how it supports and promotes security at the external level, we will first define what the EU is or is not, so what is its political nature, where it is positioned in a globalized world, with a dynamism difficult to fix in the mental categories traditional. In order to investigate what kind of security actor the EU is at global level, we will approach, from the perspective of strategic documents and policies developed in the field of external security, the transition from the "transformative" paradigm that characterizes the Union as a "normative power" and "transformative power" as evidenced by the 2003 Security Strategy, to the paradigm of "resilience" and the EU's ambition to achieve "strategic autonomy" as set out in the 2017 Global Strategy.

Keywords: *Common Foreign and Security Policy; Common Security and Defence Policy; European Security Strategy; Global Strategy; Transformative Power; Normative Power; Resilience; Strategic Autonomy*

The Political Nature of the European Union

Our approach starts from the finding that the European Union (EU) is a particular case among existing regional and international organizations. Throughout its construction, the EU has transformed from a regional organization with predominantly economic responsibilities into a political union that has also developed a security side.

To capture the political nature of the European Union, we will turn to a series of definitions provided by theorists of European integration and international integration. Politically, until the 1990s, the European Union was perceived as an entity that was described, metaphorically, as an "unidentified political object", an expression belonging to Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission (1985-1995). The evolution of the European project on the two dimensions – deepening and enlargement – has determined the unique character of the European

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Union today, an original construct that cannot be compared with other "associative phenomena of transnational level or similar (apparently) international organizations, from the past or from now on"[1], a synthesis of national and supranational elements. We also find that the EU has not yet overcome its doctrinal dilemma that has arisen since the establishment of the European Communities: a federal, state-type Europe, or a supranational Europe? Even after the long-awaited reform of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, questions about what kind of political actor the EU is still persist today. What is the EU: state or super-state? Is it a regional/international actor, an entity or an organization in the true sense of the word?

The transformations that the European Union has undergone during its construction make it difficult to fit into the traditional patterns used to describe international organizations. Researchers interested in international integration have often referred to Donald J. Puchala's article, which proposed an analysis model of what international integration is or is not. We refer to the "elephant metaphor" according to which the elephant is "seen" differently from those who, being blind, will analyse only separate segments of it, the result being that none will make a very accurate description of the elephant.[2] This metaphor has often been invoked as a model for analysing the particularity of the EU. Just as the blind have held a heated debate about the nature of the elephant, so too will the debate over the political nature of the EU.

There are competing approaches in the literature that explain the political nature of the EU. We note, firstly, that according to realistic arguments, the Union is the conscious result of the negotiation and interaction of the interests of the governments of the Member States, in which case the European construction must consider the primacy of the nation-state (whose sovereignty is indivisible). Realistic precepts, often consistent with intergovernmentalism (theory of international cooperation concerned with states maintaining their sovereignty, in which case cooperation between states at European level should be made without transfer of sovereignty, states being equal partners) are usually used to explains some major decisions in the history of the Union. In order to support this perspective and the fact that the EU is an intergovernmental organization, cooperation in the framework of the common foreign and security policy – CFSP is most often invoked, where each Member State expresses its position in accordance with its national interests.[3] On these realistic/unrealistic principles, the Union would function as a *confederation*. The second aspect is the point of view of the functionalist theory that the EU is the result of the interests of the Member States, but has its own logic of development, often beyond the will of the states. Functionalists theory, inspired by the ideas of David Mitrany, "proposes a non-territorial approach to political authority" in the sense that certain sectors of

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[1] B. Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 15-16.

[2] See D. J. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 1972, pp. 267-284.

[3] L.-A. Ghica, "Scurt istoric al Uniunii Europene", in L. A. Ghica (coord.), *Enciclopedia Uniunii Europene*, second edition, Bucharest, Meronia Publishing House, 2006, pp. 26-27.

public life are subject to collective responsibility and coordination that over time can have a *spill-over effect* on other sectors/areas[4] such as security and defence.

To overcome the dichotomy supranational entity *vs*. classical international organization, European Union theorists have advanced new research alternatives. For example, Thomas Diez has advanced a social constructivist approach that emphasizes discourse, suggesting that the EU can be "read differently from one context to another. It follows that «reading is more than a passive process. It is an act of *re*-writing, of *re*-production, the particle *re* indicating that there is always the possibility of transformation, of change »"[5].

European integration analysts and theorists have captured the political nature of the EU in a number of definitions. B. Rosamond defined the EU in four ways: "international organization"; "expression of regionalism (...), the tendency of groups of adjacent territorial states to gather in blocs"; "space interested in deepening decision-making mechanisms and policy-making"; "sui generis entity" whose profile cannot be used to develop broader generalizations, applicable to other cases[6]. Other authors have identified the EU as "an international organization", a "developing, state-like political community", "a reconfiguration of the European governance model"[7]. Other perceptions of the EU belong to D. Chrysssochoou – "international organization" or something else, usually defined by "multilevel governance"[8] – or M. Jachtenfuchs – "European governance goes beyond traditional notions, such as federal state or international organization"[9] –, and Michelle Cini simply states that "the EU is between an international organization and a state"[10].

A postmodernist approach, alternative to the classical theories mentioned in the explanation of the political nature of the EU, is proposed by J. Böröcz, who defines the EU as a "meta-state", a supranational institution that uses the elements of national sovereignty of the Member States[11]. This perspective, however, does not capture all the features of the European institutions, such as the CFSP, at which decisions are taken at intergovernmental level, unanimously, and the sovereign conduct of the Member States is preserved. For his part, J. McCormick states that the Union "is less than a state, but more than an international organization, so in trying to set its profile, we are forced to use inappropriate terms such as *actor*, *entity*, or *multi-level governance*"[12], while other authors prefer to consider

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[4] D. Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1975, p. 34.

[5] Thomas Diez, "Governance – a matter of discourse: Discursive nodal points in the British debate over Europe", 1997, p. 5, available at: http://aei.pitt.edu/2567/1/002505_1.pdf (accessed 12.12.2021).

[6] B. Rosamond, *op. cit.,* pp. 14-16.

[7] H. Wallace, W. Wallace, M. A. Pollack, "O privire de ansamblu", in H. Wallace, W. Wallace, M. A Pollack (eds.), *Elaborarea politicilor în Uniunea Europeană*, Translation by Filip Gadiuta, 5th edition, Bucharest, Institutul European Publishing House, 2005, p. 9.

[8] D. N. Chrysssochoou, *Theorizing European integration* (2nd ed.), Milton Park, Ebingdon, Oxon, New York, SAGE Publications, 2009, p. 63.

[9] M. Jachtenfuchs, "Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance", in *European Law Journal*, I (2), 1995, p. 115.

[10] M. Cini, "Introduction", in M. Cini (ed.), *European Union Politics*, 2nd. ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 2.

[11] J. Böröcz and M. Sarkar, "What Is the EU?", in *International Sociology*, 20 (2), 2005, p. 166.

[12] J. McCormick, *The European Superpower*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 43.

the EU as "a unique integration project in history whose nature and evolution depend on the will of its leaders and citizens"[13]. According to I. G. Bărbulescu, the EU has a special character, being "a unitary political model, having a unique institutional framework, but operating with two different methods"[14].

There are, therefore, a number of different approaches and definitions given to the European Union by theorists and analysts, from *the international organization* (intergovernmentalism perspective), *the changing entity* (from the perspective of neo-functionalism combined with a federalist agenda), *multi-level governance* (according to new approaches) or *sui generis* legal *phenomenon*. But if we consider that the European Union was created by the Member States through treaties and exists through their succession, it remains an international and intergovernmental integration organization that has the potential to expand and suspend the voting rights of those who violate its basic principles, while giving Member States the opportunity to withdraw from the Union, as has happened with the United Kingdom, which has already invoked Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. In addition, it offers Member States the choice of whether or not to be involved in certain programs, such as the adoption of the single currency or Schengen arrangements. All this reflects, in particular, the EU's intergovernmental dimension, which is "a sophisticated arrangement for maximizing national long-term interest in an interdependent world", as J. H. Weiler[15], once said. Although the security and defence dimension remained in the intergovernmental sphere with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (while gaining new institutions and functions), there is no doubt that the acquisition of legal personality was an important step in the political definition and international and diplomatic assertion of the Union. We can therefore conclude that the EU is an important economic and political player at the international level, so it is a *civilian power*.

The Evolution of the EU as a Global Player – Security Actor(non-military)

Despite the difficulties it has faced at the political level, the EU has not given up its vocation as a global player. At the level of the European Union, ensuring the politico-military security is traditionally assumed by each Member State by virtue of the prerogatives of the nation-state and the territory to be defended. But the elimination of internal borders between the states of the Union and the transfer of parts of their national sovereignty to joint supranational institutions are combined so that today the Union is both "an area of freedom, security and justice" and a unique player in addressing external security on cooperation between Member States. According to the theoretical framework developed by K. Deutsch[16]

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[13] L.-Al. Ghica, *op. cit*., 2006, pp. 27-28.

[14] I. Ghe. Bărbulescu, *Uniunea Europeană: de la național la federal*, Bucharest, Tritonic Publishing House, 2005, p. 41.

[15] J. H. H. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? And Other Essays on Integration*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 93-94.

[16] K. Deutsch *et. al*., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.

and later developed by Em. Adler and M. Barnett[17], the EU is a "pluralistic security community"/"closely connected security community" – a social construction resulting from a process of political and economic integration, with a cumulative sovereignty, which resolves conflicts peacefully, and interactions between states generate a collective identity – therefore, it is a community based not on power interests but on values transformed into norms and rules of behaviour. Over time, it has created its own security system based on the concept of security through cooperation and then, as it has expanded its borders and reformed itself institutionally, it has developed and strengthened both a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to support this security community. To strengthen their role as a global player, Brussels leaders have developed security strategies and set up institutions to support the EU's external action in the current international multipolar system.

The establishment of the CFSP in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty provided the Union with an opportunity to rigorously formulate and defend its security interests in both European and global policy. This was followed by the Amsterdam Treaties (1999) and Nice (2003), which strengthened the CFSP, and the Lisbon Treaty (2009), which added new institutions and functions to the field of foreign policy and considerably updated the CSDP. However, the two policies have not been integrated but are also being pursued within the intergovernmental framework, and the EU's external capacity for action depends on the convergence of the interests of all states and their consensus on certain issues aimed at removing threats or preventing conflicts. Although there are specific CFSP institutions, they have limited powers to act without the consent of the states, nor can they sanction states that have positions other than the common position. The academic debate is dominated by the theory that CFSP structures are dysfunctional because key decisions require unanimity and Member States' interests differ on certain topics, such as: the role of the USA in Europe, relations with Russia, managing the immigration crisis, etc.

The EU's biggest leap forward in overcoming civilian status and strengthening the external security dimension was the development of the first European Security Strategy in 2003, followed by the current European Global Strategy adopted in 2017. Although the evolution of the EU's external action has been rhetorical, declarative and with modest results rather than a substantial one, we are interested in capturing the paradigm shift in the EU's foreign and security policy. Next, we will analyse, from the perspective of the elaborated security policies and strategies, the transition from a *transformative paradigm* that characterizes it as a "normative power" and "transformative power" due to its ability to spread European principles and values in its vicinity neighbourhood without using coercion, to the *resilience paradigm* as a resistance to internal and external crises on the basis of a "common approach" and "concerted action at European level" to promote peace and ensure the security of the Union, its citizens and the surrounding states and societies its along with the prospect of achieving "strategic autonomy", invoked in the 2017 Global Strategy.

[17] Em. Adler and M. Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

EU – Normative Power and Transformative Power

Analysts have argued in various ways that the European Union, which has set itself the political goal of promoting peace in its neighbourhood through peaceful processes, is a *transformative power*, associating it with a *normative empire*. From the official rhetoric from a number of European documents, in particular from the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003, entitled *A Secure Europe in a Better World*[18] can be distilled from the Union's commitment to exporting peace-friendly practices to neighbouring countries, making the EU a transformative power internationally.[19] The start of the European integration project in the 1950s was driven by the ambition to create and maintain peace on the European continent peacefully. After the 1990s, the EU maintained its ambition to expand geographically in order to co-operate with its security community and other European neighbours. This ambition indicates that the EU is an *altruistic power*. V. Laporte offers an alternative explanation for promoting peace in its neighbourhood, that the EU is expanding for its own benefit, seeking to broaden its sphere of action and influence.[20]

The idea that the EU is a *transformative power* was supported by I. Manners by arguing that the EU is a *normative power* because it exerts a power of attraction for other states due to the common principles, the values it upholds and its institutions.[21] The unique circumstances of the creation of the European Communities after World War II – based on state volunteering and the renunciation of sovereignty in certain areas – had a constitutive effect on the nature, values and norms that are found today in the Copenhagen criteria, which must be respected by states who want to join the EU. In this perspective, accession is not subject to any geographical restrictions and focuses on the spread of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, giving the Union a power of attraction to different parts of the globe. According to I. Manners, normative power describes the actor's ability to "define what passes as «normal» in world politics" and this is "the greatest power of all"[22] because it sets a standard for the actions of all actors. Given that the EU is the dominant economic and political power on the European continent, it can be described as a "peaceful empire". V. Laporte notes that this definition is a contradiction in terms because, from the perspective of historical experience, it is difficult to conceive of the geographical expansion of

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[18] Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy – A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Brussels, European Communities, 2003, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf (accessed 22.12.2021).

[19] A. Bendiek, "A Paradigm Shift in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: From Transformation to Resilience", *Research Paper*, October, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2017, p. 7, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP11_bdk.pdf (accessed 22.12.2021).

[20] V. Laporte, "The European Union – an Expanding Security Community?", in *EU Diplomacy Papers*, no. 6., College of Europe, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, Belgium, Bruges, 2012, pp. 6-7, http://aei.pitt.edu/39242/1/edp_6_2012_laporte.pdf (accessed 2.02.2022).

[21] I. Manners, "Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in terms?", in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 40, Issue 2, 2002, p. 253, https://curis.ku.dk/portal/files/45209112/ (accessed 12.02.2022).

[22] *Ibidem.*

an empire as peaceful and appreciates that the elimination of this conceptual contradiction is achieved by combining the notion of "normative power" with that of "empire"[23].

Of particular relevance to the EU's approach to transformative power is the concept of *soft power* as the "power of attraction" addressed by Joseph Nye in his works[24]. The author defined *soft power* as "the ability to achieve what you want by attraction rather than coercion [coercion consisting in the use of coercion and belonging to hard power]", also mentioning that soft power "could be developed through relationships with allies, economic assistance and cultural exchanges" and arguing that this would lead to "more favourable public opinion and credibility abroad". At the same time, the author suggests that soft power can be used by both states and other political actors, including international institutions. Nye states that "Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values such as democracy, human rights and individual opportunities are deeply seductive."[25]

The idea that the EU exercises its power of attraction to its neighbours through norms and values is the "reason to be" and confirms its ability to influence the behaviour of others to achieve the desired results without resorting to *hard power*. The most telling example is that of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which, admiring the values and aspiring to the level of prosperity and openness (attracted, therefore, by the *soft power* of the EU), set their expectations and revised legislation to meet the (Copenhagen) criteria required by Brussels to join the EU. Nye attributes to the Union, as a symbol of the unification of Europe, an "important degree of legitimacy as a *soft power*" and mentions that "the accession to the European Union has become a magnet for the whole region of Eastern Europe"[26]. In other words, *soft power* involves shaping the preferences of others through the power of attraction and co-optation. The defining characteristic of *soft power* is that it is not coercive (does not use military force or economic sanctions), and its basic resources that have the power to attract are: culture (aspects that make it attractive to others), political values (when it rises at their internal and external level) and foreign policies (when others consider them legitimate and hold moral authority) to which are added the economic resources[27]. In the same paper from 2012, Nye reiterates that "*soft power* is a descriptive concept"[28] rather than "a normative one"[29], and that it does not contradict the theory of realism in international relations, nor

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[23] V. Laporte, *loc. cit.,* p. 7.

[24] Joseph Nye introduced the term soft power in the late 1980's and popularized it in his book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (1990), referring to the political power of the United States, especially international politics.

[25] J. S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, pp. 7-8.

[26] *Ibidem*, p. 77.

[27] J. S. Nye Jr., *Viitorul puterii* [The Future of Power], Translation by Ramona Lupu, Iaşi, Polirom, 2012, pp. 103-104.

[28] Therefore, the author suggests that the phrase soft power can be used both in the positive sense described above and for negative purposes, giving as an example the unfortunate attraction that the power of great dictators such as Hitler, Stalin and Mao showed in the eyes of their acolytes.

[29] J. S. Nye Jr., *op. cit*., 2012, p. 100.

is it a form of idealism or liberalism: "It is simply a form of power, a way to achieve the desired results"[30]. Therefore, the author suggests that the phrase soft power can be used both in the positive sense described above and for negative purposes, giving as an example the unfortunate attraction that the power of great dictators such as Hitler, Stalin and Mao showed in the eyes of acolytes theirs. In the same paper, he launches the term "smart power", which refers to maximizing power or maintaining hegemony, but finding ways to combine resources so that successful strategies result in the new context [of the 21st century] of the diffusion of power and the «affirmation of others»"[31]

Other authors categorize the EU as a "cosmopolitan empire", distinguishing it from previous empires as "a form of exercise whose power is to strive unceasingly to govern the ungovernable [non-EU states]"[32]. This seemingly contradictory interpretation emphasizes that the EU is ultimately a voluntary alliance of states that together form a strong centre. Beck and Grande offer several arguments in support of the idea that the EU is a "cosmopolitan empire". Firstly, given that the EU's foreign and security policy is pursued through the cooperation of the Member States, there is therefore no coercive central authority, only the obligation of the European institutions to promote common goals and to refrain from any which would be contrary to the states, and the role of the EU High Representative for the CFSP is to maintain this coherence in the EU's external action. In order to improve the coherence of the Treaty of Lisbon and the concerted approach of the EU institutions and the Member States in resolving conflicts, the Council adopted in 2014 the concept of a "global approach" as an objective of the foreign security and defence policy, and through the Global Strategy since 2017, the global approach has become the "integrated approach". Second, in imperial logic, Member States have specific capabilities and levels of commitment at their disposal. For example, Germany and France are the states that form the inner core of EU power and participate in all the specific actions required by Union policies, while the smaller states are less involved. Their central role gives Germany and France a particularly strong obligation to contribute appropriately to conflict resolution measures. Proof of this is that these Member States have provided the greatest political and material support for crisis management in the Balkans, in Iran's nuclear file and at the conclusion of the Minsk Protocol – fulfilling their responsibilities for implementing the CFSP at EU level.[33]

Another feature of the European cosmopolitan empire in the conception of the authors Beck and Grande is the "deliberate denial of violence". The EU is an empire "by invitation", in which power emanates from the voluntary recognition and submission of states to all Union regulations. As a recent example, we offer the ambitious goal promoted by France, Germany and Poland on "flexible solidarity" under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Moreover, this empire

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[30] *Ibidem*, p. 101.
[31] *Ibidem*, p. 229.
[32] U. Beck and E. Grande, *Das kosmopolitische Europa. Gesellschaft und Politik in der Zweiten Moderne*, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2007, p. 89, *apud.* A. Bendiek, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[33] A. Bendiek, *op. cit.,* pp. 9-10.

does not make any clear distinction between existing regulations within the EU and those applicable to non-EU countries. Thus, even "non-governmental" states are obliged to comply with the rules and regulations contained in EU policies in order to benefit from the political and economic incentives offered by the Union. The Union uses financial resources from the EU's external relations budget both to support actions outside the EU – humanitarian aid and development (as it did recently with Turkey in the refugee crisis), to promote the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or as a pre-accession support –, as well as for the internal structures of the Union – the Schengen area, the Economic and Monetary Union or for securing the Union's borders.[34]

The EU's approach to transformative power has also drawn some criticism. According to A. Bendiek, on a practical level, they mainly refer to the fact that the EU has failed to influence the European neighbourhood in matters of conflict resolution (we are referring mainly to the disastrous political developments in the North African and Middle East region) so as to prevent large flows of migrants to Europe; whereas, despite all the measures taken to achieve the EU's objectives towards the European states that are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the overall result of this policy has remained negative; that the CFSP budget was insufficient to support external action until the establishment of the European Development Fund. In addition, the existence of a normative foreign policy contradicts the EU's desire for more power, as genuine Member States' actions are driven by primary security needs and maximizing prosperity. Because all states have a say and every state has the right to object, the EU's external action through the CFSP is criticized and characterized as nothing more than the "lowest common denominator" of the divergent interests of states.[35]

The adoption of the European Security Strategy, also known as the "Solana Strategy" because it was drafted under the coordination of the then High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, aimed at democratically transforming the European neighbourhood and extending it to other states in the future. In addition, it was an important step in foreshadowing the European Union's role as a coherent global player in the field of security, which showed that it had a common vision, such as cooperative security. However, at EU level, the defence and assurance of national security remain attributes of state sovereignty, as do decisions on how to act, with European supranational bodies playing only a coordinating role. We find that if the EU's idea of *transformative power* has worked in the field of enlargement and neighbourhood policy, the transformative narrative has not been decisive in terms of the EU's external action. In the field of external security, the EU has remained with the image of a civilian actor, a *soft power*.

The poor overall results of the EU's transformation in the field of external security have contributed substantially to a strategic rethinking of the CFSP. Thus, *A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*,

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[34] *Ibidem*, p. 10.
[35] *Ibidem,* pp. 10-13.

prepared by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, redefined the CFSP regulatory framework and reprioritised the Union's objectives in the context of major internal crises and instability at its external borders in recent years. The new strategy paper highlights the shift from *utopianism* or *idealism* that characterized the EU's external action in the Solana Strategy to *realism* or *principle-based pragmatism* as it is called in the "Mogherini Strategy".

"Resilience" and "Strategic Autonomy"

Focusing on security, its ambition to achieve "strategic autonomy" and the principled but pragmatic approach to the European security environment, the EU's Global Strategy indicates a major change of philosophy compared to the 2003 European Security Strategy.

A new paradigm through which security at EU level can be addressed is "resilience", a concept promoted by the new Global Strategy. Among the EU's five overall priorities in the Global Strategy are strengthening resilience to internal and external threats and challenges, and responding to crises and conflicts in the EU's border regions. According to the Global Strategy, a resilient EU would have two main characteristics: the ability to avoid external risks and dangers and the ability to stabilize its neighbouring states. The concept of resilience denotes the ability of states and societies to withstand and recover from crises, disasters and other challenging situations that will benefit both Europeans and countries in neighbouring regions[36]. Resilience, as set out in the Global Strategy, is a comprehensive concept that uses all existing CFSP (economic, civilian and military) instruments and integrates the interplay of internal and external security (because EU internal security depends on the climate of peace outside its external borders) and to include all relevant parties ("all individuals and the whole of society") – thus referring to "the resilience of society". A resilient society is democratic and based on trust in institutions and sustainable development.[37]

The concept of resilience proposes a recalibration of the CFSP (which acted externally to increase the level of peace and prosperity in the region) in order to promote the EU's own interests by addressing and resilient crises in its internal and external areas, along with maintaining the existing values and norms that qualified it as a *normative and transformative power*. Some analysts (Biscop and Juncos) see resilience as an opposite concept to transformation a "counter-concept of transformative approaches"[38], while others see it as a constructive proposition

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[36] European Union, *Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy*, Bruxelles, 2016, p. 23, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives (accesed 12.12.2021).

[37] *Ibidem*.

[38] S. Biscop, *A Strategy for Europe's Neighbourhood: Keep Resilient and Carry On?*, Madrid, Real Institute Elcano, 16 January 2017, https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ari4-2017-biscop-strategy-europe-neighbourhood-keep-resilient-carry-on.pdf (accessed 2.02.2022); Ana E. Juncos, "Resilience as the New EU Foreign Policy Paradigm: A Pragmatic Turn?", in *European Security*, Volume 26, No. 1, 2017, pp. 1–18, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09662839.2016.1247809 (accessed 2.02.2022).

to overcome the contradiction between fostering stability and promoting democracy through external action in third countries[39]. Although, apparently, it is understood that the new Global Strategy abandons the objectives of democratic transformation of the European neighbourhood and future expansion to other states as proposed by the Solana Strategy, the European Union does not give up significant for resilience. Therefore, the priority will be resistance to external threats and the development of new flexible ways of integrating with neighbouring/third countries, in the sense of adapting policies with an emphasis on "differentiation between partner countries", an approach that is in line with "the main pragmatism" which should "guide our external actions in the coming years", as stated in the Solana Strategy[40].

The focus of the CFSP on resilience, beyond basic pragmatism, also indicates a certain EU caution, which is expected to see further crises in the future. Therefore, the EU does not abandon its transformative ideal through external actions initiated with third countries in order to maintain stability and political order based on common laws and values, but restricts it to those elements that are significant for resilience, meaning a reprioritization of external action in the future. The EU therefore maintains its normative power and respect for diversity at home, which ensures its credibility and influence abroad, and adds resilience both in crisis areas and at home, in the EU's internal space, presented as being closely related. Both types of resistance (internal and external) are equally important for understanding the new CFSP. External resilience refers exclusively to external challenges that are relevant to security and the ability to withstand them. If resistance is interpreted as internal, it eliminates the gap between domestic and foreign policy, showing that the EU intends to develop more resilience to current challenges such as terrorist attacks, illegal migration, cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure in Member States or the EU, hybrid threats, natural and environmental disasters.

Another foreign and security policy objective set out in the "Mogherini Strategy" is autonomous EU action. The Union aims to make a decisive contribution to ensuring Europe's collective security and to "act autonomously, if and when necessary", within its borders to support internal security but also outside borders, through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)[41]. The strategy thus reflects the EU's ambition to build a unified foreign policy that will allow it to achieve "strategic autonomy" in the future.

But what does the concept of *strategic autonomy* entail: does it mean that the US is abandoning Europe, that the transatlantic relationship is being broken and that alliances are being abandoned? The idea of *strategic autonomy* in the EU's security and defence dimension came from France, backed by Merkel's Germany and then strengthened by the Trump administration's criticism of Europeans' insufficient contribution to NATO's common defence. France and Germany had

[39] W. Wagner and R. Anholt, "Resilience as the EU Global Strategy's New Leitmotif: Pragmatic, Problematic or Promising?", in *Contemporary Security Policy*, Volume 37, No. 3, 2016, pp. 414-430, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13523260.2016.1228034 (accessed 2.02.2022).

[40] Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*, 2003, p. 8.

[41] European Union, *Global Strategy*, 2016, p. 19.

different views on "strategic autonomy" at EU level. For example, the Paris vision contained nuances of sovereignty ("European sovereignty") but did not nullify the complementarity between EU and NATO strategic autonomy and saw the EU as a possible arbiter in the event of an international conflict (between China and the US, for example) while Merkel-era Berlin proposed a security vision in which the EU is umbilically linked to NATO, in the sense of decisive complementarity in a common security community, of which the EU and NATO are a part.

The Global Strategy reveals that NATO remains the mainstay of the defence of collective security; EU-NATO relations must not undermine the security and defence policy of those states that are not members of NATO; and cooperation with the Alliance will take place in the spirit of "complementarity, synergy and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making autonomy of the two"[42].

Therefore, the EU's "strategic autonomy" is a European goal that transcends the interests of states, it means the desire of Europeans to take the issue of security into their own hands, an important means of protecting and promoting their own core values and interests. However, it is not clear "to whom will Europe strategically become autonomous" or "what is the «geography» of strategic autonomy: the EU or Europe?"[43] What is certain is that assuming strategic independence in the field of security and defence requires greater integration in this area. The ability to make and implement defence decisions means that the EU needs to improve its dimensions: political, institutional, industrial and technological, operational.

First and foremost, the EU must have the capacity to make security and defence decisions, but at the moment it does not have enough political and institutional coherence to build a credible security alliance. The current way of making decisions in the field of security is mainly intergovernmental, and "strategic autonomy" requires much more than the coordination and unanimous agreement of the Member States on various foreign policy issues. That is why the Union needs to adapt its decision-making mechanisms to its organizational status as it stands today. At the level of the Union, political power is not evenly distributed: Paris and Berlin are the centres of power around which the interests of other states, whether voluntary or transactional, coagulate. Only when German and French interests coincide could the necessary political will emerge for security and defence decisions. This minimum requirement for accelerating the security and defence integration process is now being met. But the need to change the current profile of European foreign and security policy also needs institutional revitalization to achieve such an important level of ambition.[44]

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[42] *Ibidem*, p. 20.

[43] Dan Dungaciu, "Un tramvai numit dorință. «Autonomia Strategică» a Europei" [A Streetcar Named Desire. Europe's "Strategic Autonomy"], in R. Iordache (coord.), *UE și noua "furtună perfectă"* [*EU and the New "Perfect Storm"*], Bucharest, ISPRI Publishing House, 2021, p. 10.

[44] N. Iancu, "European Union's strategy autonomy or big powers' game illusion", 23 August 2019, https://en.monitorulapararii.ro/european-union-s-strategy-autonomy-or-big-powers-game-illusion-1-22544 (accessed 4.04.2022).

The European organizational architecture in the fields of diplomacy and defence must be complemented, in addition to the existence of the Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the most representative position[45] in this architecture by a legitimate political command commanding a security alliance. In military terms, the highest body in the Union is the EU Military Committee, made up of the heads of defence of the Member States, who propose a permanent President, appointed by the Council. However, all major decisions are still being taken at national level, with Member States avoiding, for the time being, an increase in the allocation of responsibilities to the institutions in Brussels. In recent years, leaders in Brussels have foreshadowed the prospect of setting up a *European Defence Union* that would complete the European project, as well as setting up a *European army*, a theme publicly launched by French President Emanuel Macron. These are sensitive topics but with significant potential for shaping the future profile of the European common defence.

Second, "strategic autonomy" means industrial and technological autonomy, the ability to research, design and develop the capabilities needed to participate in operations. It means reducing the European defence industry's dependence on foreign technologies and having the technological capability to support Member States' military forces with products made from its own European sources. EU efforts in the defence industry and military technologies have intensified following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the Global Strategy. In recent years, a number of instruments have been operationalized within the European defence package: *Permanent Structured Cooperation*, *the European Defence Fund*, *the Annual Defence Capabilities Analysis*; *the European Defence Industrial Development Program*.

Thirdly, the operational dimension refers to the existence of the necessary capabilities for the independent planning and conduct of civilian and military missions and operations. As such, the Union must be able to conduct military operations autonomously, without the involvement of the USA military, in order to promote or defend European interests. Achieving EU military autonomy would require the existence of a whole common gear of intelligence, planning, organization and conduct of military operations, as well as all the logistics on which the success of a mission depends. But how will it be possible to achieve this operational autonomy if most EU member states are also members of NATO, how will they manage their resources allocated for defence in an allied format? Is the aim of creating a "European military alliance", a common/united army of EU Member States complementary to the North Atlantic Alliance, in which the particularities and roles of each are respected? A. Bendiek suggests that the aim of the EU's foreign and security policy should not be "strategic autonomy" but "strategic interweaving", in order to include the commitments of the United Kingdom and the United States to the European security order, and

[45] The EU's Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and represents the Union internationally, is also Vice-President of the European Commission, attends European Council meetings, leads the External Action Service and the European Defense and is Chairman of the Board of the EU Institute for Security Studies.

from the perspective of the process. The author considers that the goal of creating a *Security and Defence Union* is a tendency to shift the EU's regulatory focus from the cosmopolitan ideal of the integrated market to an integration project aimed at European protectionism and sovereignty.[46]

In addition, the EU must consider that Member States have different perceptions of the challenges and threats that come from outside the borders, because it affects them differently. Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, are paying more attention to Russia's aggressive actions on the eastern border of the Union, compared to terrorist, immigration or other threats that have the potential to it turns into major crises, which we can find on the security agendas of other European states. At the moment, the crisis in Ukraine is ongoing, a state aspiring to integrate into the EU[47] but also into NATO, which the Russian Federation does not want to lose from its sphere of influence. Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine immediately endanger the states on the eastern border of the EU, although they are a challenge for the entire Union in view of the immigration of the population of Ukraine and the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created one of the largest humanitarian crises in recent European history, with the ongoing war causing more and more casualties, destruction and displacement inside and outside Ukraine.

At the Versailles Summit on 10-11 March 2022, convened in the context of the launch of the Russian military offensive in Ukraine, European leaders strongly supported "investments in defence capabilities and innovative technologies" and continued efforts to make the EU "a state and stronger, a capable security provider", while "a defence strategy is to be published before the end of the month". At the same time, the European Commission has been asked to be involved in assessing plans to increase the future military spending of EU member states.[48] President Macron has announced that Europe is preparing for "all scenarios", including independence from Russian gas and independence for its own defence.[49]

In the context of the invasion of Ukraine, the European Union has imposed unprecedented sanctions on the Russian Federation targeting the Russian financial system, economic sanctions on the ban on imports of wood, vodka, Russian coal, collectively supplied weapons to Ukraine to resist the Russian attack and make efforts to reduce the dependence of EU states on Russian gas and oil. It remains

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[46] A. Bendiek, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

[47] Ukraine has already concluded the Association Agreement with the EU, and in the wake of Russia's increasingly aggressive actions, Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership on 28 February 2022 and urged Brussels leaders to adopt a fast-track accession procedure. However, the Union does not allow itself to integrate a country at war, but neither does it allow itself to repel it. All the more so as the Treaty of Lisbon contains the clause that if an EU Member State is the victim of armed aggression, the other countries have an obligation to help and assist it by all means within their power.

[48] S. Petrequin, S. Corbeteu, "EU united on Ukraine, but won't offer fast-track membership", 11 March 2022, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/united-ukraine-eu-tackles-devil-details-summit-83360558 (accessed 7.04.2022).

[49] R. Lupițu, "De la Versailles, Emmanuel Macron anunță că Europa se pregătește «pentru toate scenariile», inclusiv independența de gazul rusesc și independența pentru propria apărare", March 10, 2022, https://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/ (accessed 8.04.2022).

to be seen what action the EU will take against Russia in this conflict, which has major effects across Europe. It is time for the concept of resilience promoted by the Global Strategy to be more clearly formulated and strengthened in the sense of demonstrating who has to resist, in the face of what, in what context and with what resources.

From the perspective of the Global Strategy, security interpreted as crisis resistance reflects a conservative EU foreign and security policy and declining interdependence in EU relations with third countries, different from liberal foreign policy promoting "effective multilateralism" in international relations and the need for cooperation based on mutual interdependence as it results from the Solana Strategy.

Conclusions

Given that state sovereignty is either delegated to the community/integrated dimension or preserved in the field of CFSP and CSDP, it is difficult to find a concept that encompasses the political specificity of the EU, which is why we can conclude that the EU is a synthesis of national and supranational. From the perspective of the two paradigms that guided the EU's external action (transformation and resilience), we can note that the European Union has had all the attributes of a normative and transformative power that has respected and continues to respect the diversity of national components in the European space and a considerable influence on the external environment, favouring stability and promoting democracy in the neighbouring states. But according to the directions given by the Global Strategy, the EU maintains its normative character, but becomes more cautious in addressing future internal crises and (external) security challenges that arise at its borders, by strengthening resistance to them, interconnecting the field of internal security with the external one and the creation in the future of a Security and Defence Union, to which is added the assumption of the most ambitious security objective, "strategic autonomy", which would allow it to "act autonomously if and when necessary", by establishing a joint/united army of EU Member States, without neglecting cooperation with NATO to ensure collective security.

As such, the expertise that the EU has been able to provide in the field of external security has been (and continues to be) civilly oriented, based on the order emanating from international law and foreign policy instruments, and the involvement of the CSDP in crisis management has been in commitments. assistance and solidarity, civilian missions, police, monitoring and stabilization, humanitarian. Currently, the implementation of programs and tools in the European defence package within the CSDP mentioned above, along with the outsourcing of internal security objectives (such as cyber security, counter-terrorism, the fight against organized crime or migration), in fact their passage in the field of CFSP, it is an extension of this area and reflects a trend towards an integrated security policy at EU level.

So, to the question of what kind of actor the EU is, we put the following answer: The European Union is a postmodern/post-sovereign political actor, it is a civilian normative power that promotes soft actions in the field of security and defence globally, is a security actor whose strategic objectives are to withstand future security crises and challenges and to address security integrative and autonomously so as to be able to combine military intervention with non-military modes of action, such as political, economic and humanitarian.

At this stage in the evolution of the international system towards a new world order and in the current geopolitical and security context on its eastern border, the EU's strategic orientation has the potential to move towards achieving effective European autonomy in the field of security, as an advanced political state of the process of community integration and the acquisition of an assumed political identity. But the creation of a genuine European security and defence policy and the transformation of the EU into a real security actor depends on the purpose of the European project, in the sense of full political integration. This means turning the EU into a true political union like the "United States of Europe" that would allow it to eliminate institutional shortcomings, act uniformly in the field of internal and external security and gain military autonomy by creating a European army.

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