SPACE, TIME, AND ROSI BRAIDOTTI’S EUROPE

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Abstract. As a surface to be crossed, space provides metaphors that many discourses on Europe politicize. Some such discourses attribute Utopian qualities to European space, while neglecting considerations of time and diachronic ethical debts to Europe’s ‘others’. Unlike them, Rosi Braidotti’s nomadism accommodates temporality and addresses some historical concerns. However, I argue, this accommodation is insufficient and ambivalent. It fails to consider European time in ways that undo the projection of the Northwestern-European past onto the rest of Europe. It echoes developmentalist idioms and some generalities concerning European responsibility that reflect the dominant spirit of the times. Through these criticisms the article aims to remind political thought of the ‘un-timely’ and its disruptive power over an often self-congratulatory European imaginary.

Keywords: Rosi Braidotti; Europe; developmentalist; nomadism; space; time.

Introduction

Europeanness is typically theorized through the double registry of Europe as the continent’s actuality of common ground and of Europe as political potentiality1. Time and again, theorists employ spatial metaphoricity to illustrate such Europeanness. Playing with the metaphors of the cap, the cape and the peninsula in Jacques Derrida’s The Other Heading (1992) is perhaps most emblematic of the emphasis on spatiality2. Various political-philosophical engagements with Europe involve spatial metaphors such as: North and South divisions (Held, 1993); crossroads and border-crossing (Rumford, 2006); the topos of commonalities (Habermas, 2015); and the chora of cities of refuge

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1 See, for instance, the essays included in Levy, D. et. al. volume Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe (2005).

2 I am talking about ‘emphasis’ here because Derrida certainly employs temporal metaphors. A central element of this text, indeed its opening discussion, focuses on the notion of ‘today’ in Valery’s work and the problematic uses of the present within nationalism. But such temporal metaphors are mainly associated either with nationalism or with deferrals of political ideality. Thus they are not beyond the objections to the priority of the spatial over the temporal and do not perform the specific genealogies that, I shall argue in this article, are missing in theorizations of Europe.

(Kelly, 2004). Also, as spatial metaphors, ever receding global borders and ever expanding global cities evoke contact zones (Pratt, 1993) where different people meet. In most political philosophy from liberal down to postcolonial leanings, these zones appear as sites where the promise of better politics may materialize. Though not always explicitly or exclusively applied to Europe, the figurative power of political spatiality has importantly been drawn into the European imaginary.

This article begins with the claim that the reliance on the spatial figurative has a lasting, yet inflated, importance. I say ‘inflated’ because, sometimes, considerations of spatiality become faddish and hegemonic at the expense of considering temporality and the nuance that temporality introduces into political discourse. When this happens, acts of border-crossing are theoretically invested with ethico-political value. Such theoretical operations rely on processes of: political homogenization of acts of border-crossing; and hasty politicization of the locations (e.g. Europe) hosting such acts. Within this framework, the nuance that resists these processes is often ignored. For, in reality, acts of border-crossing vary from being politically significant, subtly or overtly subversive, unavoidable and heart-rending, to being optional, individualistic, profit-seeking or, at other instances, mainly recreational. Bypassing the polymorphous character of movement, much contemporary political thought attaches uniformly idealized implications to these acts of mobility, and grants them the promise of a better political future beyond cultural purism, isolationism and xenophobia.

Ultimately, the potential of a place, say, of Europe, is so exaggerated that the place is elevated to the status of a Promised Land. Likewise, potentiality is at times mistaken for actuality, and the political promise of a place (which may in truth be nothing more than the promise of any place) is singled out as unique, imminent or already fulfilled. We may describe this as ‘utopianization of a place’. To make the idealization involved in utopianizing operations more evident, we may talk about the ‘eutopianization of a place’, i.e. the idealized description of it as a good topos. In such discourses, the significance of history is often overlooked. Or, when taken into account, history takes the shape of a uniform and simplified narrative.

Rosi Braidotti (2004) explores the European potential through various spatial metaphors. She illustrates European potentiality as a prospect for overcoming ‘fortress’ Europe and as a process of de-centering Europeanness beyond center – periphery divisions. Unlike thinkers indifferent to temporality, Braidotti claims that explorations of European potentiality should not bypass considerations of time. Granting this point, I critically focus on Braidotti’s approach to Europe and on some of her dealings with European spatiotemporality. I then examine the uneven treatment of spatiality and temporality, as well as the failure to politicize

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3 I think that Michelle Bastian makes a similar point when she writes: ‘even while the importance of the temporal dimension is recognized, the continued claim from across a range of social science and humanities disciplines – that time is a missing element of analysis – suggests that it has yet to develop the same kind of analytical purchase as other reworked metaphysical concepts such as identity and space’ (Bastian, 2013: 95).

4 Let us recall here Thomas More’s famous pun of Utopia as u-topos (no-topos) and eu-topos (good topos). For a more detailed discussion see Papastephanou (2009).
asynchronous time⁵ even in approaches such as Braidotti’s. I will argue that, despite the accommodation of historical concerns and temporal aspects, Braidotti’s nomadism deals ambivalently with temporality. Hence, nomadism often fails to account for European asynchronous time in ways that undo the projection of Northwestern-European past onto the rest of Europe. It also falls prey to developmentalist Northwestern ideals of global, synchronized time and of synchronization with the spirit of the times.

Ultimately, such lapses may lead to EUtopianizing a particular construction of Europeanness. Critical of such handling of time, this article offers examples of challenges and stakes such as historical ethico-political debts and unresolved political problems of global justice. Such challenges and stakes invite a different ideality, one that heightens awareness of responsibility and avoids unqualified glorification of border-crossings. This ideality presupposes a non-developmental sense of asynchronous time that operates as the ‘un-timely’ and urges feminist political thought about Europe to consider the possibility of its own radical redirection, of breaking with its own dominant spirit of the times. Therefore, this critique of Braidotti’s nomadism has two stages: one deals with the nomadic outlook on temporality and difference within European spatiality; and the other deals with the concomitant nomadic response to European ideality, a response that, as the article argues, is too focused on movement across European space and too celebratory of post-nationalism to be able to critically theorize pending European debts to otherness.

**Braidotti’s Nomadism**

The contact zone, the global border, the border-less world and several places, such as, for instance, Europe, become settings for acts of literal and symbolic border-crossing. As such, they stand out as politically invested spatialities. Ultimately, they illustrate a subtle and poorly themed return of spatial utopianism. Keeping this constantly in view, let us explore how Braidotti’s nomadism relies on the spatial metaphoricity of cartography, locations and movement, while also accommodating concerns of temporality. This step prepares the ground for a critique of the narrowness of Braidotti’s demands on the ‘subject-in-transit’.

Braidotti’s (2006: 199) thinking subject is in transition and in process; yet this does not place thought ‘outside history or time’. As she (1999: 89) writes, ‘thinking may not be topologically bound, especially in the age of the global economy and telematic networks, but it certainly is not outside the temporal span of history’. Reflecting on her theory of nomadic subjectivity, Braidotti explains that, quite against neglects of temporality, her feminist work goes ‘to some lengths to connect the nomadic subject position’ to ‘locations as spatiotemporal conditions’ (ibid). She defines a location as an embedded and embodied set of counter-memories ‘activated by the resisting thinker against the grain of the dominant representations of subjectivity’ (Braidotti, 2006: 199).

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⁵ Terms such as developmentalism, asynchronous time and synchronized time are explained later on in the relevant section.
A spatial metaphoricity of the map operates inside Braidotti’s nomadism, since locations ‘are not cognitive entities, but politically informed cartographies that aim at making visible and consequently undoing power relations’ (Braidotti, 1999: 91). As a ‘politically informed reading of the present’ (Braidotti, 1994: 200), a cartography goes beyond hermeneutic analytical grids to offer loci of resistance that contest dominant formations in the social field. Therefore, Braidotti’s (1999: 92) nomadic politics of location attempts to make sense ‘of diversity within the category of “difference” understood as the binary opposite of the phallogocentric subject’.

Thinking is a nomadic activity; for, thinking is tightly connected with spatial metaphors of movement and passage. It takes place in the spaces in between, ‘in the transitions’ between positions. Yet, Braidotti denies that this makes thinking ‘a “view from nowhere”’ (2006: 199). In a palimpsest mode, the statement from the above-cited 2006 text that ‘to be nomadic or in transition does not place the thinking subject outside history or time’ also appears verbatim in her earlier texts (e.g. Braidotti, 1999: 89). Applied to European nomadism, this statement reads as follows: ‘Being a nomadic European subject means to be critical of unitary, hegemonic and imperial notions of Euro-centrism. It situates the subject in transit within different identity-formations, but sufficiently anchored to a historical position to accept responsibility for it’ (Braidotti, 2005: 174; again to palimpsest effect, also in: Braidotti, 1997: 31; and Braidotti, 2004: 137). To accept responsibility involves a practice of accountability for one’s embodied and embedded locations. ‘As a relational, collective activity of undoing power differentials’, this practice is linked, Braidotti holds, ‘to two crucial notions: memory and narratives’. These ‘activate the process of putting into words’, of ‘bringing into symbolic representation, that which by definition escapes consciousness, insofar as it is relational and invested by a yearning or desire for change’ (Braidotti, 1999: 92). The stated aim of accepting responsibility is to promote the post-nationalistic restructuring of European identity that extends citizenship rights to various ‘others’ (Braidotti, 2004: 130-1).

Then again, if ‘cartography is a theoretically-based and politically-informed reading of the present’, as already explained, we may ask: what about the past? Is the past just absorbed and contained in the present? At first sight, in a declarative tone, the past is accommodated when Braidotti adds: as such, cartography responds to two main requirements, i.e., ‘to account for one’s locations in terms both of space (geo-political or ecological dimension) and time (historical and genealogical dimension); and to provide alternative figurations or schemes of representation for these locations’ (Braidotti, 2010: 410). However, as I argue next, this accommodation of temporality is performed only to a degree and at times involves an intro-European asynchronicity that smacks of developmentalism.

**Developmentalist Temporality**

Let us first explain the above terms. Developmentalism denotes an Eurocentric political and colonial project ‘linked to liberal ideology and to the idea of progress’ (Grosfoguel, 2000: 348). Developmentalism dictated that the path of Europe’s
modern development must be followed by every other culture (Dussel, 1993: 68) because it exemplified the evolutionary process by which a superior civilization unraveled itself. Corresponding discourses prescriptively offered to non-Western others ‘a recipe about how to become like the “West”’ (Grosfoguel, 2000: 370). This sense of superiority obliged modernity ‘to “develop” (civilize, uplift, educate) the more primitive, barbarous, underdeveloped civilizations’ (Dussel, 1993: 75), to help them adapt to a pragmatically changing world, to make them fit in with the rest of the world and to ‘show’ some evolutionary ability.

Developmentalism depended upon a sense of asynchrony since its progressivism contrasted European spatiality and extra-European places as lacking temporal concurrence. People living in asynchronous time relative to Northwestern Europe, ‘archaic’ people, should see Europe as the ‘model’ to imitate. They should endorse the developmentalist goal to ‘catch up’ with advanced states (Grosfoguel, 2000: 350), to synchronize themselves with Northwestern European currency. Therefore, developmentalism did not only produce ‘civilizing heroes’ and their conquered, colonized victims. It also created a connection of time between them (Dussel, 1993: 75), since it presented them as inhabiting two distinct temporalities that could be contrasted. On the one side, the linear, ‘progressive’, modern time, taking the status of history proper; on the other side, the cyclical, repetitive, pre-modern time to be abandoned because it constitutes humanity’s pre-history. The civilizing agent (the oppressor) made it his mission to synchronize the oppressed, to help them overcome their archaism, to initiate them into progress through a modernization process.

In my view, this entailed a dystopianization of ‘archaic’, ‘developing’ places and a eutopianization of the ‘advanced’, Northwestern ‘model’ states. Especially within colonial contexts, developmentalism de-territorialized those who suffered it, ‘emptied’ them of rootedness in their specific semiotic regimes. But the dystopianization of archaic rootedness and concomitant Northwestern operations of uprooting were not devoid of utopianizing re-territorialization. A general tropology of developmentalism involved the assumption that, not sharing the same historical time, different geographical spaces had their own destiny (Grosfoguel, 2000: 349). Modern Northwestern spaces were eutopianized and set as the final destination of accelerated modernization processes of the ‘undeveloped’. Passing through a stage of development that ‘Europe’ had already left behind, the ‘archaic’ world was interpellated to an ever receding (e)utopian re-territorialization.

Nowadays, developmentalism is openly combated and its blatant manifestations chastised, though its subtle resilience often goes unnoticed. Residual yet lasting, the theorization of Northwestern-European and ‘other’ spatialities as asynchronous and in need of synchronization is based on a specifically politicized concept of time. Along its lines, time becomes a metaphor of evolution and a central device through which difference is demarcated. The perpetual ‘other’ (the East, the South, etc.) – unable or unwilling to follow the rhythms or achievements (political, financial, etc.) of the West or the North – remains locked in primitive times and is perceived as a current ‘other’.
Let us now consider whether Braidotti unwittingly makes developmentalist implicit assumptions of different temporalities and applies them to European spatiality. Most telling of her assumption of different temporalities is a point on the archaic that, if thought through, eutopianizes the EU present.

Braidotti describes the present through the following generalities: ‘we already live in permanent states of transition, hybridization and nomadic mobility, in emancipated (post feminist), multi-ethnic societies with high degrees of technological mediation. These are neither simple, nor linear events, but rather multi-layered and internally contradictory phenomena’. These phenomena relate to multiple temporalities as follows: they ‘combine elements of ultra-modernity with splinters of neo-archaism: high tech advances and neo-primitivism’ (Braidotti, 2013b: 188 and 198 emph added; also palimpsestically in Braidotti, 2007: 68).

Splinters are, I think, very revealing spatial metaphors. They are surfaces, thin, sharp pieces of something (such as wood, glass, etc.) that have broken off a larger piece. As a body or a surface, Europe is not only a land with its jetties and caps but also with its splinters, breaking off from the main body, from the whole. A splinter of archaism, then, evokes that the broken European surface also contains pieces of the past. Or, Europe appears attached to a renegade piece (was it part of Europe before it broke away?) of asynchronous time. As it happens when we consider multiple temporalities associated with different spatialities, the issue of developmentalism assigning to ‘splinters’ the task of catching up with the rest of Europe in order to reach post-nationalist stages cannot be sidestepped. It must be discussed head-on. Therefore, when Braidotti writes that ‘splinters of archaism are mixed up with the most advanced social, urban, technological and cultural developments, to produce the paradox of simultaneously opposite social effects’ (Braidotti, 2009: 6), we may ask: who inhabits such asynchronous spatialities? Whose temporalities does she contrast? Which spatialities are thus correspondingly dystopianized and eutopianized?

The answer we extrapolate from some Braidottian texts (2002; 2004; 2005) is that a major splinter of archaism is Eastern-European nationalism. Certainly, Braidotti acknowledges splinters of nationalist archaism in Northwestern Europe. But it is significant that, in her writings, the major illustrations of such splinters are Eastern-European spatialities.

In Braidotti’s (2004: 131) most relevant short essay on Europe, the formerly Eastern bloc comes up only in the mode of crisis and as an example of resurgent archaism: ‘the disintegration of the Soviet empire marks simultaneously the triumph of the advanced market economy and the return of tribal ethnic wars of the most archaic kind’. While Northwestern Europe is represented as having, to a large degree, reached a post-national level of experience, the splinters of archaism are still trapped in nationalist sentiment. Eastern-Europeans crop up in Braidotti’s textuality only to illustrate the space of crisis created by those lagging behind. In another of her essays (Griffin and Braidotti, 2002), Europe’s ‘eastern borders’ do not signify or engender anything other than a crisis inviting response. For her, Europe faces issues such as ‘emerging nationalisms in the former Eastern bloc countries’
and implications such as the ‘trafficking in women, various forms of forced migrations, war rape and other similar gendered offenses against women’ (19).

Asynchronous spatiality (post-nationalism versus archaism) associated with Northwest and Southeast is also evident in the following etatist/regionalistical connection of emotion and politics. North-European feminism has surpassed the stage of political emotion that demarcates an archaic realm where affect plays a significant part in one’s political identifications: ‘the notion that emotions might govern one’s politics, or that emotions and emotionally invested social structures should be taken into consideration in the public and political spheres, is quite anathema to North European and Anglo-American feminists’ (Griffin and Braidotti, 2002: 16). Unlike some other feminists (see below), North-European feminists base their political beliefs ‘on certain rationally defensible principles’ (ibid). One is struck by the implicit dichotomy of ‘reason versus emotions’: granted, some emotions are dangerous when they govern politics; but should one not be emotional about, and passionately defend, rational principles? Why the either/or of emotions and rationality? Is this not an indication that some Northern-European feminist philosophy treats emotions uniformly and disparagingly, in ways reminiscent of the orientalist colonial assumption that some peoples were unfit to rule themselves because they were too emotional rather than rational? Curiously, the rationale emerges in this passage not as a notion suspect of phallogocentrism but as a sanitizing and legitimizing force that frees women from dangerous emotions.

The comparative element and its implicit developmentalism surfaces more clearly when the attachment to political emotion is attributed to a homogenized Southeast and treated as a residue of ‘archaisms’ such as patriarchy, fascism, Catholic nation-statism and dictatorships. ‘Since it is the Eastern European and Southern European countries to whom passion in politics is most meaningful, one may speculate whether or not this disposition is associated with intensely patriarchal, Catholic nation-states that have experienced fascist and other forms of dictatorship or absolutist regimes’ (Griffin and Braidotti, 2002: 16). Evidently, this position reinforces the wholesale incrimination of political emotion and presents an unifying narrative of Southeastern politics as explicable via surpassed temporalities.

Astonishingly, in the above source, some pages before the statement in question, a pan-European view was defended against an old comparative perspective that operated within methodological nationalism. It is even more interesting that the promotion of an European dimension involves the following slippage into an ‘othering’ of the Eastern bloc. The European dimension ‘is in part determined by Europe’s geopolitical and socioeconomic history, which is not only the history of Europe itself and in itself but also of Europe’s relations with others such as the United States and the so-called Eastern bloc’ (Griffin and Braidotti, 2002: 13). Was Europe’s relation with the Eastern bloc a relation with a non-European ‘other’? What are we to make out of the positioning of the Eastern bloc along with the United States as others with whom Europe was related? Was a major part of the Eastern bloc not European? What counts as Europe in the above citation? In it, ‘Europe’ feels like another name for ‘Northwestern Europe’ or for ‘EU’ (EEC in
the age of bloc-ism). Only thus could it make sense to treat the Eastern bloc as the other of Europe, given that most states of the Eastern bloc (and an important part of the Soviet Union) were sweepingly European spatialities in the geographic, cultural and historical sense. The othering of the Eastern bloc here chimes with the construction of the ‘archaic’ Southeastern ‘other’ as inhabiting a distant space and a past time, a splinter in dubious relation to Europe proper. Does all this not bring Braidotti’s nomadism (despite its good intentions) dangerously close to works which Denise Roman (2006: 6) accuses of having historically treated ‘Eastern Europeans as “lesser” Europeans, and Eastern Europe as the traditionally “backward”, “uncivilized”, “other”, “Oriental” half of Europe’?

As stated above, the main figure making the neo-archaism of splinters concrete is the East-European. But, let us wonder, how would we theorize those ‘others’ who do not personify the neo-archaic but the ultra-modern (i.e. others who affirmatively respond to the modernizing summons with too few questions)? After all, a more nuanced and cautious study of the ‘splinters’ proves that, instead of being committed to ‘passionate’ politics of national entrenchment, some Eastern-Europeans jump too unquestioningly on the bandwagon of Europe and its current, sweeping and unqualified glorification of its supposedly post-national course. Eastern-European post-communism comprises discourses ‘of “return to Europe”, of imagining Europe as a model to be emulated, of a home lost under communism and Soviet political and Russian cultural colonialism’ (Roman, 2006: 6). We may also add the many southern-Europeans who hastily endorse a Northwestern-European political rhetoric and uncritically assume its global relevance (or philosophical soundness). This is the flip side of the developmentalist coin. For, some of the ‘others’ who, at first sight, resist their placing within the designation of the ‘archaic’ in fact give in to EUtopianizations and adopt all too easily the Northwestern interpellation to catch up with hegemonic European ideality.

**Counter-memories**

‘The project of becoming minoritarian of Europe involves a process of consciousness raising, which in turn expresses the critique of the self-appointed missionary role of Europe as the alleged center of the world’ (Braidotti, 2004: 132): is this missionary role not repeated when Europe and related intellectuals come to rescue splinters from their archaism? As a way out, I propose the counter-memory that works as an un-timey interruption of the dominant spirit of the times and has a non-toxic universalistic feel by being a call that concerns us all. If the Zeitgeist chiefly comprises identification with the mobile subject; glorification of post-nationalism (purportedly approximated by the EUtopianized spatiality); and a concomitant unequivocal historical narrative that incriminates wholesale all ethnic/national affectivity, the appropriate counter-memory here is not that which just spots resilient nationalism. It is the counter-memory that brings to the fore whatever still escapes European consciousness. To unpack this point let me begin with disclaimers and preliminary remarks.
What follows affirms neither the nostalgic Left that Braidotti accuses of dismissing the engagement with Europe as vain and self-obsessive for the sake of a politically correct solidarity with the Third World; nor the anti-European nationalist Right that is nostalgic for ‘authentic’ and pure local identities. And what I will be arguing below certainly does not support any kind of regressive nationalism. On the contrary, what follows presupposes an interest in European matters seen precisely as a necessary step toward a less vain or self-obsessive preoccupation with the ethic-political pending debts of (some) Europeanness. It assumes that such interest has to be other-oriented, if we are fully to realize a nuanced European responsibility. In my opinion, much leftist thought is only gestural about the sufferings inflicted on the Third World, and, in being so, it secures psychic discharge or, much worse, it secures for itself the morally convenient image of the progressive. By paying only lip service to the metaphor of the Third World, much leftist discourse renders this metaphor as dead as a doornail. Thus, the counter-memories highlighted below unveil the closure of some European leftist minds as much as the closure of some of their opponents (right-wing or post-structuralist and nomadic).

I do not dispute that forms of nationalism (encountered in East and West, North and South) are detrimental and should be condemned unequivocally. Such nationalisms converge in co-opting difference and subjecting it to discriminatory purposes. They are part, as I see it, of what Braidotti calls ‘the new conservatism’. The latter celebrates ‘differences of identity, culture, religion, ability and opportunity’ but defines them ‘in a heavily deterministic manner’ (Braidotti, 2007: 65). It is true that, all too often, ‘beliefs about national and cultural identities are organized along a scale of cultural development which is not only deterministic, but also exclusive and xenophobic’ (*ibid*). Beyond doubt, certain kinds of nationalism assume purity and exclusiveness and trigger xenophobia and intolerance. And they should vehemently be criticized. Therefore, what follows does not condone such phenomena; it rather complicates their relevant cartographies.

Attention to such, mostly blatant, phenomena sometimes blocks our awareness of other, more subtle yet no less pernicious pathologies that may burden Europe. Singling kinds of nationalism out as the problem and associating them mainly with a specific European spatiality/splinter asserts too general or uniform and, in fact, ahistorical accounts of European time. Within Braidotti’s nomadism, nationalism becomes a scapegoat category, a ‘placeholder’ recruited whenever a political pathology is to be theorized. Even when nationalism is used along with, say, colonialism, in a string of nouns expected to singularize sources of political violence, a reading between the lines reveals that colonialism is reduced to nationalism or placed in a strict causal connection with nationalism. But, in varying ways, imperialism, expansionism, colonialism, racism, bloc-ism and other such –isms are singular pathologies, irreducible to nationalism, and operating beyond nationalist confines. This irreducibility compels a nuanced outlook on European history and helps us reveal a further nomadic neglect of varying temporality. I believe that Roman points to something similar when she writes: ‘ultimately, it
is history that may represent the crux of the problem’. For, ‘transnational feminism appears as a dehistoricized and geographically amorphous theoretical framework’ that has in mind ‘a romanticized, generic notion of Europe, as if taken from some prudish nineteenth-century British novel’ (Roman, 2006: 6).

Some of Roman’s comments also help us theorize that which escapes nomadic European consciousness. Against uniform historical narratives, Roman argues that ‘for historical and geographical reasons, East-Central and Southeastern European states never participated in the history of worldwide colonialism, slavery, and imperialism, as Western European states did’ (ibid). This does not imply a supposed innocence or exculpation. For, it is true that many East-Central and Southeastern-European states ‘practiced ethnic discrimination and a serf-based class system throughout their history’ and nurtured ‘the racial politics of WWII and the Holocaust – inside their borders (as a matter of policies, legislation, or old customs)’ (ibid). To Roman, ‘the only sound international politics these states practiced during most of their history up to modern times was defending, more or less successfully, their frontiers against great historical powers – the Czarist Empire (later the Soviet Union) and the Ottoman Empire’ (ibid). As I see it, Braidotti is unable to accommodate Roman’s point, since Braidotti has incriminated all ethnic/national affects and failed to differentiate between conservative nationalism and revolutionary nationalism. More, Braidotti is unable to provide the heterogeneous and cautious genealogical accounts that resist slippages into a new grand-narrative of uniform European incrimination of local attachment.

Eurocentrism in parts of Eastern Europe must be located ‘in the inner fascisms and racisms, not in colonialism, which is a mark of [some – M. P.] Western European history’ (Roman, 2006: 6). Roman’s point helps us illustrate the weakness we have detected in Braidotti’s effort to couple space and time concerns. In Roman’s words, ‘for transnational feminism to enter into a dialogue with Eastern European women and a democratic notion of the European Union’, first it must ‘open a discussion and make these distinctions, and not simply spread an indiscriminate and collective politics of “European guilt” from West to East’ (ibid).

The questions Braidotti asks in order to increase awareness of responsibility and accountability reveal both attention paid to time and also the limitation of temporal considerations to synchronicity. For instance, such an issue is: ‘How to resist the injustice, violence and vulgarity of the times, while being worthy of our times, so as to engage with the present in a productively oppositional and affirmative manner?’ (Braidotti, 2010: 413). Let us complicate this by asking: are the injustice, violence and vulgarity only of our times? Are they not part of a genealogy whose continuities and ruptures will be missed if we keep viewing such pathologies uniformly? For Braidotti, ‘amor fati is not fatalism, but the awareness of a bond of profound intimacy between ourselves and the world, the space-time we are living in’ (ibid). If this is true, should we not enlarge our scope of accountability by changing the tense of the ‘space-time we are living in’ to that of ‘the space-time we have been living in’? If yes, then, the ‘acknowledgment
that “we” are in this together (Ibid.) should become an acknowledgment that some of us have been in this together, while some of us may have been responsible for other things that differ from the vague ‘this’ implied by Braidotti. Such nuance entails a differentiated and varying accountability of: the citizen who, despite various denunciations of the state-centric tradition, still profits from citizenship in ‘advanced’ states, from Europeanness and from the global landscape that has historically been shaped through old expansionist operations; and the citizen who constitutes an ‘other’ within ‘Europe’.

Lack of adequate distinction and historical nuance explains the existence of slippages or ambivalence in Braidotti’s work such as the following: generally and declaratively, Braidotti (2013b: 190) urges contemporary European subjects of knowledge to ‘meet the ethical obligation to be accountable for their past history and the long shadow it casts on their present-day politics’. This leaves some space for theorizing concrete ethico-political debts emanating from the past. But it is then diluted, by recourse to commonplace truths that detect as pathologies only the usual and well-rehearsed: xenophobia, lack of respect, etc. When the above generality invites examples, Braidotti writes: Europe’s new mission has to entail ‘the criticism of narrow-minded self-interests, intolerance, and xenophobic rejection of otherness. Symbolic of the closure of the European mind is the fate of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, which bear the brunt of racism in contemporary Europe’ (Ibid.). Certainly, part of the immediate political context to which many philosophers (and Braidotti) respond comprises tensions about immigration. But why do Braidotti’s examples concern only movement, specifically, the kind of movement that brings the other into European spatiality? Are more static peoples not recipients of racist attitudes? The examples below not only show that this is a possibility, but also how forgetful European consciousness is of the static recipient of European profit-seeking violence.

To Braidotti, ‘a radical restructuring of European identity as post-nationalistic can concretely be translated into a set of “flexible forms of citizenship” that would allow for all “others”, all kinds of hybrid citizens, to acquire legal status in what would otherwise deserve the label of “Fortress Europe”’ (2004: 137). So, is all that Europe owes to otherness just a better treatment of the people ashore? What about other ‘states of exception’ within Europe? Or, what about those who may not be in Europe, like the Herero, whose claims are legal-political without involving a visit to European space or a claim to European citizenship? What about the Chagossians, who demand ‘re-territorialization’ to their islands rather than nomadic expeditions to, or residence in, Europe? I introduce the Herero and Chagos cases here precisely as ‘counter-memories’ and alternative narratives that complicate the synchronous temporality that limits European ethico-political responsibility to granting rights to the just arriving ‘other’. These counter-memories challenge the comfortable assumption that European accountability is exhausted in granting

6 My discussion of these cases in this article is brief and limited to selected writings due to reasons of concision and brevity; it does not reflect lack of adequate sources. But a fuller bibliography would increase the length of the article too much. For my more detailed account of the Chagos case, see Papastephanou (2015a and b).
respect and legal status to immigrants\textsuperscript{7}. Let us, then, unfold these examples as counter-memories that escape European consciousness and Braidotti’s narrow demarcation of European accountability.

In the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, European imperial powers intensified their search for new trade routes and colonies. Germany seized the part of Africa that is now Namibia. The uprising of the local Herero and Nama tribes was met with genocidal ‘de-territorialization’, as these tribes were disposed of all stock and land, and, by 1908, wiped out. ‘The Herero emerged from the German colonial period as a completely dispersed people, not only within Namibia, but also across its borders’. Thus, ‘Germany’s deliberate policy of genocide’ not only reduced ‘their numbers to about 20 per cent of their former strength, but also disrupted their entire social and political fabric’ (Werner, 1990: 476-7). In 2001, Herero descendants issued a restitution claim (Krüger, 2005: 45). Germany responded in 2004 with a mere verbal apology (by one minister) and a downright rejection of any obligation for compensations. As for European nomads, expected simply to respect encountered ‘difference’ and to grant citizenship, they remain unaware of: the first genocide of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century performed by a European empire; the pending debt; the ethical and material demands the unmet compensation claim makes on European subjectivity; and all the implications of the fact that the Herero case is not debated in the European public sphere and does not matter in political-philosophical pondering upon European accountability and potentiality.

Political-philosophical cartographies of European responsibility (symbolized exclusively as obligation to the \textit{arrivant}) also ignore (and do not offer the theoretical tools for voicing) the Chagos case. The Chagossians do not live in Chagos today. Most live 1,200 miles away in Mauritius and the Seychelles. They cannot return to their homes because, between 1968 and 1973, Britain, in collaboration with the USA, exiled all the islanders in order to create a major U.S. military base on the Chagossians’ island Diego Garcia (Vine, 2012: 847). This uprooting doomed the Chagossians to extreme poverty and physical and cultural genocidal effects. Chagossians demand to return to their islands; to my knowledge, they have not, as a people, demanded to join ‘our’ European spatiality and placed ‘us’ in a position to consider granting them citizenship. Thus, strictly speaking, they do not qualify as recipients of the kind of benevolent responsibility that Braidotti’s cartographies of postmodernity demarcate.

Instead of finding our own eutopianized spatiality as appealing as we usually do when we imagine that all we owe to others is just to make them room and let them also enjoy the ‘place’ that we have created, the Chagossians wish re-territorialization. Hence, they have, for decades, ‘engaged in a David-and-Goliath struggle to win the right to return to Chagos and proper compensation’ (Vine, 2009: 10-11). They still live in exile.

\textsuperscript{7} After all, how much of a ‘sacrifice’ is this for European burghers? Is it not too minimal a demand on them? And does such a ‘concession’ (i.e. the granting of mere citizenship rights) answer the issue of migration irrespective of how some migrants feel about having no other choice but to move to Europe and of why their choice is so limited in the first place? What is the European share of responsibility for the situation that some people face in their countries and that leaves them no other choice but to migrate?
The selected counter-memories are (un-)timely (also in the sense of the non-fashionable and as-yet-unacknowledged) interruptions of a uniform normativity that enjoys philosophical currency and reduces European responsibility to respecting the others shore and ‘conceding’ citizenship to them. They disrupt the convenient narrative of splinters of Southeast archaism being the major setback of European potentiality. Finally, they are un-timely (asynchronous) as regards those EU (self-)understandings that lack nuance, yet are extremely effective in synchronizing the whole academic world with dominant narratives of EU history. Braidotti employs a historical narrative of EU creation as a post-nationalist project that states the following: ‘the project of the European Union originates in the aftermath of Fascism and Nazism after the disaster of World War II’ (2004: 131); it also ‘originates from the acceptance of the decline of nationalism’ (130). And it is ‘a post-nationalist project to open a new era in European self-reflection’ (ibid).

Braidotti grounds her hope for an EU potential in an inaugural moment that presents nationalism as the only or main pathology.

Braidotti’s narrative is a half-truth about the EU’s ‘post-nationalist’ origins. The EU also originated at a time when some of its members: had already started trampling over the rational principles for which WW2 had been fought; and they entered the relevant treaties, in reality, as empires instead of nation-states (i.e., being imperial, they were, strictly-speaking, pre-national instead of post-national). Of the six founding members of European Communities in the early fifties, France was the well-known Empire that struggled to maintain its power over colonies such as Algeria even by means of torture; the Netherlands had just after the VE day fought a colonial war with Indonesia (1945-1949), lost it and joined the first European initiatives as the Kingdom of the Netherlands; and Belgium was the colonial power whose role in Rwanda, Congo and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was critical. As for West Germany, it erased all memory of the Herero and Nama genocide and joined EEC initiatives as a ‘facilitator’ of decolonization: in the late 1950s, ‘a Foreign Ministry official stated that Germany, free from any colonial obligations, should play a mediating role between Africa and the colonial powers’ (Krüger, 2005: 45). As for the skulls of Herero and Nama prisoners used by German universities for scientific research to ‘prove’ the superiority of white Europeans over Africans, it took ‘post-nationalist’ (later unified and EU) Germany about 104 years to return them to Namibia.

After the WW2, Britain maintained colonies – despite the Atlantic Charter – within and without European space, and used torture against uprisings in Cyprus (colony in Europe) and Kenya (colony outside Europe), in order to maintain its geostrategic control; it (1960) applied to join the EEC while still occupying Malta. After joining the EU, it carried out bloc-ist, cold war ‘operations’ such as the Chagos. Repeating the initial, French de-territorializing colonial act that brought

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8 But colonialism and the cold war which framed the EU course were both in interesting though diverse ways post-national while no less pathological than ‘nation-state’ nationalism.

9 They were returned in 2011. ‘Germany returns Namibian skulls’. BBC News. 2011-10-30.

10 The eight principal points of the Charter included the statement that ‘all people had a right to self-determination’.
the enslaved Africans (ancestors of the Chagossians) as human cargo on those islands, Britain, in 1973, by then a ‘post-nationalist’ member of the EEC, ‘forced the remaining islanders to board overcrowded cargo ships and left them on the docks of Mauritius and Seychelles’ (Vine, 2009: 1).

The Un-timely

Setting European splinters aside in order to consider other challenges and stakes of European ideality and of its new, nomadic self-understanding, we have now reached a point in our discussion where we may ask: which set of responsibilities has the supposedly post-nationalist Europe accepted so far? Can it truly accept responsibility (especially of a kind more demanding than just legal rights) when most European thought uncritically celebrates the spatial metaphor of the subject-in-transit for which the present consists of successive moments of moving about? Is this lack of acknowledgment and accountability theorized at all by the nomadic thought on Europe? Can the latter do so when it fails to see that, literal or metaphorical, transit cannot be eutopianized without falling into the very homogenization and conceptual uniformity that European thought seems otherwise to loath? In simpler words, apart from condemning easily detected pathologies such as patriarchal ‘gate-keeping’ nationalism; projecting them developmentally onto ‘archaic’ asynchronous spatialities; and vaguely theorizing imperialism and Eurocentrism, how far has European discourse gone in order to ‘bring into symbolic representation’ that which escapes European consciousness? Apart from some generalities in favor of diversity and of positively represented otherness, how often do we encounter, in related discourses (philosophical notwithstanding), any mention or acknowledgment of unsettling historical events with lasting effects such as those mentioned above? This would be of minor importance if such events did not complicate dominant views in the sociopolitical field and if they did not have real-life effects on people. But they do, as they prolong for these people a condition created in the past that determines their present and anticipates a likely future of lack of recognition, compensation or settlement of damages, and lack of true equality. Hence, such events illustrate the need for un-timely interruptions of the hegemonic European imaginary.

Symbolic of the closure of the Zeitgeist, the forgetfulness about events that make higher demands on the European subject indicates the following complex political operation. Even when most European nomads become self-disparaging at an abstract level by detecting politically incorrect or improper European attitudes toward a generalized Other (e.g. the migrant, the exile, etc.), they still perform a typically European self-exoneration, as follows. They indulge in the psychic discharge effected by the morally convenient self-image of the self-critical and open subject who grants citizenship, respect and other such ethico-political ‘concessions’ to the non-European arrivant. At the same time, they ignore demands that invite a higher sense of justice owed to those entangled in European history and still suffering concrete damage. They ignore such demands especially when the latter require material measures (compensations, radical political redirection as concerns decision-making). Limiting responsibility to welcoming the mobile
arrivant – narcissistically misrecognized by the European mobile burgher as a reflection of himself – does not only attest to the self-exculpating and self-congratulatory effects of European attachment to political generalities and platitudes regarding otherness. It also reveals a further EUtopianization of European spatiality: deep down, believing that they inhabit the advanced space of promise and possibility, many Europeans have to such an extent eutopianized their locality as an appealing Promised Land that they fail to realize that, to some immigrants, coming to Europe is a necessity, not a choice. If those immigrants could stay home, some of them may have preferred to do so rather than join European privileged ‘temporalities’. Hence, instead of expecting from Europeans just to open Europe as a Land promised to the ‘other’, many non-Europeans would expect from Europeans those measures that would enhance non-European capability of free choice regarding residence.

But, measures on the part of Europe that increase life choice for non-Europeans (especially when such measures go beyond aid or charity) presuppose, in some cases, the heightened political consciousness that acknowledges responsibility to concrete others (who may demand settlement of past damages rather than citizenship rights). Cases such as the Herero and Chagos are missing in European dialogue and in ‘cosmopolitan’ philosophy not just because of possibly inadvertent reliance on safer metonymizations. Such cases cannot come up without seriously challenging a political-philosophical architectonics that: celebrates nomadic mobility against attachment to locality; considers the post-nationalist as by definition ‘healthier’ than any claim to place and any ethnic/national affect; and limits responsibility to facile respect and minimal rights granted to encountered otherness. Also, I claim, such a challenge better serves what Amy Allen theorizes as current complexities of feminist thought. Those require analyses that illuminate ‘overlapping structures of gender, sexuality, and race with those of class, culture, and postcolonial imperialism’ (Allen, 2015: 520).

Consider the Chagossian claim to return to their homes (re-territorialization): is this a residue of archaic rootedness that resists the permanent state of transition and nomadic mobility? How can the affect for a people or for a place be theorized in the age of the glorification of the (literal and figurative) subject-in-transit? Can the notion of nationalism adequately explain the lack of response to the Herero and the Chagossians? Is the raising of the issue of the Herero or the Chagossians reducible to ‘Third-World-obsessed’ leftism and thus easily dismissible? Is it a matter of internal affairs for a nation-state (Germany vs the Herero, UK vs. the Chagossians)? If yes, what about Europe being/becoming post-nationalist? Can these issues be raised without a prior differentiation between the pernicious national/ethnic affect and that which is politically pertinent, demanding and enabling of international justice? That the ethnic identity of the Herero and the Chagossians is constructed rather than ‘natural’ – just as all identities – does not make it less justifiably demanding and politically operative. ‘In order to announce the death of the subject, one must first have gained the right to speak as one’ (Braidotti, 2001: 1423): if this holds true for feminist claims, why not for ethnic or national demands too? The seeming paradox of simultaneously producing and destabilizing a category for the sake of an empowering political project is no less
relevant to the Herero or Chagos designation of ‘peoples’ than to sexual difference.

‘To be worthy of our times, we need to be pragmatic: we need schemes of thought and figurations that enable us to account in empowering terms for the changes and transformations currently on the way’ (Braidotti, 2013b: 197). To be worthy of our times: what about the un-timely or the ‘out of time’? Braidotti is ambivalent. On the one hand, she indicates something like the ‘un-timely’ that, if thought through, would add an ironic echo, I believe, on her affirmation of the times of which we must be worthy by becoming ‘pragmatic’ and responsive to a changing world. She (2008a: 16) writes: ‘the political activist has to think “in spite of the times” and hence “out of my time”, thus creating the analytics – the conditions of possibility – of the future’. On the other hand, this remains a vague, declarative generality, undermined by the fact that Braidotti’s nomadism affirms the present too much: ‘contemporary feminism works towards a more affirmative approach’ (Braidotti, 2009: 9). Map, the horizon, the cartographic mode, all assume the relevance of temporality but, ultimately, they empty it into the flux of today: ‘I see my work as outward-bound, affirmative and looking at the concrete historical realities of today – the actual here and now. Hence the emphasis I place on cartographic accuracy and situated, embodied, and embedded perspectives’ (LaFountain and Braidotti, 2008: 6). Hence, I would add, the emphasis on synchronization, as contemporary feminism ‘helps subjects synchronize themselves with the changing world in which they try to make a positive difference’ (Braidotti, 2009: 9). In my view, to this synchronization, one may respond with a deliberate obsolescence.

Now, consider the following comment on co-synchronizations: Co-synchronizations constitute communities across generations. ‘Fitting-in-with-the-world in order to help it along the horizon of hope and sustainability expresses an evolutionary talent. It is about the ability to adapt and develop suitable navigational tools within the fast-moving techno-, ethno – and gender-scapes of a globally mediated world’ (Braidotti, 2009: 9). Evidently, the problem of pragmatic asynchronicity implied here between backwardness in time and navigation within the current world – whose solution is the evolutionary talent of adaptation and development – does not fit in well with the ideal asynchronicity between the spirit of the times and any thought that disrupts it.

**Conclusion**

Derrida’s writings about Europeanness have influenced Western thought across continents along the following dilemma: on the one hand, Europeans must preserve a certain idea of Europe related to the past as memory and to the future as the desirable ‘yet to come’; on the other hand, preservation of the idea of Europe should not risk European openness. Europe must avoid the closure of its identity. It must not let commitment to its own promise lead to perpetuation of Europe’s old complicities and to a new liability to injustices. As a specific place Europe must avoid the dangers of a centralizing hegemony and the dangers of ‘dispersion’. It must respect ‘differences, idioms, minorities, singularities,’ and, at the same
time, acknowledge ‘the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement
and univocity, the law of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism and
xenophobia’ (Derrida, 1993: 19).

Much of the above is reflected in Braidotti’s (2004: 132) view that the EU ‘today
means a site of possible political resistance against nationalism, xenophobia and
racism’. But this potential is not adequately theorized so long as the whole approach
does not enable the temporal considerations that: complicate the eutopianizations
of spatial metaphors of movement; reveal residues of patriarchal, developmentalist
asynchrony; and effect (un)-timely ruptures upon the here and now.

I have suggested that the current framework be qualified as follows: first,
keeping the memory of the idea of Europe in acceptable terms does not only
require the spatial metaphor of being open, of being a chora, but also of viewing
time beyond the chronological measurable sense. The latter qualification invites
us to obtain awareness of how European chorochronos (spatio-temporality) has
created responsibilities that have not yet been met, not even at the level of a mere
acknowledgment of the ethico-political debts that such responsibilities entail.
Second, the ethico-political demand of respecting differences and granting
citizenship (though a major task and as yet frighteningly unattained) is too
limited an expectation from European (or any) subjects. Respect often has a
clearly topological character of being nice to the other you encounter – literally
or metaphorically. But it does not say much about the more active and demanding
ethico-political debts that Europeans may have toward those others who had
made parts of Europe (and some Europeans) rich, and who are still burdened
with intractable problems bequeathed to them by European expansion. Their current
realities may challenge us to think differently about our own conceptualizations
and to take some critical distance from our familiar ways of interpreting the
world. Overall, through a critical discussion of Braidotti, I have suggested that
an ethics of European time also invites considerations of the un-timely, of the
break and rupture that is required if the continent’s liminality, its oscillation
between its own particularism and its universal aspirations, is to overcome the
dangers of ‘fortress Europe’.

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