THE BIOPOLITICS OF POSTHUMANISM.
POSTHUMAN BIOPOLITICS

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Abstract. Although avoiding, programmatically, any blocking in a specific area, defined by the concept of posthuman, the present study falls under the sign of a (secured) rhetorical-Hamletian exploration intended for a beingness of becoming posthuman. The status displayed in this manner is required to be reported to the insignia of a post-question, as post-disciplinary-reflective practice, exercise and evaluation of a particular context – the posthuman condition. We propose, accordingly, a deductive, interrogative-clarifying post-context for the biopolitics of posthumanism and posthuman biopolitics: the first is reported to three types of future, with one common denominator – Fukuyama & Habermas & Braidotti – and the second is showing interest in the way in which the Foucaultian triad security-territory-population can be attached, with modification, to the concept of posthuman security. Therefore we decree, as director landmark of the present approach, a double formula of the validating accreditation for the interference of biopolitics with posthumanism, in a nov context: the first expresses, by the construct the biopolitics of posthumanism, an equality of meaning between the terms, each referring to the other, but without omitting the emergence of posthumanism in/to contain/hold the contextual data of a radical post-becoming and, by default, attributing a narrative status to the aspects of bio-political posthuman condition; the second considers that by the primacy of the posthuman itself, the concepts balance and, moreover, contaminate each other, by reference to each other, certifying, therefore, the prevalence of an evolutionary to be, as speculative post-beingness.

Keywords: Posthuman, the Biopolitics of Posthumanism, Posthuman Biopolitics, Biopower, Biotechnologies, Posthuman Security.

To become or not to become posthuman(s)...

There are, in decreeing the evolutionary-possible posthumanism, a double guiding substance, able to confer a quintessential sense to the concept/the state/the condition, thus bounded. On the one hand, it envisages the intensification of

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effort and, of course, has the effect of auto-inserting posthumanism in the critical discourse of the humanist and social sciences of the ’90s. Or, according to Cary Wolfe\textsuperscript{1}, its justification is possible both by preserving the theory of mutation of knowledge, and also through the practice of revalorizing the archaeologizing, Foucaultian approach\textsuperscript{2}. On the other hand, it highlights the ability of retaining their own genealogies in the series of biological-mechanical-communicational model theory of cybernetic systems (via Gregory Bateson, Warren McCulloch, Norbert Wiener, or John von Neumann), by pointing out the differences/changes that occur and by highlighting the predisposition/competitive ability of posthumanism, of self-employment in theoretically distinct devices.

The idea that stated, in fact, by Cary Wolfe consists in the need of a private mediation positioning by a conceptual tempering of the term, offering it to a different angle of analysis, intended for determining the resistance to theoretical sedimentation (certified through the continued flow of posthumanism search of the theory – with reference to the essay \textit{In Search of Post-humanist Theory}, 1995), but also in the need of interpretation of the term through analogies. Wolfe places his own sense, referred to the concept, both in the continuation of the data of a Lyotardian report (with respect to the ability of postmodernism to place itself before and after humanism, and the reflexes of embodiment and engagement of the human being not only in the intimate structure of biologic-technological requests, but in the very coevolutionary-prosthetic landmarks of the human being), and in the Foucaultian spirit of the archived-archiving mechanisms. But, more than that, it reaffirms the values of \textit{post} - a conductor prefix, apt to agree that posthumanism designates a particular historic moment, in which the deviation of/fragmentation and recomposition of the technical-medical-informatic-economic human ad substantiation of a new/other theoretical paradigm, capable of producing \textit{after} depleted realities or \textit{after} “registers of cultural fantasy”, of protocols and

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\item Cary Wolfe insists, in this respect, promoting the essentializing cutout, on the end passage of the work \textit{Words and things. An archaeology of the human sciences}, considering it relevant (in the Foucaultian spirit of the declaration of man who “is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been presented to human knowledge”), as priority for the exposure of limits and for fixing the coordinates – the recent date of the beginning of man –, for the announcement/imminent chronicles of his impending end.

If however, it would be imperative to accredit, with directing sense, a single Foucaultian passage, we would agree on the additional support of argumentative nature included by the Foucaultian ante-passage, which plays upon “the impression of fulfillment and of ending” “the attenuated feeling which supports and animates thinking”, both contexts founded, formulated and re-funded by/in the data of modern \textit{episthema} (discourse as the only way to be and to empirically know man) “related to the disappearance of Discourse and its reign of the monotonous, sliding language upon the side of objectivity and of its multiplied recurrence”.

The emergence of language in a unit with mandatory title, prints, in Foucaultian manner, an effect of inversion, of waste, marking the end of the being of language. Only in this context, it requires a rethinking by the interpretation of current experience as close as possible to the “disappearance of the human – and of the soil of positivity of all the sciences about man – in correlation with the concern relating to the language”, acknowledging that “language, becoming present, man is likely to return to the calm nonexistence in which he had been maintained, in the old days, by the imperative unity of Discourse”. And only in such a score, considers Foucault, can one resume the questions left in suspension, through the rediscovery of “pathways towards thinking the future”. See, in this regard, Michel Foucault, \textit{Words and things. An archaeology of the human sciences} [Les mots et les choses (une archéologie des sciences humaines)], Univers Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996.
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philosophical breakthroughs that were the elements of humanism. Cary Wolfe resorts to the procreative Foucaultian of the uncanny, through which man is nothing more than the consequence of a “rupture in the order of things”, “a configuration drawn by the new layout gained inside knowledge”, fracture and strained-tension arrangement which germinate “all the chimeras of the new humanism, all the amenities of an anthropology understood as a general reflection, half-positive, half-philosophical, on the human”, keeping the blocking structure even on the “threshold of a modernity from which we have yet to come out”.

Precisely in this context Wolfe considers that the détente of his own approach occurs: even if we accept it and we can tune into a suspicion of humanism with regard to “revelation and the religious authority” and even if we reject, in the posthumanist manner, the exciting problems of the Enlightenment, it is imperative to admit the meaning and significance of a new overrun, the active/functional role of a post-able to incorporate and summarize the contorted nature of knowledge. The debate is no longer limited, by Wolfe, to the topic of misalignment of the human being, but expands on to the formula/method by which thinking is confronted with the very transformations of thought and with its own dynamism, with the aim of coping with the new challenges.

In itself, the stake of clarification reclaims the commercial intention of transforming the rhetoric-Hamletian question of beingness (to be) in the present infinitive mode, by/through an equation designed, from the perspective of a past perfect composed (with the meanings of a grammar of the near future) of becoming, in the plural register (I became). The state thus, exposed is required to be reported to a double theoretical answer – on the one hand, the opinion of Francis Fukuyama (in Our posthuman future, 2004), connected the moment in which we became human, and, on the other hand, the interest granted to the process by which we became posthuman, with appeal to the prospections of N. Katherine Hayles (1999).

In the opinion of Fukuyama, ethical controversy, supported by biotechnology, represents a threat to those who do not have the full range of capabilities characteristic for the specificity of the human, a category in which Fukuyama includes the unborn, young children, or terminally ill patients, elderly people with invalidating sufferings, people with disabilities, with a priority for stem cell research and cloning. The research set valued by Fukuyama targets, on the one hand, the moral profile of the categories named and, on the other hand, the opportunity of studying human dignity through the prism of natural rights. Such a doctrine, which underpins human dignity on the belief that the human species possesses unique features, ranks the rights referred to in terms of the degree to which any individual member of this species shares and manifests the characteristics listed. Reason, moral choice, and possession of that range of emotions which is

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3 Michel Foucault, quoted work.
4 Cary Wolfe, quoted work., pp. XV-XVI.
specifically-shared provides the basis of universal equality. With the required mention – that the possession of these traits in different degrees and proportions, confirming the variability of the possession of such qualities, constitutes a layering that grants rights differentiated for each individual (Fukuyama stating, here, the strengths of natural aristocracy).

What is recommended by Fukuyama is both caution and adopting a position which is non-hierarchical in the assignment of political rights. However, he notes the absence of an assessment unit and a general consensus in terms of setting the exact list of human-essential features that could justify and guarantee the granting of human rights; an endeavour most often tributary to suspected-concerned judgments. “Any liberal-contemporary democracy differentiates rights on the basis of the degree in which individuals and categories of individuals share certain characteristics typical for the species”, insists Fukuyama. But, more than that, from the perspective of natural rights, it is reasonable to assign different rights to the unborn (a child under the age of one day, reported to an embryo with the same life span, possess the essential elements of the range of emotions, while the embryo has the potential to become a whole human being). Fukuyama admits that ontogeny repeats phylogeny, and remarks upon this qualitative leap of the transformation of prehuman precursors of language, of reason and of emotion, without denying their boundaries and inherent constraints, and without giving up on the platform of equality in a future world of biotechnology. Politically, this threatens to fragment the radical left wing, but also to crash the right of strictly humanist ideas under the pressure of issues associated with human dignity.

The détente of posthuman becoming is subsumed by N. Katherine Hayles to the project of mapping the human condition, appealing to the coordinates of a central triple-dialectic – the presence/absence and randomness – through an operation/process in whose privacy and reaction, even if information preserves a central role, the presence/absence holds the prerogative of connecting materiality and significance. N. Katherine Hayles insists, in turn, upon the lack of consensus regarding what is involved and accepted as posthumanist(m) integrated into constructed, and thus imagined, forms/formulas. In itself, the topological act used reveals not so much the way in which the human factor and the posthuman can coexist, as the complexity of contexts and of problems that lie in this risky analogy. Hayles argues that there are constructs theoretically supporting the posthuman not as an abstract entity, ascribed to the rules of theoretical and general analysis, but as a field of heterogenous-vectorial forces, creating the impression of a context more unified than it is in reality. The method consists in the trend of registration and incorporation, by crossing from the confirmation of a completed time, long past, to the open information of the future, in a perpetual

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7 Francis Fukuyama, Viitorul nostru postuman, p. 204.
8 Ibidem, p. 205.
dynamic, by marking a projection area, within the limits of which the attributes of the liberal humanist subject continue to be evaluated, rewritten, or substantially revised through reporting either to the act of preservation, or to the inflections of resistance, through conservation: in place of a decontextualized representation, the new subjects are assigned to the different levels of coding and significance, playing a role in changing the data of self-knowledge.

N. Katherine Hayles proposes, as a central concern obsessive for the dynamics of evolution and involution, highlighting essential questions with respect to the number of problems/unknowns: when the human intersects with the posthuman, the meeting is one with positive or negative effects? will the posthuman preserve or annihilate the liberal subject? free will no longer be possible in the scheme of the posthuman future? how will the human/self-assigned to the posthuman recognize itself? All of these open tracks converge towards the accreditation of the prefix post – with certain facets of the indication of a change/transformation already discernible in the substance of the human nature, the latter term being able to expose the nature of change. The possible answers can be found in the ability of the human to design his existence by continuing the effort to find new meanings, weighting and harmonisation of differences, and adjustment to the new intelligences. 

What makes us posthuman is just a double dose of pleasure and fear, concepts that imprint with plus-sense the definition of the prefix post: on the one hand, it takes into consideration the act of over-stimulation of the present and the proliferation of imagined scenarios for the era of the posthuman, which maintains the fearful feeling stating that the “days are numbered” for the human, but also announces the replacement of the theoretical arguments about the existence of man with another theory, that of the valorisation of intelligent machines; on the other hand, feeling the pleasure of accrediting the posthuman with valences of a novel project, the opening of old theories to new contexts and launching innovative ways/modes of thinking and rethinking the human pinpoints the passages that have occurred – from presence to absence, from model to random structure – and determines the emergence of categories transformed from the inside into new configurations of cultural structure – external, overcoming named dualities.

The posthuman cannot be defined through a single concept and cannot be reduced to the register of endisms, insists N. Katherine Hayles; if there is an influx of anti-human in the preservation of the imagined self, as founded in/by

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13 Ibidem, pp. 218-282.
14 N. Katherine Hayles anchors none of the two terms to the semantic context of post-terms. This theoretical lacuna is remedied (for example) by Feminist Media Studies (vol.7, no.1, 2007), through interest for the meaning of the ideological, representational, polysignic sense of post-pleasure: annexed to a dichotomy of affective order – certainty – uncertainty (see in this sense, Helen Graham, “Representations, ideologies and affects of a newly post-9/11 feminist icon”), but also through accreditation (dictionary-like) of the 2000s generation with the attribute of post-terror/post-fear generation, subsumed to concept modalities, management, policies and the economics of the named post-condition.
15 N. Katherine Hayles, quoted work, p. 283.
attendance, it lasts through the persistence of the identification of the guarantees for the original and of teleological trajectories, with rock solid foundations of logic, validating a particular subsystem with the meanings of self-construction and self-preservation, by ignoring the dynamics of complex systems. And, if the posthuman announces a hypothetical end, it targets only certain conceptions of man (with reference to those which particularized the autonomous structure of wealth, power and leisure time). Lethal is, in contrast, argues N. Katherine Hayles, the grafting of posthumanism on the perspective structure of the liberal-humanist self\textsuperscript{17}: under the pressure of the prefix anti --, posthumanism asks neither to be recovered, nor to be built on such a model. Located in the sphere of the dialectics of randomness and based on the data of reality made incarnate, the posthuman can provide the necessary resources able to rethink the connection of the human to the mode of being of intelligent machines\textsuperscript{18}.

...this is the (post) question!

The question that directly guides the introductory chapter of the present study requires to be correlated with the insignia of post-question, resorting to a post-disciplined-reflexive practice, exercise and evaluation of a particular context which guarantees settlement through the appreciation of a state (how I became) and not by the clarification of the concept that gives the measure of the item being named.

Avoiding blocking in the content of the complex of the question what is the posthuman, the double filter applied (Fukuyama & Hayles) proposes a post-context deductive, interrogative-clarification just by the projection which it implies, by reporting the advancement to the requests of implementing the roadmap. The post-question retains, however, the Hamletian values which Georges Minois designated by the justification of the prolongation of existence beyond the constraints and limits of the human condition\textsuperscript{19}, through a question that was worded, there is and, therefore, persists: “I wonder if the answer to Hamlet’s question – to be or not to be – is not: this question makes no sense?”\textsuperscript{20}. I am, I know turns, in the context of post-question into I became/I become, a reflex that stimulates, in Hamletian manner, that register of dualities which characterizes an intermediate state – to die, to sleep. And maybe to dream\textsuperscript{21}.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibidem, p. 286.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem, p. 287.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibidem, p. 119.
The perspective of an interpretation is extrapolated in *Posthumanist Shakespeares*\(^{22}\), by the explicitly tri-phasic questioning of Hamlet, "Posthumanist'? [Laurent Milesi, *(Post-)Heideggerian Hamlet*, pp. 181-193; Marie-Dominique Garnier, *Loam, Moles and l’homme: Reversible Hamlet*, pp. 194-213 and Ivan Callus, *This?: Posthumanism and the Graveyard Scene in Hamlet*, pp. 213-240], expressing in three times: the existential difference of being and/or not to be and inflections of a final *let be*, which are the poles of query for the significance of the concepts of *(no)thing – being – man*, reconstituted by the marks of posthumanity’s research centre transfigured by a *where* and *when*; the new Hamletian placement of *post* – in the nomadic openings of a temporality thus guided, allows to *be or not to be* to face two literal series – on the one hand, an alliterative reversible enumeration, and, on the other hand, a report of the requests for a mutant stream, in the perimeter of Deleuzian-Guattarian design of “the post-signifier regime of the sign”; a review of the clichés and hopes the posthuman has (symbolically present in the scene of the cemetery and the skull) means a confirmation of the fact that, heading in the direction of the posthuman, death pulls us back, imposing the vision of the inevitable end – the *posthuman is already dead* – reiterating an *Ecce Homo*, as a standard of technological posthuman utopianism (of a *transhuman posthumanism*).  

More; invested with a specific temporality, posthumanism is packed with elements of localization, in the spatializing sense\(^{23}\), and included in the series of *isms* to which we attach the prefix *post*, as habitual valence of translation for human-contemporary geographies. With the surplus of geographizing, exchanges, felt in the cartography of posthumanism, do not resist the launch of the question on *what it is/what it entails (discourse about)* posthumanism; and does not tolerate anything else than another neologistic denizen of the realm, whose liquid substance is virtually impossible to capture; or a specific genre, “sophisticated” and complicated by the very nature that preserves and projects; and an appetite for giving specific meaning to eschatological lamentations and formulas.

Hence, an explainable multiplication of questions: Does posthumanist discourse fold, in its different states, upon the rigours of Deleuze’s, Guattari’s or Latour’s intuitions, using, in this sense, an alt/nov idiom? Is able to provide an additional lever of the project in progress of geographic stakeholders of the change and the location of the research *post*-disciplinary in the new registers? Is posthumanism  

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22 S. Herbrechter and I. Callus (eds.), *Posthumanist Shakespeares*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. The volume places posthumanism in the “history of skepticism”, by a display of critical consciousness, through the valorization of the principle of vengeance, as the natural instinctual-human, by overplaying cynicism and rethinking the system of beliefs, through the deepening of suspicion, estrangement and alienation. The appeal to Shakespeare is based on two main arguments: first, the accreditation of the latter with the status of essential contributor to the disenchantment of the modern-sceptical world and, thus, his acceptance as *posthumanist avant la lettre* and second, establishing the type of skeptical posthumanist, recognizing, in/by Shakespeare, a reactive way of re-composition of the human, using new fragilizing shapes/formulas.

a concept affected by the pressure of the semantics of post, equated to another
literary term? What options are delivered to posthumanism: to be or to become?

The Badmingtonian answer states unitarily that just by the act of mapping
posthumanism one may certify its existence in a specific discursive area and only
the substantive becomings of the concept can measure its productivity, by
investing it with another triple insinuating reflex: to overcome convenient,
apocalyptically-hyperbolic inflexions, of nov historical condition, imbued with
the Fukuyama reflexes of the end and the beginning; the acceptance of
posthumanism as a set of ontological theses about a human impossible to locate
and theorize, faced with technoscience and a knowledge of genomics; the
conservation of a scepticism reagent with respect to the human and its notional
transcendence. What prevails, however – in the interdependence of to be with to
become – is the meaning of becoming posthuman, resulting in a double quintessential
dynamic, with the role of determine the valences of projection and reality of the
posthuman.

Three types of future, one common ground:
the biopolitics of posthumanism

Future 1: Fukuyama and the posthuman message in a bottle

Fukuyama’s approach\textsuperscript{24} of inventorying (through a “giant leap” and a “madness
with method”) the prefiguration of biotechnology wants to be a replica (articulated
at a distance of ten years) to the article annexed to the end of history and the last
man, establishing that the only argument impossible to reject, which endures
since the publication of the article and the book, is that according to which “there
could not be an end of history without an end of science”. Therefore, the
development of natural-modern science and technology seemed to be the “main
drivers” of such directions, but the effect felt is one of considerable distancing
from the data of the end through its location “in the middle of a period of
progress in the life sciences”\textsuperscript{25}.

Hence, the need for substantial re-considering (the prefix re – involves, in
this case, an element of composition with iterative, derivative verbal sense,
pointing out repetitive-intensive meaning, or a return to the primitive state – not
the last but the first) to see “the future in a more systematic way”, and imbue
science and technology with the meanings of “vulnerable points”\textsuperscript{26} of
coordinates, thus, designed.

The explicit specification in Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the
Biotechnology Revolution re – re-states the reference to data presented in the
article “Second thoughts: the last man in a bottle”\textsuperscript{27}, delivering a double

\textsuperscript{24} Francis Fukuyama, Viitorul nostru postuman. Consecinþele revoluþiei biotehnologice [Our Posthuman
\textsuperscript{25} Ibidem, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibidem, p. 10.
perspective: the correspondence of the message in a bottle with the data sampled in the test tube, as the new container for the collection and analysis of the parameters of the current, declaring Fukuyama a *private interpreter* [close to the movie profile of the character John Koestler, from the film *Knowing* (2009)], or a *receiver-visionary*, able to decrypt the numbers encapsulated in the “safe of history”, and, thus, to predict projections in the sequence of events and plot solutions for the future.

The method used by Fukuyama re-calculates the timeline – through the initial presentation of the conclusions – and, thus, decrees a state of transformational impassibility: nothing has changed/happened (at the time of 1999) in the global economy, liberal democracy and the consumer market, oriented towards a thriving economic order, remains the only viable option of modern societies, the Asian economic crisis and the apparent braking of reform in Russia not requesting systemic essential reformulations.

Fukuyama notes the inadequacy of the directional, progressive argument, culminating in the validation of the modern liberal status of history, decreeing its end, but in a different manner: human nature *is/exists*; if culture can overtake nature in the shaping of the units and in the affirmation of fundamental human preferences, if the entire cultural horizon is socially constructed, then there is no particular set of political and economic liberal-democratic institutions which may be considered to be, in a Kojève-ian sense, “completely satisfactory” for any given reality; the state of the end of science is aimed at the dominance of technologies of the late XXth century, with the supportive role of the “world-democratic order”. But, admits Fukuyama, if there would be the certainty that the meaning of the future of technological innovations will follow the direction traced, society would benefit from the certainty of designing a correct set of political and economic institutions; the new effervescence of technological forces, however, rethinking the principles issued, will have obvious repercussions, in itself changing the nature of the human. Thus, Fukuyama accredits the human factor with a role in the distribution of statistical characteristics for the controlled genetics of a population, suggesting that biotechnology will be able to accomplish what the radical ideologies of the past have failed to do: the creation of a new type of human being. A future that Fukuyama places not under an alarming sign/signal, but, on the contrary, considers as a new therapeutic impetus.

**Future 2: Habermas and the posthuman philosophical background**

Habermas accredits with plus-relevance, for the condition of the posthuman future, a scenario of interventions (fundamentally) philosophical, created by an appropriate situation, germinated by the effervescence of the ethical self-understanding of the language of the agents. The progress of biological sciences and the development of biotechnology not only guarantees the expansion of the

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30 *Ibidem*, p. 15.
register recording the possibilities of familiar action, but facilitates a new way of intervention: from “the given”, the nature of the organic, to the field of artefacts and the production thereof, through the inclusion of the human body inside a sphere of private intervention, overdosing the phenomenological Plessner-ian distinction between “being a body” and “having a body”, and, in the end, evading the demarcation lines between of the nature of to be and new organic becomings/amenities. The result of this overlap consists in another type of self-transformation, of intervention at the deeper level of the organic substrate and, thus, invested with a status particular to “the subject on which an intervention was made”: the new field of decision promotes autonomous actions, in accordance with the standards that govern the regulatory deliberations of the democratic will, or the dictates of arbitrary subjective preferences whose satisfaction depends on the requirements of the market.

The position that Habermas adopts is not that of a cultural critic of the progress of scientific knowledge, but of a philosopher who investigates the way in which the implementation of these achievements affects the self-understanding of the human in the position illustrated by the “responsible agents”\(^3\). Biotechnological interventions lead to the philosopher’s formulation of post-questions not only difficult, but also placed in a questioningly-different register: do we continue to understand and perceive ourselves at the stage of normative creatures? what is the role of morality and law in the regulation of social interaction which, in turn, can be reordered in the proximity of functional terms, deprived of any rules? Habermas assesses, thus, even the context of (future) implementation in the discussion of natural alternatives to higher intelligence, but also of ethics successfully being oneself, decreeing that the register of competing proposals/projections requires a different perception of the phrase “the good life”. Hence, the urgency of philosophy to engage in the debate, to take the primacy of the argument, countering the “biologicals and engineers intoxicated by science fiction”\(^3\).\(^2\)

The context flaunted by Habermas is one of generalized questions with the addition of a plus-moral weight that goes beyond the context and the substance of nodal points on the agenda of political disputes: biotechnological research is interdependent with the interests of investors and with the pressure felt by national governments in obtaining the successes they expected; the dynamics of the development of genetic engineering has a menacing potential of addressing inherent processes, ethical-political opinion-forming and the exercise of will within the public sphere. Deprived of new insights, political understanding is located in the post-situation of avoiding/resisting attachment to its demands and technological regulations, guided by the comprehensive directive of future developments/becomings.

The restriction of the debate, by focusing exclusively on the subject faced with the interventions of genetic modification, imprints an effect of ignoring/

\(^2\) Ibidem, p. 15.
subsidiarity to other biopolitical issues, notes Habermas. If the liberal orientation accredits new reproductive technologies – organ transplants or medically induced death – as directions for increasing the autonomy of the individual, existing counter-contexts do not undermine the premises exposed, but overplay specific issues relating to uncertainties germinated by a malfunctioning legalization of the measures called. In themselves, the problems of the bioethics registry are interrelated with the expansion of diagnosis and therapeutic control. The selection and modification of traits accredits future genetic treatment with the status of a fundamental challenge to the order of the known, adding plus-sense to the Kantian need – that of contingency extended into the “kingdom of the end”, of control exercised over the interior by changing the essential structure of the human-moral experience. The line of demarcation of the moral distinction chance-choice has an essential effect in re-funding the base of the system of values, through rethinking and weakening the claims of hard statements – genetic modifications are aimed at improving human life through the transformation of the general structure of the experience of morals – affecting the self-understanding of the morals, by adding an extra awareness of the status of a moral being and by its location in the anthropological background of the ethics of the species.

Habermas’s questioning is aimed at a double set of alternatives with respect to genetic self-transformation and self-optimization of the species, as a way to enhance, on the one hand, the autonomy of the individual and, on the other hand, as undermining the normative understanding of oneself. The second perspective involves the need for an act continued with caution and moderation, the moral argument (controvertially constitutional) claiming the full human dignity of the embryo and its right to absolute protection “from the beginning”, a position which, in fact, short-circuits the chance for a political agreement with regard to requests issued. Research and advances in genetic engineering are justified through reference to the objectives of the biopolitical which specifies, punctually, optimized nutrition and health, but also a prolonged lifespan. What is lost from view is precisely the clinical model reporting to the dynamics inherent to nature, empathy “resonant comprehension” re-loaded on the basis of the sensitivity of one’s own body and the distinction between subjectivity – world of manipulated objects, a context in which biotechnological intervention becomes a substitute for clinical treatment.

Habermas reaffirms the Jonasian opinion bringing attention to a debate of abstractedness on the teleology of nature and the philosophy of history; what is important for the German philosopher is precisely the firm distinction between/ of authoritarian eugenics and liberal plurality: in liberal societies, eugenic decisions are transferred, via markets governed by the orientation towards profit, the claims of preferential individual choices and the vagaries of anarchic consumers and customers.

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33 Ibidem, p. 19.
34 Ibidem, pp. 27-29.
“Why is it not desirable for complex societies to give up entirely their normative foundations and pass to mechanisms of systemic (or, in the future, biogenetic) targeting?” asks Habermas, feeling, at the level of argument, the inflections of a self-reflective morals, the valorisation of the considerations of the ethical species with regard to the organic presuppositions necessary for a person’s action, for understanding and assuming their own responsibilities.

With reference to actuality, as a node of reporting, Habermas admits that, until now, only born persons (not the ones made/produced) have participated as actors/subjects in social interaction. In the biopolitical future prophesied by liberal eugenists, we find the projection of interconnected, intergenerational action and communication, intersectingly located at the vertical level, with the genome of future generations deliberately modified. Thus, according to the German philosopher, the important point which should be noted and discussed is precisely the morality of egalitarian universalism, claiming that the modern form of moral conscience is the only one that can provide a rational-acceptable basis for the normative regulation of conflicts of action, in plural societies.

Future 3: Braidotti and the posthuman condition

Fixing the date (Robert Pepperell identifies the appearance of the concept of the posthuman condition in the period immediately following the First World War), and affirmed by the perspectives (certifying, via Heisenberg, the location in an area with multiple possibilities) offered by the theory of relativity, quantum physics and cubism, the posthuman condition does not announce the end of the human being (in a Nietzschean manner), nor does it accept the “naiveté” that foresees the annihilation of the humankind by machine/technology: “Posthumanism refers to the end of a man centred Universe, human in a phallocentric way.”

If, however, a terminus point be is indicated, one that is infused with the posthuman condition, it will recognize itself, according to Pepperell, in the end (albeit not a precipitous end) of humanism, in the end of the belief in the infallibility of power and in human superiority/uniqueness. Therefore, the posthuman condition is related to mechanical-technological evolution, without giving up on the old models’ evaluation and is preoccupied with the intercession (initiatives and projects) of generating new patterns. Politically and ideologically, radical manifestations are registered, regarding “the gradual exit from any type of exploitation” (by means of flourishing feminist movements, movements for animal rights, movements against the unrestrained exploitation of the Earth’s resources, against slavery or in favour of the rights of the Planet etc.).

41 Ibidem.
Robert Pepperell identifies three constitutive-fundamental stages of the *posthuman condition*: the first accords the posthuman with a sense of the “closure of the social development period” (of humanism), by means of rethinking the semantic value attached to the prefix *post*; the second assumes the revision of “the traditional account of what the human being/man means, in particular, or human, in general”, the third identifies the convergence of biology-technology.

In the light of such an inventorying proposed by Pepperell, the sense of the term *condition* indicates, in the context of attaching it to the posthuman, “the existential situation in which we found ourselves at the moment of the beginning of the posthuman era, fully aware of reaching this stage, of the energy/effervescence that the prefix *post* holds, when attached to the human”. If we were to establish a relationship between the *posthuman condition* and the syntagma *postmodern condition-post modernity condition*, one would immediately ascertain the preservation of the meaning of knowledge in the technologized societies, the changes imposed on the subject, and also the particularities of the recent versions of theorizing posthuman meta-narrations.

In Rosi Braidotti’s usage\(^ {42}\), the variations imposed by the prefix *post* that accord a specific meaning to the *posthuman condition* are maintained by the data attached to the “qualitative change of the basic reference point for the human species, for the social organizing and for interhuman relationships”. Braidotti uses posthuman theory as a “genealogical-navigational instrument”, a way of “exploring the forms of affirmative engagement with the present”, of “non-reductionist and critical understanding of empirically grounded characteristics”, deferring to the posthuman status the “dominant term of technologically mediated and globally connected societies”. An “instrument generating the rethinking of the basic and referential unit for the human”, posthuman theory reaffirms “the basic principles of non-human agents’ interactions on a planetary scale”\(^ {43}\).

To the stages identified by Pepperell, Braidotti proposes the association with *four vignettes* able to exemplify “the contradictions generated by the historical posthuman condition”, with roles in identifying: the limits of humanism and the registry of the anti-humanist critics – both contexts becoming central themes for posthumanist discussion; the new post anthropocentric approach stating, that, in a paradoxical way, the *posthuman condition* is generated by advanced capitalism, recommending, in response, various forms of ideological resistance; the preservation of “in-human moments”, the management and co-existence of bio-power and necropolises; civic responsibilities by means of a new type of knowledge and intellectual value. All these indications converge towards investing the *posthuman condition* with the status of an “alternative scheme of thinking, knowing and self-representation, of critical and creative thinking in the becoming process”\(^ {44}\).

From an alternative point of view, Braidotti identifies in the *posthuman condition* both the distancing from anti-humanism as well as the reconstruction of the posthumanist program on the basis of the anti-humanist legacy, of

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\(^ {43}\) Ibidem, p. 13.

\(^ {44}\) Ibidem, p. 21.
political-epistemological origins, of the poststructuralist generation. Contemporary posthumanist thinking sustains, therefore, three particular currents: the first, arising from moral philosophy, which articulates a form of reactive posthumanism; the second – a formula derived from studies in science and technology – assimilates the posthuman-analytical form; the third, drawn from the anti-humanist philosophy of subjectivity – proposes the reference point of critical posthumanism. Interested in the critical posthumanism, as own brand inventory, Braidotti offers and develops affirmative opinions regarding the posthuman subject, invested with relational valences and marked by multiplicity, differentiated, grounded and responsible, possessor of an acute sense collectively, relations, and preoccupied with the construction of communitarian approaches. These points ground the well-defined score of a “radical posthuman subjectivity”, based on the ethics of becoming, on moving the accent from the unity of subjectivity to a nomadic one, operating with the enlarged comprehension of the inter-connectivity of self-others (by others, meaning also non-humans) and by an affirmative recomposing of the human interaction. In Braidottian manner, “radical posthumanism transforms hybridity, nomadism, diasporas into means of re-establishing the claims regarding subjectivity, connections, and community.”

We cannot omit, in this context, the explicit warning of Andy Miah, according to which, it is impossible to operate with a perfect synonymy between the historical analysis of the posthumanism and the history of medical conquest/transformations, even if the philosophy of posthumanism questions the very legitimacy of the limitation of medical interventions to therapeutic applications. By extension, the history of posthumanism is neither similar to the history of technology, nor does it occur in philosophical surveys on technology: “technological change is an essential component of the contemporary imaginary dedicated to posthumanity, but nothing more, with only a contingent-history effect on posthuman ideas.”

Thus, the prefix post – attached to humanism calls for detachment from the meaning of the ended word, or relies on overcoming the biological-evolutionary human. For Miah, the history of posthumanism is partially a history of disagreements which expresses the value of human (medical) metamorphoses, and an inquiry regarding social conditions, a context/condition within which the need for justification of self-modification (through technology) became a necessary feature, defining contemporary socio-political processes.

The Biopolitics of Posthumanism: trans-/nomadic position

Rosi Braidotti value the essential coordinates that compose and prominently individualize both the context of development of bio-technologies, as well as the
effect of extrapolating the *bios* towards diverse areas of living organisms. Even if, from a contextual perspective, sexuality and reproduction are maintained as nodal-privileged points of biopower, calculation and a rational management of the living characterize a whole discourse and give the extent of open concerns/becomings of the present. Braidotti places the abovementioned predispositions either in the inflow of the postmodern condition with a taste for the dislocation of socio-temporal continuities (of Jamesonian origin), or in the schizoid temporal-Deleuzian sequences questioning the inextricably technological unity between life and death. Also, she considers that the tool, the weapon and the artefact (with the whole predisposition of poststructuralism for searching organic extensions in/through language) have been both counterfeited and diverted. *Homo sapiens* is compared with a *homo faber* slow, cumbersome, the processes and the universe of technology being animated by the elementary principle of prosthetics and projection prosthetics. According to Braidotti, primitive anthropomorphism is inserted into the technical universe; tools/instruments are, therefore, products of the creation of the human imagination, copies and multiplications/extensions of the potency of the human body.

Although with a status of extension/composition from the outside, technology fulfils the biological destiny of man by appealing to an “intimate act”, by the adaptation of the organic to the technical, by using the data of a reciprocal responsiveness manifested between biology and technology. The space of this investigated contamination is compared by Canguilhem and Foucault, to a/with a fertile soil, in/on which the discourse about biopower should be planted, both as a political reflection on the subject, as body incarnate, and as a bio-cultural entity *par excellence*. Moreover, Braidotti believes that the ramifications mentioned converge in establishing that the premises of technological-postmodernism do not trigger a scientific revolution, but an ideological one, marked by an economy of representation, whose cultural, legal, moral, and emotional attributes are characteristic for biopower: “the world of biopower is not marked by the sovereignty of the law, but also by prohibitions, rules and regulations that it overcomes, surpassing what used to be the law. The body is immediately and directly trapped in the effects of the field of power and in mechanisms whose legislation, when it is not archaic, is simply redundant”.

Braidotti proposes and, in equal measure, opposes (in the *becoming* of a historically given context) the interpretations of Foucault and Haraway, considering that Haraway analyses the contemporary scientific revolution in terms more radical than those of Foucault. Held accountable by the imperative of bringing the diagram of power up to date, by opposing the strategies of Foucaultian biopower to a genealogy of deconstructing feminine subjectivities, in the privacy of a psychopathological climate, the author concludes that the patriarchy of the capitalist system has become a complex contextual area, dominated by information technology. It reaffirms, therefore, a set of questionings about the implications

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50 *Ibidem*, pp. 43-44.
51 *Ibidem*, p. 52.
of the human in a posthuman world, rethinking the unity of a human subject deprived of its references to a system of human beliefs, devoid of dual oppositions, and set in a new dynamic of the self, able to substantiate the policies operating on the basis of coalitions and temporarily-mobile affinities.

The solution proposed by Braidotti is a double mechanical positioning. The first is aimed at transposition, as a means of adopting a balanced posture (on the background of a challenge of conservative positions, as a reflex of the liberation from the monopoly of moral philosophy, of Anglo-American origins), able to maintain and guide the interaction between/of moral philosophy and ethical post structuralism towards a nomadic sustainable ethics, which is filing the sum of ideas, rules, practices, communities and theoretical pedigrees.

The fundamental paradox of the current period lies precisely in the conflict germinated by the urgency of finding new ways and alternatives of policy and ethics, and by the perpetuation of the inertia and interests of real estate neo-conservatism. The latter would promote, in the analytical grid proposed by Fukuyama, a general engagement towards the new, similar to a gesture of rhetorical attention towards the way in which acquired interests can boost neoliberal-individualistic values and relations of power. The Braidottian transposition is “on the side of the forces of technology”, outlining their liberating and transgressive potential, as a mark of the alliance which moral philosophy offers to post-structuralist ethics. The articulation of a contextual transposition irrigates and stimulates the debate of ideas between Braidotti and Fukuyama, by evaluations (one sided – Braidotti) able to give preference to future becoming, without avoiding, however, the common denominator of a past beingness. For Braidotti, Fukuyama is perceived as “one of the most vocal champions of the contemporary conservative or neoliberal restoration”, “determined and strongly in favour of evolutionary psychology”, whose “crusade directed against postmodern French relativists” refines his “perverse talent of twisting the theory or the event”, until both – the theory and the event – seem to be compatible with the data of a reality already consumed/confirmed, and, thus, able to issue conclusions “about the inevitability of capitalism as a variant to the highest level of historical progress and human evolution”.

The evidence provided by contemporary science (molecular biology, genetics, and neurology) gives Fukuyama “new ammunition” for the dynamiting of constructivism’s social left and for the reaffirmation of faith in the features of the genetic human-universal. The intentions expressed by Fukuyama, from the position of “conservative pan-humanist neoliberalism” consist, according to Braidotti, in the reaffirmation of a status quo which includes traditional values, and in which the state is called upon to regulate (with convincing instruments – liberal principles) the “technologies of life”, asserting the primacy of “free choice, but within established limits”. The result has in mind a “soft eugenics”.

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52 Ibidem, p. 104.
as a choice and not as a coercive act. But, more than that, from the position of a neo-conservative thinker, Fukuyama proposes a rigid and serious modality, a combinatoric act between “scientific rationality and the fluidity of liberal individualism”, all this through a nostalgic approach, under the predilect influence of contemporary cultural technology\(^ {54} \).

The announced debate is maintained by Braidotti through the testing of her own theory, by an appeal to data from the real world, placed under the sign of a “policy of life”, corresponding to the power of \textit{bios/zoe}, a position which puts strong emphasis on the proliferation of the generative posthuman condition, valuing \textit{nomadic subjectivity} and thus launching a second element of its positioning mechanics: \textit{nomadic eco-philosophy}.\(^ {55} \) The position is fixed at the intersection of concerns regarding a rethinking of the contemporary subject, owner of a body which is accepted as posthuman gear, an approach with repercussions in the production of a management of life, annexed to the functioning of the posthuman. Valued centrally, the non-human factor is the expression of a posthuman rethinking of \textit{zoe}, which involves updating any data belonging to the symbiotic relationship between technologies and the body, and the need to deliver a \textit{bio-central egalitarianism} which, from the end of postmodernism, re-estimates distances: half-human-animal – non-human (the dominance of \textit{zoe}); half politico-discursive approach (the prevalence of \textit{bios}).\(^ {56} \)

Rethickening the strokes of the post-Foucault generation (either tributary to Foucault, or influenced by the success of his overcoming – a “group portrait” which does not forget N. Rose, G. Deleuze, F. Guattari and G. Agamben), Braidotti self-integrates the dynamics of Foucaultian \textit{updating}, considering it appropriate to introduce a set of new positions/positionings aimed at decreeing the technological organism, which has the marks of an ecological unit. Thus, the concept of the compound, obtained by the balanced conjoining – \textit{zoe-techno-body} – translates a relationship of interdependence with the environment, through a structure of flows and mutual transfers of data, configured by \textit{viral contamination} or by \textit{intensified interconnection}, with results in an “eco-philosophy of nomadic belonging, complex and multi-layered”. Reporting to the environment challenges the very coordinates of classic humanism and anthropocentrism: “the entity in the flesh feeds on, incorporates and transforms the environment. To be incorporated ecologically and technologically means to be immersed in the fields of flows and constant transformation”. Braidotti proposes as the subject of power, a \textit{bios I zoe} whose tireless force resides in trans-species egalitarianism, which validates a dimension disputed, on the one hand, by the balancing of forces, and, on the other hand, by the requests of ethology. Braidotti’s alternative refers precisely to the specific temporality of the subject as engine of evolution, possessing highlights of temporality embodied, subordinated both to a specific timetable of the genetic code, and to the genealogy of the temporal, featuring its own individual memories.

\(^ {54} \text{Ibidem, pp. 33-35.}\)
\(^ {55} \text{Ibidem, p. 36.}\)
\(^ {56} \text{Ibidem, pp. 37-38.}\)
Braidotti individualizes the complexity of the existential context of the subject embedded into bio-energy, a condition that requires new ethical values, but also involves the establishment of a policy agency, which will have the ability to reflect the changes/transformationsthat occurred, approaches that cannot be dissociated from the concept of power. This vision of the postmodern or the structure of advanced capitalism, which presents the data of the being/becoming of the report bios/zoe, betrays internal contradictions, for which Braidotti proposes a formula of remediation/accommodation through non-anthropocentric vitalism and the affirmative-productive force of posthumanism\(^{57}\).

The frame of reference remains post-Foucaultian, noting, as nodal points, milestones with key role: characterized by non-exteriority, the biopolitical object is invested with/taken over by new forms of power; biopower is shifted towards the space of bios and of vital zoe, both featuring the modelling force of social-contemporary spaces, highlighting the contiguous relationship established between the material mechanisms of formation for areas/objects and the processes of subjectivation. For Braidotti, life is not desiccated by bio-technology, but, rather, becomes its product and the result of its discourse practices. The subject of the political process extrapolates its coordinates until the integration of the non-human, in-human or posthuman into new constructs of the category of life; the debate as to who builds life and for what purpose, who has access to it and for what purpose\(^{58}\) remains essential. Hence, requests for critics of the social – not only to recognize, but also to challenge the nominated categories, in fact, to amplitudinally measure and inventory just the post-becomings of the living.

**Posthuman Biopolitics**

There are, in the shaping and articulation of the concept of posthuman biopolitics, a few aspects/particulars/details which individualize the détente of the characteristics mentioned. We note, thus, the persistence of an effort of clarification by bringing biopolitics up-to-date, by harnessing pivot theorists and by signalling conceptual-theoretical directions, willing to consider biopolitics as a theoretically essential landmark for the amount of references issued by the humanities and social sciences, a concept whose derivatives – biogleality, biocultures, biosociality, biocapital – incorporate various sides and angles, but also interpretative nodes able to solve/prevent the problems of political-philosophical activism. Therefore, biopolitics is decreed as productive term, as dissemination, but also confused conceptually\(^{59}\), meant to be optimized and subject to the political-educational economies of biocapitalism\(^{60}\), whose meanings derive from Foucaultian determinations and from Agambenian extensions. What transpires is

\(^{57}\) Ibidem, p. 42.

\(^{58}\) Ibidem, p. 55.

\(^{59}\) Catherine Mills, Biopolitics, Routledge, 2017.

\(^{60}\) C. Pierce, Education in the Age of Biocapitalism: Optimizing Educational Life for a Flat World, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
both an attitude of resistance, performative-conceptual\textsuperscript{61}, but also a double detente – either empirically-descriptive (of historic location, highlighting the biopolitics-biopower relationship; of detailing the rationality of the concept and insisting upon bio-political, ontologically grounded systems), or normative-critical, tendering the concept with positive-affirmative alternatives (Esposito, Negri).

As a conclusion, we decree as directing hypothesis of the present study the double formula validating the accreditation interference between biopolitics and posthumanism, in a nov context: the first expresses by the construct the biopolitics of posthumanism, an equality of meaning between the terms, each referring to the other, but without omitting the emergence of posthumanism in containing/holding the contextual data of a radical post-becoming and, by default, attributing the aspects of the bio-political directory narrative status to the posthuman condition; the second considers that by the primacy of the posthuman itself, concepts balance and, moreover, contaminate each other, by reference to each other, certifying, therefore, the prevalence of an evolutionary to be, as post-speculative being.

In the economy of the factions that make up the substance/content of scenarios designed by Richard Hayes\textsuperscript{62}, the combination posthuman biopolitics is projected on a tense ground (with libertarian-communitarian inflections), which illustrates alternatively, either one future, or another. Issued prospections are covering: the libertarian triumph of transhumanism [combinatoric act of social individual values and the free market with genetic technologies, with a role of anticipation for a posthuman trajectory/direction, remounting ideologically by lengthening and deepening non-ideologic property (science, technology, individual rights)]; appraisal of the parity – one family, one future (without omitting responses to address the new genetic technologies, driven to a neo-traditionalist direction and positioned against modernity and post-modernity); the nightmarish competition for the supremacy and dominance of technoeugenics; directioning towards the application of the slogan for the Common Good (by valuing the central role of democratic institutions, informed by values of equality, of social justice and of the community, able to establish cultural norms and to decide legal limits in supporting scientific research, but also by the prohibition of its use for purposes which endanger/threaten human health). More than simple projections, the responses offered to current challenges are characterized by an extra-opening of semantics, through the incorporation and practical use of new terms/concepts, to the list of which announced scenarios subsume cloning, cryonics, the new applied eugenics, gene doping/therapy, germline modification, nanotechnology, ovarian surges syndrome, sex selection, stem cells, synthetic biology\textsuperscript{63} – valuing a terminology that is insinuating and inserting a swivel in the construct of current language.

\textsuperscript{61} S. E. Wilmer, Audronė Žukauskaitė (Eds.), Resisting Biopolitics: Philosophical, Political, and Performative Strategies, Routledge, 2016.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibidem.
The future is therefore reviewed from the privacy of the projections attached to the human and the citizen, as the biotech alternatives are not interested in perfecting the human or creating a perfect posthuman, but in getting results for prevention, treatment and offering reversible solutions to dysfunctions previously without treatment. The posthuman asks to be accepted as a context for the production of a new system of will and desires, impregnated by the directorate of correction and treatment of the irreversible, managing, as an essential act, the policy of self-improvement.

Ronald Bailey places posthumanity under the sign of the ideological, marked by fear – *Who’s Afraid of Posthumanity?* – an excellent questioning location that sends, allusively, to an Albee-ian context, by exposing uncomfortable feelings and reporting to extended-complicated situations, or over-sealed, intellectual-scientific ones. It is found that this also works in the case of the posthuman, a reflex prefixoid cloaking of the structural term – *human* –, confirming the unknown détente, impossible to decipher until the end of the given condition/contextualization. The context is auto-delivered as competitive construct a benchmark for the transformation of the academic-scientific environment, a product/outcome, but also a chorus apt to give the measure of a future euphorizing rhythm. The element that works in the play of Edward Albee, as a substitute of the homophone relationship Wolf – Woolf expresses, in the context of posthumanity, the thresholds of posthumanist tolerance, fulfilment and habituation with/to the data of a currently uncomfortable, and, also, incommoding present.

*Posthuman (recombinatory) security*

Referring, in the analysis, to the triple architectural approach of *We need to defend society – Security, Territory, Population* – and – *The birth of biopolitics*, the volume *Foucault on Politics, Security and War* captures the contradictory and provisional ways which Foucault applies to the inventory of modern power, without insisting (in excess) on the review of the above-mentioned texts, intending only to use the method of re-problematization, through the essential “waiver of new issues”.

The real object of the Foucaultian lectures is the conceptualization of biopolitics attached to the genesis of political economy, through generating an interest for the principles of political parties and towards new forms of development of the mechanisms of power and governance, all of them agreeing, in the opinion of Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, on a “single shaft traced around a single issue”.

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Foucault on Politics, Security and War sees, through *Security, Territory, Population* a specific meaning for the way in which modern politics is viewed as a way of extending war, amending Foucault’s inability of organizing a set of lectures – the French philosopher refusing to deviate, in the second lecture, from explaining the causality war – security. Didier Bigo insists that the issue of security – reported to war – is not really discussed by Foucault, leaving the impression of a renunciation of the theme of war and, subsequently, even the subject of security. Foucault’s expediency and indifference are subjective factors that are blocking his approach due to some stagnant points, unable to provide new explanations. Security does not constitute a fundamental policy objective; Foucault’s innovation lies, however, in the attention deferred to his dispositif de sécurité – a neutral concept, equidistant from the issue of protection and conservation, with reference to the population (and less to the people), unconcerned with acts of volition, but with statistics, patterns and behavioural regularities: “Foucault’s security has less to do with certainty than with contingency”, being subsumed to calculations of the probable and, thus, the only operation available for Foucault becomes one of historicity and presentation, with maximum attention paid to the governance of security. “As a dispositif de sécurité, security is a set of mechanisms through which the biopolitical imperative is operationalized at the government level. Then, these themes disappear from his lectures”68.

The volume dedicated to Foucault misses the very opinion at the start of Foucaultian research – “this year I’d like to begin the study of what I called, a little jokingly, bio-power, i.e. the series of phenomena which seems to me quite important, I mean the ensemble of mechanisms through which what, in the human species, constitute the traits of its fundamental biological, will be able to enter inside a policy, a political strategy, a general strategy of power”69 – of scoring policies for a “certain number of sentences”, equivalent to indications of the option – which will not adhere to any principles, rules or theorems.

The study proposed by Foucault, premeditated and voluntary, is in itself, *just a beginning of theory*, from analysis/analysing of the mechanisms of priming of power, pointing to information on the global perspective of society, and of its subsequent folding on the history of economic transformations: “but after all what I do (...) is neither history, nor sociology, nor economics, (...), but the policy of truth (...) the role of showing what are the effects of knowledge produced in our society by the fights, the confrontations, the clashes which unfold in it and the tactics of power that are the elements of this fight”70. All of these are, of course, subsumed under the imperative of “not making politics/policy”.

Thus, Foucaultian *indications of option* value its status with enlightening examples, dosed in three times, with explicit reference to the theme of security:

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68 Ibidem, pp. 11-12.
70 Ibidem, p. 12.
rhythm 1 aimed at simple criminal law, interdict followed by punishment – as a legal/juridical mechanism of levelling a type of prohibited action with its punishment; rhythm 2 has valences of the framing of the assembly in a series of private processes – supervision, inspections, observations, various landmarks which allow the preventive identification of the crime scene (even if not yet committed) – as a mechanism for disciplinary action, interested in the establishment of the culprit and enforcement of the law beyond the legislative act itself; rhythm 3 displays the duplication matrix described by/with a series of questions aimed at statistics, optimal choices, costs, comparisons – as a mechanism of the device of security, concerned about the series of probable events and reactions to them.\(^71\)

There are, in the words of Foucault, complex structures which include elements of the archaic, modern and contemporary, providing the measure of a rhythmicity able to establish the fact that “contemporary developments put into question the problem in an essential way, in terms of security”. The approach takes into consideration the “society of security, the actual existence of the general economy of power, with a form dominated by security technology, with overflight studying of the premises by security, with randomness, with a normalizing and disciplinary emergence of the reality of the population”. Security is trying to set up an environment depending on events or series of events/adjusted series on a multivalent and transformable frame, with the entry of the temporal and randomness in a given space.

The environment transmits, in Foucaultian manner, the action at a distance of a body on another, with the status of support and circulatory element of the action, of sum of the number of effects, or equivalent to a field of intervention, with reference to the multiplicity of individuals biologically connected through the materiality within which there is: “this eruption of the naturalness of the human species inside the political artificiality of relations of power is something fundamental, and I’ll send, to finish, just to a text (Jean-Baptiste Moheau, Research on the population, our note) of the one who has been, without a doubt, the first great theorist of what you might call biopolitics, bio-power”\(^72\) (the Foucaultian reference insists on “the problem of the sovereign, that has to do with nature, with interference, with the interweaving of the geographical environment, the physical climate”, exercising their power in the point of articulation of where the environment becomes a determinant framework of nature).

In the breakdown of security devices, the relationship of the government with the event remains essential for Foucault. If the problem/problematization of the event is clarified by the example of shortage, driven to a state of rarity and a horizon of philosophic and political thinking about the misery of the inevitable, the philosophic moral array, the “evil nature”, Foucault relates the security device to that model which the physiocrats and the economists of the XVIII\(^{th}\)

\(^72\) Ibidem, p. 30.
century created to explain shortage; and, if discipline is centripedic, if it isolates space and determines a segment by concentration, closure and regulatory absolutes, then security devices expand, integrate new elements, are centrifugal, the disciplinary mechanism having just an encoding and prescriptive role. Without giving up on the conceptualization of security, Foucault comments on the connection location which the concept relates to the issue of population: “security has as a function to support the details, which will not be evaluated as good or bad, which will be accepted as necessary, unavoidable processes, as natural processes, in a broad sense, and will rely on these details that are what they are, so will be considered as relevant because it is located at the level of the population”\textsuperscript{73}. If discipline normalizes, disciplinary normalization consists in the plotting of an optimal model, built according to a particular result, its intention being to induce/impose compliance with the model, highlighting the transition from the norm to the normal-abnormal report, “through a standardization over normalization”\textsuperscript{74}.

Michael Dillon\textsuperscript{74} proposes to re-actualize Foucault, by updating him in order to position biopolitics within the limits of the posthuman context, as the act/process accompanying the digitization and molecularization of life, pointing out the changes of registry which converge towards affirmative biopolitics, the creation of life which Dillon attributes to the biopolitics of security, without missing or minimizing the relationship biopolitics-governmentality-security. In itself, the report aims to a double inflection felt from recombination biopolitics and the securization of “pluripotent life”, but also from the freedom that propagates the biopolitics of security\textsuperscript{76}. Changing lifestyles, insists Dillon, imprints with directional plus-sense the regime and register of biopolitics, having as subject life itself, operating an effect of multiplication and complication the XVIII\textsuperscript{th} century context so envied by Foucault.

Molecular science possesses a new/different reality, blasting the intersections of life with death, including the centre, lives on the edge, and turning them into formulas of biopolitcized relations of power, which constantly concern biopolitical governmentality. Recombination forms of biopolitics imply a harmonious dosing of requests on pre- and post-life, both endowed with the vocation to create and sustain life, with a plurivalent combining of all materialities (organic and inorganic): “recombinant biopolitics is the biopolitics of the molecular age, because all that matters here is not simply the molecular structure of life, but the massive advance that has been made in exposing the mechanisms of heterogeneity as such; what in truth gives life to the molecular age”\textsuperscript{77}. The field of regenerative medicine holds the formula that marks the data and the coordinates of a nov context in which scientific knowledge no longer represents

\textsuperscript{73} Ibidem, p. 49.  
\textsuperscript{74} Ibidem, p. 55.  
\textsuperscript{75} Michael Dillon, Biopolitics of Security: A Political Analytic of Finitude, Routledge, 2015.  
\textsuperscript{77} Ibidem, p. 286.
the truth of life, no longer states the ambition to manipulate life forms, but
requires, as a philosophy and policy of its own, the objective to control and
command the morphogenetic process itself: life is equated to pluripotency, and
the object of biopower becomes concerned not only by the strategies of
resilience, self-repair and regeneration, but also by extending the investigative
approach on new forms of life. What is felt is a sense of non-prophylactic
attached security practices, informed by the understanding of living matter and
reported to the force and morphogenesis fields, whose guiding principle is not
so much the attribute of protection/protecting, but the act of regeneration, and
whose object requires to be transformed, rather than preserved. The principle of
insurance is paramount (similar to generation and manipulation) correlating
contingencies between events and the processes by which life forms
metamorphose and become/morph. The concern of recombinant biopolitics has
in view the securing of living material in its “intrinsic pluripotency”, as the
“transformation event”. Profound changes of the economy of biopolitical
security concern “the act of securing by instantiating a savings to the general
quota in all the processes that affect the existence of the species as a whole”78.

The biopolitical substance attached to the security domain irrigates, in
Foucaultian style, modern conceptions with regard to the heterogeneity and the
problematic discourses of modern power. But, more than that, the invitation of
Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero lies not only in the prerogative of
responding to the Foucaultian perspective through updating, through continued
implementation of concepts to new contexts in the field, but by the act of
theoretical location beyond79 Foucault, especially in regard to the double
relationship power-knowledge, freedom-security80.

Contemporary uses of biopolitics (far from clarifying its meaning) recombine
the meanings of the term, emphasizing its reflexive dimension, the ability to
refer to the data policy of inclusion/exclusion, reattaching an extra abstraction to
it and enhancing interest in the object of scientific knowledge, administrative
requests and the détente of technical development. The policy remains tributary-
dependent upon processes of life that cannot be regulated and whose self-
regulatory capacity, targeting the mechanisms of indirect incitement and
directioning, of prevention and foresight, moralization and normalization, by
prescribing and prohibiting, by discipline and supervision, through activation
and animation81, in fact, by accommodating biopolitics to the condition of the
posthuman and by reconsidering the security attached to the nov context called.

78 Ibidem, p. 289.
79 Is necessary, here, to clarify a theoretical framework created under the sign of the two prepositions-
guidelines: an after temporal, interested in changes in the conception of political power post-Foucault, a
context relieved of the politicization inflections attached to the areas of practice and knowledge [here, the task
of resuming the act of delimitation and contextualization of political Foucaultian theory – see, in this regard,
John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, Anne Phillips (eds.), Power After Foucault, in “The Oxford Handbook of Political
Theory”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008]; and a beyond Foucault, with a role in the intensification of
conceptions of power, which imprints a supra-role to the political mutations of the term (see, Jeffrey T. Nealon,
80 Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero, p. 290.
Technological plus-value attached to the meaning of biopolitics elasticizes the context of the conjugation of natural bio-facts with artificial artefacts for rethinking moral-legal codes, rectifying bio-objects and operating a reassessment process of synthetic procedures attached to life – genetically modified organisms, embryos fertilized in vitro, stem and pluripotent cells. In fact, it redelivers the updated data of genopolitics as a mechanism of reduction of politics to the foundations of the biological, a Foucaultian concept which allows a rethinking of the genetics of behaviour, with appeal to anthropological presuppositions, with explicit politico-ideological consequences: the genome explains political behaviour, reducing biopolitics to a limited horizon, unboosted culturally, socially, philosophically and politically.

The opinion which shall be inserted in the perimeter of the actual concerns a tactile biopolitics (germinated from the connection of anthropology with the history of the sensorium), corresponding to the approach launched by bio-engineering with the aim to decide/impose the limits of the social-pragmatic, through the valorisation of biological citizenship, reaffirmed through micropolitical action. In the context of revaluating decisions and of the implication/implications of the species – no imperative corresponds/responds only to the self [human] – cosmopolitics accredits, with validating respect, the direction of adjustment with/to private requests by their new definition/defining, and the posthuman invests with meaning the policies of bio-remediation, through a discourse that departs from the self and is addressed to the multiplied variants of the other.

Attached to the policy of sensory-human involvement, the posthuman centralizes the creative possibilities and combinatorial values – assumptions – beliefs relating to culture and society, through a resignification of the being, embodied in the incorporation of the experience of the subject of becomings/new ways of being human, featuring new forms of power and knowledge.

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