

THE VERSAILLES PEACE CONFERENCE – A CENTURY OF CONTINUOUS ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN DEBATES

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Abstract. *The 100 years celebration of a great historical achievement for the Romanians and (why not to accept) a painful memory for the Hungarians may be also an opportunity for further attempts of dialogue and cooperation within the field of History research, probable the great missing link between these two neighboring countries. Interpretation of History still divides these countries, which otherwise are good and well integrated neighbors with excellent military relationship, a great deal of economic cooperation. After all by 2018 these two countries are member of the same military alliance, of the same politic and economic structure and once Romania will be accepted in the Schengen Area the border controls between them will be abolished. A single domain remains dominated by antagonist points of view, namely the History.*

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Romanians and Hungarians alike regarded historical arguments as having a key role at the Versailles Peace Conference. The production of propaganda material and history works belonging to Hungarian historiography exceeds quantitatively the Romanian historiography on sensitive topics such as the typology of Transylvanian civilization, aspects of historical demography, the history of culture and civilization. In the Hungarian case all of them are works aiming to demonstrate what is considered by the “the injustice” of the Trianon treaty, and the “legitimacy” of the Hungarian claims for Hungary’s reconstruction of (even partially) its former frontiers. The “Trianon moment” will mark the historiography, including the propaganda and cultural diplomacy of both nations, to this day. In Hungarian historiography there is talk of “Trianon Syndrome” to describe the psychological shock caused to Hungarian intelligentsia by the loss of 2/3 of pre-war territory, a loss felt by many at personal level (by choosing refuge, loss of property etc). The Hungarian delegation at Versailles Peace Conference led by count Apponyi Albert went to Paris with an impressive amount of material meant to justify

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Hungarian “historical rights” on the territory claimed by its neighbor countries (Serbia, Romania) or its former non Hungarian nationalities (Czech and Slovaks)¹. Surprisingly enough, the Hungarian delegation did not make claims regarding the territories that will become Croatia (which anyway use to have a large autonomy within Austro-Hungary). The Hungarians send hydrographs, economists, and demographers, in total more than 70 experts (one of the largest delegations). The documentary material was contained in four volumes printed on two columns. The first volume had 661 pages, the second 585 pages, the third 418 pages, and the fourth contained a large number of maps².

The mission of hydrographs was to demonstrate that the Danube is not just a river but also an entire hydrographic basin, which should not be disturbed. The mission of economists was to demonstrate the economic unity and the subsidiarity of its industry “harmonious distributed” among *Transleithania* (the official name of the Hungarian part of Austro-Hungary). The demographer’s mission was to reverse the use of the main argumentative weapon of the Allies, the *Nationalities principle*, by claiming that the proposed Treaty does not correspond entirely to this principle leaving behind regions with a Hungarian majority. However, the Hungarian delegation as well as the German one made a fatal argumentative mistake. The mistake was to focus the bulk of documentation on ideas based on the cultural and civilization superiority of the Hungarians towards other people with whom they are cohabiting, to which is added the little diplomatic attitude to accuse the winning powers of their “inability” to ensure the order for “normal” plebiscites that would have been able to provide a “real” consultation of the population. Count Apponyi also drew on the idea of the “Hungarian bastion of Western Christianity” in the face of “Eastern barbarism” (represented by the Turks or Slavs, the Romanians being usually included as “Slavs” if not through language at least by religion and culture). At the Conference, the general impression was that of arrogance to the irritation of the Allied representatives including Clemenceau. The delegations of the new national states constituted or unified on the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire presented historical arguments by which they dismantled “the millenary character of the Hungarian kingdom,” its “primacy” in the Carpatho-Danubian basin, and especially the bulk of their arguments were tangential to the new principles of self-determination of nations. Most of those ideas were well known to the ears of the Romanian delegation as various Hungarian social theorists use to develop them in the previous decades. Most of those ideas are based on a certain Social Darwinism as a theory designed to justify the supremacy a certain nation.³

The Hungarian arguments did not deny a state of affairs, namely the numerical superiority of the Romanians in Transylvania, but they argued that this is rather

¹ Albert Apponyi, gróf, *The memoirs of Count Apponyi, 1846-1933*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935, eBook, pp. 252-288.

² Among the delegation were the Transylvanians count István Bethlen and the geographer Count Pál Teleki, who were to assume key roles in Horthy’s administration.

³ The concept was developed by the anthropologist Gustav Friedrich Klemm, who divided populations into “active” and “passive” races or populations whose destiny is to rule and populations whose destiny is to obey and follow.

“relative” and have “recent date” (due to organized colonization, humanitarian acceptance of migrants from the extra-Carpathian provinces and the higher birth rates specific to the predominantly rural population and a low socio-economic level). The logic of this argument is again autarchic and not on line with the times, respectively it can be synthesized as a single idea: A relative numerical superiority cannot be substituted for the “cultural superiority” and the “civilizational historical mission” of Hungary carried on behalf of the values of Western civilization.⁴ The Hungarian delegation also claimed that it was unfair that access to state-subsidized education was labeled as a forced *Magyarization policy* by the Romanians, of course “forgetting” to omit the permanent harassments towards the Romanian private and confessionnal schools. The Romanians delegates will come up with the historical argument of the origins, unity and continuity structured in what Hungarian historians call generic *Daco-Romanism*, to which they added less autarchic principles invoking the number (the right to self-determination), the economic contribution, the geographical unity, the contribution to the struggle to protect Christendom, and also the Romanian Army contribution to protect Europe from the Bolshevik threat represented by the Hungarian Republic of Councils. Arguments such as Hungarian’s civilization superiority were countered by the Romanian delegation with arguments developed by Iuliu Maniu in his years of experience of combating racial despotism legally founded by the governors in Budapest.⁵ There were also more conciliatory opinions that prompted moderation on both sides. Some Hungarian historians did not deny the importance of the contribution of other nationalities to the Hungarian state, and the Romanian representatives at the Peace Congress recommended to the Czechoslovaks and Serbs moderation in the application of the linguistic principle, given the composite character and the ethnic enclaves existing *de facto* in Banat and the Trans-Danubian regions.

The definition of “Historical rights” was different in the case of Hungarians and Romanians. For the Hungarians is not important who inhabited a territory before but rather who “deserve it” by a superior management and *mission civilisatrice*.

Following the signing of the treaty, some of the Hungarian more conciliatory opinions will consider as a possible compromise the revision of the “linguistic border” which, in their opinion, should have been somewhere behind the cities of Satu Mare, Oradea, Arad and Timisoara and the creation of a corridor meant to secure the link between the Szeklerland located in the south-eastern extremity of Transylvania and Hungary.

Although the documents, the minutes of the meeting, etc., testify to the views expressed by the Hungarian delegation during the negotiations, many years later

⁴ István Bethlen, “The Treaty of Trianon and European Peace,” Cap. III: *The Problem of Transylvania: A lecture delivered on November 27, 1933, at The Royal Institute of International Affairs in London*, London, 1933, *apud* Polgar István-József, PhD Thesis, University of Oradea, 2011 (unpublished).

⁵ Maniu’s arguments were “historical” regarding the origins of the Romanians in Transylvania, “economic” arguments, regarding their contribution to the country’s wealth, “demographic” arguments (regarding the size of the population), “civilizational arguments” were based on the equality of Romanian civilization with the others in the region. There were also “political” arguments based on the “modern ideas” like the *nationality principle*, democracy, equality and the right of existence and self-determination.

in his memoirs, Count Apponyi will remember something else, namely that his argumentative strategy was focused on using “the most rewarding weapon” of the Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Serbs namely *The Principle of Nationalities*. He will briefly note how he tried to dismantle the misinterpretation of demographic data in various contexts (especially in Slovakia). Count Apponyi wrote his memoirs at the end of his career and many years after the end of the war, when elements such as *universal suffrage* and the right to *self-determination* became more common than in 1918 and especially when they were widely used by the new ally of Hungary, Germany.

Apponyi’s memoirs are an interesting reading even if the accuracy of the information is most likely distorted by the distance to events (over a decade). Count Apponyi also provides information on how the Hungarian government has tried to influence the Allies’ decisions by conditioning lucrative post-war reconstruction public contracts beneficial to French or British firms, to their governments’ attitude towards the final form of the Treaty.⁶

In Hungary, it is difficult or even impossible to find any significant intellectual (historian, political scientist, philosopher, poet, journalist, or politician) who has not written something about Trianon. Formulated by Klebelsberg in the mid-20s, the Hungarian *Neo-nationalism* can be characterized as an attempt to adjust Hungarian nationalism in its various forms of expression, including the historical writing of post-Trianon realities.⁷ Given that, according with them, in the case of post-Trianon Hungary the state no longer coincides with the nation, historical writing and political discourse had to be shifted from state-centered discourse to nation-centered speech, from a typical paternalistic speech of a dominant nation to a discourse focused on the present and the cultural domination in the Carpathian basin even in the post-Trianon conditions.

This ideology maintains and develops in another form the old myth of Hungarian cultural superiority that presumably will allow them a cultural preeminence in the Carpathian Basin, as the first step in the way of future political and territorial restoration. The same Klebelsberg recommends reorienting from a strategy of confronting to a strategy of cooperation with the neighboring nations based on the idea that the alleged cultural and civilian superiority of the Hungarians will ultimately naturally ensure Hungarian intellectual dominance, as an *outpost* to a future political domination. Without real support in the demographic realities, the Hungarian argument against Trianon will focus primarily on historical arguments, the argument relying on a pretended civilizational superiority “inviting” the Western powers in their decisions not to contemplate “the quantity” or number but “the quality.” There were arguments about the role of Hungary as Western Medieval defender of the West both in front of the Romanians and of the Slav-Oriental barbarity, so that in the end the West would ‘reward’ Hungary with the Trianon. It is relevant to say that this idea of the betrayal of Hungary by the West will give birth to the Turanian orientation in the Hungarian cultural ideology, with

⁶ Albert Apponyi, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-288.

⁷ Steven Béla Várdy, “The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the Hungarian Mind: The Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism,” *Hungarian Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No 1, Spring 1983, pp. 21-25.

many adherents including today. The movement's advocates proposed renouncing the Western "coat" worn by the Hungarians for 1000 years and returning to the "pure" Hungarian civilization.

Another feature of this intellectual trend (with reminiscences also today) was to claim that the Trianon is temporary, an aberration of history and an injustice so great for the Hungarians that, like a bad dream, will vanish over time.⁸ School maps, geography books were either exclusive to pre-Trianon Hungary, or they represented the lost territories encountered as a normal part of Hungary under "normal circumstances." We are talking here about a permanently state induced catastrophic cult into the collective memory, generation by generation, for decades, which generate a cult of victimhood or Hungarian "Golgotha" with three-point marks: "The invasion of Tatars" in 1241, "Mohach" 1526 and the Ottoman Occupation and "Trianon" 1920. In a post feudal society, in which the religion had a primordial importance, the word "Golgotha" has a particular significance being related with the idea of a promised resurrection. The significant number of irredentist organizations can also be explained by the amount and size of Hungarian irredentist works and actions. Well financed and with well-motivated members, they flooded the Western World with propagandistic works and revisionist lobbyist activities.⁹

Among those semi-academic revisionist Hungarian organizations can be nominated: *The Hungarian Territorial Integrity League*, *The National Association of Defense Leagues*, and *The Hungarian Revisionist League*. In 1927 *The Hungarian National Federation* was established by absorbing more than 30 irredentist organizations of various kinds. Worth to mention that the unification of all irredentist organizations in a "united front" was the "master piece" of a well-known British journalist, namely Lord Harold Sidney Harmsworth Rothermere, the author of massive pro-revisionist campaigns in the British and American mass media. To the massive revisionist effort was strengthened with the help of various academic organizations such as *The Hungarian Geographical Association*, *Transylvanian Research Institute*, *Hungarian Historical Association*, and *Hungarian Statistical Association*. Most of those institutions were active some 6 years only (between 1935 and 1941).

It seems that during the negotiations with the Romanians in Transylvania, in certain desperation for their cause, some less known solutions would have been among the suggestions offered by the Hungarian part, including a union between Hungary and Romania in the form of a Hungarian-Romanian dualism under the crown of King Ferdinand of Romania. It seems that the initiators of the proposal were under the influence of the counts Banffy and Teleky, both of them Transylvanians.¹⁰ There are studies and recent published documents confirming that, in principle, the Plans were agreed by the two monarchs, as well as the Hungarian regent-governor, admiral Miklos Horthy, who sent his ministers several

⁸ I found this opinion in the totality of Hungarian consulted resources especially in those contemporary with the events (see the bibliography).

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 27.

¹⁰ Lucian Leuştean, *O istorie internațională a Europei în secolul XX*, vol. I: 1919-1945, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University Publishing House, *Historica* collection, Jassy, 2015.

times to treat the problem. Miklos Horthy came to power after the Romanian armies defeated the Hungarian Soviet Republic, created after the First World War by Communist Bela Kun. In order to preserve the free throne of Hungary for the King of Romania, the attempts of Charles IV of Habsburg to return to the throne of Hungary in 1921 were thwarted, even at the price of bloodshed.¹¹ The information is confirmed by the *Memoirs* of Alexandru Vaida-Voievod, published only in recent years, plus by the official reports of the Romanian diplomat Nicolae Petrescu Comnen, found in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives. The historian Lucian Leuștean considers that although “exotic” the idea of a union between Romania and Hungary caused concerns in London. The fact that the British representative in Bucharest, Frank Rattigan, was requested by the Foreign Office to give a report regarding this issue also demonstrate that there was something more than just *diplomatic rumors*. Yugoslav archives also contain notes in which the Belgrade government is worried about the construction of a supra-state Romanian-Hungarian super state structure that would jeopardize the Serbian Banat and parts of Croatia. A report of the State Police and State Security Department to the Bucharest Ministry of Interior is another document confirming this scenario describing the way count Banffy would have been negotiating with King Ferdinand for two weeks in Sinaia¹². The same Report gave us lapidary information about the end of the project. The expected opposition of the Liberals in the Romanian Parliament and an expected upraise of the Romanian peasants in Transylvania (perhaps one of the conditions in the negotiation process from the Hungarian part was a mild application of the Agrarian Reform in Transylvania). In his book *Romania and the End of Europe. Memories of the Lost Country. Romania of 1917-1947*, the prince Mihail Sturdza also talks about this seemingly bizarre episode. There is also a recently discovered telegram of Iuliu Maniu sent from Sibiu to Bucharest on December 3, 2019 informing the Romanian royal authorities about the “state of sympathy” within the Budapest intelligence regarding the possibility that Ferdinand I would become King of Hungary after the abdication of the last Hungarian king (this information being send by Dr. Erdely from Budapest).¹³

However, the Hungarian proposal is not mentioned in the biographies of King Ferdinand and in the memoirs of Alexandru Marghiloman.¹⁴ Most likely, it was about (backstage) proposals made in personal names (for “testing the ground”) and not an official proposal of the Hungarian state. It may have been an initiative of Count Banffy, an idealist who, after the end of his mandate as Foreign Minister of Hungary, will obtain the Romanian citizenship (thanks to the personal interventions of the Romanian King). Was it about some political ideals or just the desire to better manage their properties in Transylvania?

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ Bogdan Bucur (Ed), *Cartea de Aur a Centenarului Marii Uniri*, RAO Books, Bucharest, 2017 (include the facsimile of the Telegram send by Iuliu Maniu to The Romanian Ministre of Foreign Affairs), p. 111.

¹⁴ Mihail Sturdza, *România si sfârșitul Europei. Amintiri din țara pierdută. Romania anilor 1917-1947*, Criterion Publishing, Bucharest, 2004, p. 8.

We can also note that at the time the *Confederation idea* was not necessarily new among Hungarian intellectuals. It existed in the pre-Dualist Hungary after 1848. Lajos Kossuth himself authored the idea regarding a *Danubian Confederation* of “oppressed Central European populations” who lived in the Habsburgs Empire. Until the emergence of new documents, we can only speculate.

Are interesting and relevant at the same time the “confessional arguments,” used by the Romanians to protect their biggest achievement Transylvania against the massive anti-Trianon Hungarian propaganda in the interwar period. The reconciliation of the doctrine so prized by the Romanians as a nation with a culture belonging to Western culture and civilization and the *Neo-Latin World* is difficult to reconcile, among the Western public opinion, with the reality of a massive and obvious Eastern Orthodox spirituality that Romanians will not only never denied but emphasized in the manifestations of identity of any kind. A first reconciliation (little known and perceived as such in the West) was accomplished by Greek Catholics by joining the Church of Rome. A second one consisted in presenting the Orthodox tradition as part of the Byzantine spirituality that was the continuation of the Roman imperial majesty in other conditions and in another dimension. The use of religious argumentation has always been a two-edged weapon due to the complexity of the confessional landscape. Consider here the permanent tensions between Orthodox and Greek Catholics, Catholics and Protestants, between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Greek, Russian and Serbian Orthodox Church. Often, the worst conflict has turned out to be the fratricide conflict.

The Romanian-Hungarian Cooperation in the Field of Historical Research

I felt opportune to touch this subject considering the *100 years jubilee* of *The Great Union* or *The Union of Transylvania with Romania*, an event of great joy for the Romanians and perceived if not with the same passionate hate as in the interwar time at least with reserve and a dose of bitterness by the Hungarians both from Hungary and from Transylvania. In the last years the Hungarian Government prohibited its diplomats to attend any event on the 1 December, Romanians National Day which celebrates The Union of Transylvania with Romania in 2018. Also, in Hungary some interwar Transylvanian writers like Albert Wass, József Nyirz, Dezső Szabó, although known for their xenophobic, extreme right and anti-Semitic attitudes, were suddenly rehabilitated and introduced into the school curricula.¹⁵ Just like in Romania, there is noticeable today some xenophobic literature sold in the street authoring various names as well as car bumpers with ante Trianon Hungary. Surprisingly enough, Hungarian registered cars with pre-Trianon Hungary bumpers are watched in Romania with calm or a dose of amusement, often with ignorance. Perhaps this is a solid sign of political maturity and confidence (at least as far as this issue is concerned).

¹⁵ Ignác Romsics, *The dismantling of historic Hungary: the Peace Treaty of Trianon*, 1920, Wayne NJ, 2002, p. 53.

The 100 years celebration of a great historical achievement for the Romanians and (why not to accept) a painful memory for the Hungarians may be also an opportunity for further attempts of dialogue and cooperation within the field of History research, probable the great missing link between these two neighboring countries. Interpretation of History still divides these countries that otherwise are good and well integrated neighbors, with excellent military relationship and a great deal of economic cooperation. After all, by 2018 these two countries are member of the same military alliance, of the same politic and economic structure and, once Romania will be accepted in the Schengen Area, the border controls between them will be abolished. A single domain remains dominated by antagonist points of view, namely the History.

The attempts to cooperate in the field of History research are not necessary new. A Romanian-Hungarian mixt historical commission was initiated in the early 70's. For more than three decades the Commission has been coordinated for the Romanian side by professors Camil Muresan and Alexandru Porțeanu. The latter, during the talks, confided to us various details with reference to the embarrassment the Romanian professional historians had to face at every meeting from the political interference of various Romanian Communist Party delegates. Every delegation of the Romanian Commission had to include at least one-party activist who did not hesitate to make his "expertise" known in plenary. The work of the Commission and the delegation movement benefited, especially in Hungary, from all media attention and diplomatic protocol of highest degree. The various issues of interest for the common history, such as the "Liberal Movement in Central Europe" or the "History of the Danube River Basin," have been approached, while deliberately avoiding major polemics and "hot" subjects like the Trianon treaty, the Romanian continuity in Transylvania, demographic aspects etc.

Nominally, the committee has worked continuously, including during the 1980s, with interesting academic results, but almost entirely unknown to the public in both countries. The 90's were expected to produce more consistent results as long as the censorship and the interference of the politic were abolished and the researchers had the possibility to travel freely between the two countries. Apart from the state funds, there were also available for the first time private funds facilitating the integrated research. However, the results were rather disappointing. In the talks with professor Porțeanu, he accuses also a certain lack of interest from the Hungarian side, which after 89' had the opportunity and was concentrated to reconquer the affluent West leaving the "East" in neglect and shadow. After 2000, under the auspices of the Transylvanian Studies Center of the "Gheroghe Bariț" History Institute in Cluj, a series of initiatives for the publication of an "integrated" Romanian-Hungarian History of the Transylvania took place. The results were some published but not the much-expected integrated History of Transylvania but rather collections of various history and cultural studies reflecting the research concerns of various contributors. Again, the disputed aspects in that volume are diplomatically avoided¹⁶.

¹⁶ In 2004 the subject of the Joint Romanian-Hungarian History Commission, held in Arad and Budapest, was *Man and nature in the course of history (climatic cycles, natural catastrophes, interpretations of nature in Romanian and Hungarian contexts)* and for 2008: *Religion and Society in the Central and South-Eastern European Space*.

In November 2006, the Romanian Foreign Ministry announced again that Romanian and Hungarian historians will collaborate to draw up a joint volume of history of Romania and Hungary, conducted under the joint patronage of the Romanian Academy and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The topic was also on the agenda of the joint meeting of the governments of Romania and Hungary, which took place on November 16, 2006 in Budapest. Foreign Minister Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu (also a reputed historian) sent a request to the Romanian Academy leadership to nominate the members of the joint commission by Romania until December. The deadline for setting up the commission was July 2007 and the completion of the project was set for 2010. The proposed work designed for academics was to be followed by a joint History school book modeling the French-German history textbooks, which were introduced in 2006 in schools in France and Germany giving pupils the possibility to know the historical events common to the two countries, sensitive themes seen from both the French and German perspectives. The Romanian Education Minister Mihail Hârdău was skeptic saying that he supports the takeover of the Franco-German model in both Romanian and Hungarian schools however, but that a Romanian-Hungarian history manual will be left for many years, the minister stressing that it is quite difficult to harmonize the vision of Romania and Hungary on key events regarding the history of these two nations. And he was right. A decade later the results or at least signs regarding the “work in progress” are still expected. As long as the very fundamentals of the Romanian modern nation, namely the daco-roman origins, unity, continuity in Transylvania and the legitimacy of the Trianon treaty, are all challenged by the Hungarian historiography, a reconciliation of the points of view leading to an integrated History of Transylvania is difficult to achieve. The French – and German Historical commissions did not encounter such fundamental divergences nor is their public opinion such passionate about the interpretation of various key historical events. In Romania also every attempt to mild and mingle the interpretation of key historic events was regarded with reluctance and suspicion especially in the 1990’s. The History Text Books scandal in 1999 is relevant and almost 20 years later the sensitive subjects must be approached with great care in order to avoid possible misunderstandings.

In Romania, along with the traditional historiographical approaches in the 2000s, the chairs of History Faculties were taken over by a new wave of historians with new approaches that address the problem of simultaneous instrumentalization of the image of Transylvania’s history in Hungarian and Romanian national mythologies. They address the extent to which the Romanian or Hungarian historiography is used for political legitimacy and nationalist-populist mobilization. Among the representatives of Transylvania’s new current historians we mention the group around the Center for Transylvanian Studies in Cluj-Napoca, and the magazines *Altera*, *Transylvanian Review*, *Echinox* or *Provincia*: authors such as Sorin Mitu, Florin Gogâltan, Ovidiu Pecican, Victor Neumann, Valeriu Leu, Toader Nicoară, Maria Crăciun or Ovidiu Ghitta, Ottmar Trașcă, Ionut Costea, Marius Diaconescu. They focus on studying from perspectives long time neglected in the name of a certain perceived “political correctness.” Among them we can

nominate the regional specificity, and its connections with the European intellectual movements in Central Europe, the history of the imaginary and the cultural diversity of Transylvania. This approach introduces for the first time the Romanians of Transylvania in a complex, multi-ethnic historical picture in which they are object and subject of the interaction with other ethnic groups.

To conclude, in the last almost three decades the major preconditions for the long-term cooperation in the field of History, including the most controversial aspects, were settled. There have been already an incalculable number of researches/documentation exchanges carried out at different levels (specialists, PhD students, master students, students etc.), thematic conferences and meetings, as well as articles/studies in profile publications in both countries. All are collaborative variants that have nuanced approaches and the tense atmosphere that existed during the 80's and which can form the basis for future integrated history textbooks. If they will succeed a Romanian-Hungarian project may become a good model for reconciliation of historical memories of several other nations (Turks and Greeks, Turks and Armenians, Koreans and Japanese, Chinese and Japanese etc.).

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